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
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THE HIGHWAY OF GOD



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# THE HIGHWAY OF GOD

A STUDY IN SOME CONTEMPORARY  
MOVEMENTS IN AFRICA AND THE EAST

BY  
KATHLEEN HARNETT  
AND  
WILLIAM PATON

*(Missionary Secretaries of the Student Christian Movement)*

LONDON :  
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## PREFACE

THIS book has been written in response to a need which has, for some time, been felt by members of the Student Christian Movement in several Universities, for a general statement, in outline, concerning the main forces at work in the countries of Asia and Africa, with special reference to the influence of the Christian spirit and the building up of the Christian Church. So wide a survey involves the necessity for compressing half a dozen great subjects within the limits of each single chapter. We have faced and accepted this necessity and its attendant dangers of superficiality and "scrappiness," and we can only hope that, in so far as we have failed wholly to escape such a danger, the readers of this book will fill up what is lacking in it by reference to some of the other works suggested, at the end of each chapter, for further reading. The reason why two chapters have been given to China, whereas the other countries have one each, is that, in spite of the great importance of political, social and religious developments in the country since the Revolution, very little has been written recently, in popular form, which gives to the ordinary reader an impression of the general situation in China. The scantiness of existing materials for the study of this subject has made apparent to us the need for a somewhat fuller treatment of it than is accorded to those other countries, concerning which more literature is available.

The size and scope of this book forbid any attempt at a systematic treatment of the non-Christian religions. For this, again, reference must be made to those who speak and write with authority on the various religions. We have touched upon the non-Christian faiths only in their relation to national and social life.

We feel keenly the handicap that is imposed upon us by our lack of actual, personal experience of life abroad. We should not, under the circumstances, have felt justified in undertaking our task, had we been forced to rely solely upon books, periodicals and published papers for our information and our impressions. We have, however, been able to rely for help, not only on such things as these, but also on the information and guidance which has been given us by many who speak with first-hand authority on the various countries we have surveyed. Some of these men and women, to whom we acknowledge our great debt of gratitude, have written at length, in answer to our questions, from overseas; others have helped us through conversations in this country.

We especially wish to thank the Rev. E. D. Lucas, Dr. Nicol Macnicol, Mr. K. T. Paul, the Rev. G. E. Phillips, the Rev. B. C. Sircar, and the Rev. F. J. Western, for help in connection with the chapter on India. For the chapters on China we are indebted to the Rev. W. Nelson Bitton, Dr. Cheng Ching-yi, the Rev. R. K. Evans, the Rev. P. J. MacLagan, the Rt. Rev. Bishop Roots and Mr. J. B. Tayler; for the chapter on Japan, to Mr. Galen M. Fisher, Miss Michi Kawai, Professor K. S. Latourette, the Rev. J. C. Mann and Dr. A. K. Reischauer. For information and advice on the subject of the Moslem World we thank Canon W. H. T. Gairdner, the Rt. Rev. Bishop Linton, the Rev. J. L. Macintyre, the Rev. R. F. McNeile, Dr. Walter Miller, Miss C.

Padwick, Dr. H. U. W. Stanton and Dr. S. M. Zwemer. The Rev. A. J. Haile, the Rev. H. D. Hooper, and Dr. Norman Leys have given help with the chapter on Africa. Finally we desire to thank the Church Missionary Society, the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, and the London Missionary Society for supplying us with books and periodicals from their libraries, and we gratefully acknowledge the courtesy of Mr. J. H. Oldham and Miss Gollock, of the *International Review of Missions*, in allowing us access to the "missionary archives" of Edinburgh House.

K.M.H.

W.P.

London,

*November, 1920.*





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## INTRODUCTION

ALWAYS and everywhere men have been looking to find God in their own human life and its setting. The sense of something divine and eternal woven into the texture of the life of nature and of the short-lived business of men has been the foundation alike of natural religion and of creative art. It is the common heritage of the sun worshipper, of the unknown poet who first told the secret of the woods in the story of Pan's pipes, and of the ordinary man and woman to-day, caught for a moment out of the matter of fact routine of existence into an eternal world, by the arch of a great roof, by a group of children in a South London street, by the face of someone sitting opposite in the tube, by a voice singing or a door shutting.

But in human experience these links between God and the world have not proved wholly satisfactory. More than to glimpse in and through the everyday world a "glory everlasting," men have needed the assurance of a living, acting, Person, into whose hands they could trust themselves and in whose fellowship they could feel themselves to be at home in the universe, even when all vision failed. This assurance has, as a matter of history, been attained to, in varying degree, by different nations and individuals all over the world. Pre-eminently, the Hebrew people, through the years of their wanderings and wars and captivities, became sure beyond all doubt of this one fact—that they were in the hands of a supreme guide and God. As a nation and as individuals they came certainly to know that they were not mere witnesses of some divine beauty and splendour, momentarily breaking through the clouds, but that they were themselves

children of God, led by and acting with Him in the fulfilment of His purpose in history. The metaphor in which this conviction was expressed varied with the different prophets who voiced it. Sometimes God is spoken of as the Over-ruler, sitting high above the heavens, and yet stooping to consider the sons of men, judging between the nations and protecting the chosen people.

The Lord is in his holy temple,  
The Lord, his throne is in heaven ;  
His eyes behold, his eyelids try, the children of men.  
(Ps. 11.)

The counsel of the Lord standeth fast for ever.  
The thoughts of his heart to all generations.  
Blessed is the nation whose God is the Lord,  
The people whom he hath chosen for his own inheritance. . .  
There is no king saved by the multitude of an host :  
A mighty man is not delivered by great strength.  
A horse is a vain thing for safety ;  
Neither shall he deliver any by his great power.  
Behold the eye of the Lord is upon them that fear him,  
Upon them that hope in his mercy,  
To deliver their soul from death,  
And to keep them alive in famine.

(Ps. 33.)

Sometimes God is a warrior-chief, leading to victory, sometimes a master with his servant, sometimes a potter moulding the clay, sometimes a father calling to his children.

When Israel was a child, then I loved him, and called my son out of Egypt. . . . I taught Ephraim to go ; I took them on my arms ; but they knew not that I healed them. I drew them with cords of a man, with bands of love. " (Hosea xi.)

But most characteristic of all is the metaphor of the shepherd and his flock.

Give ear, O Shepherd of Israel,  
Thou that leadest Joseph like a flock.

(Ps. 80.)

So he was their saviour. In all their affliction he was afflicted, and the angel of his presence saved them ; in his love



and in his pity he redeemed them ; and he bare them and carried them all the days of old. . . . As the cattle that go down into the valley, the spirit of the Lord caused them to rest ; so didst thou lead thy people, to make thyself a glorious name." (Isaiah 63.)

This sense of divine guidance in history has, in a lesser degree and on a lower scale, influenced the thought of many nations. The serious practical consequences that have, from time to time, resulted from the warping of this sense by pride or prejudice are at least a testimony to its strength.

But for most people to-day belief in what our grandfathers called " Divine Providence " has become very difficult. Partly this is due to the untrue and unjustifiable ascription by a certain school of piety of *all* human events to the direct working of God. The blasphemy that could attribute a high rate of infant-mortality to the " Providence of God," and could say resignedly of slums and slavery " Thy will be done," has made reaction against any form of belief in God's over-ruling almost inevitable. The events of the last six years in Europe have again inevitably helped to swing the pendulum further in this direction.

But, for the Christian, there can and must be no permanent failure of faith in the working of God in history. In spite of the present state of the world, it is still possible, though at times difficult, to think with Burke of history as " the known march of the ordinary Providence of God." For the life and death of Jesus Christ have fulfilled for all time the instinct of the artist for the momentarily revealed divinity of common life, and the trust of the Hebrew in a transcendent, guiding God. In His likeness to ordinary men, Jesus has made us sure that God's spirit is indeed in ordinary men and women, the street artist on a Bloomsbury pavement, and the girl in a

Japanese factory. The Kingdom of God on earth, to which Jesus came to call men, means the transfiguration of the common life of men by the splendour of that eternal world whose gleams lighten every man. Through the very fact that Jesus *came* among men, through His personality and His teaching, He has made us sure for ever that God is more than an eternal unchanging truth and beauty, in that He is the father of His people, actively loving and guiding them, and though they rebel and fight against Him, still working through them, and giving Himself for them. The doctrine of the Incarnation at least means this. It makes history a *real* thing—not a mere purposeless sequence of events, not a long lane without turning or ending, leading nowhere; but the highway along which God walks with His children towards some consummation of purpose and effort which, in its fulness, they cannot apprehend, but towards whose achievement they can dimly mark stages of progress.

What follows in this book rests upon this belief in the reality and meaning of human history. An attempt will be made to do two things. In the first place it is intended to trace some of the outstanding movements in thought and event which are now in progress in the countries of Africa and the East. Within the wider manifestation of God's working, in the general life—political, social, economic and religious—of these countries, an attempt will be made, in the second place, to trace the progress and upbuilding of the Christian Church, which, to a Christian, must reveal, in a very special and direct way, the acts of God in history. The last chapter will try to show why, in the opinion of the authors, the extension of the knowledge of Jesus Christ and the upbuilding of His church is of absolutely fundamental importance to the life of the world.

There is an obvious disadvantage in writing a book which concerns itself mainly, if not exclusively, with the study of non-European countries, and with the progress of Christianity in them. It is easy, by this concentration of interest on Africa and the East, to appear forgetful of the state of Christendom and of the appalling need for its conversion to the principles of Jesus Christ. But though forgetfulness of this may be apparent, it is most certainly not real in the minds of the authors. "Un-Christian Christendom," to use a phrase that has lately become common, is the background against which this book is written. Wherever possible, and it is frequently possible, attempts will be made to show the influence of Christendom's sub-Christian commerce and politics and social life on the thought and lives of Indians and Chinese and Japanese and Africans, particularly in relation to their impressions of what is to them the "western religion." The impossibility of writing a book about the whole world and the progress of Christianity therein, makes some choice of subject, some geographical division, a necessity. The division customary to "missionary" books has in this case been followed, firstly because it is based on a certain historic fact—*i.e.*, that Christianity has been rooted in and has undeniably coloured the civilisation of Christendom for many hundreds of years—and secondly, because the division harmonises with an important fact of the existing situation —*i.e.*, the maintenance abroad by Europe and America of large numbers of their finest Christian men and women in the service of the Church of Christ.

When this has been said, it is only possible again to emphasise the fundamental unity of the whole Christian enterprise, both beyond and within Christendom. Though we may write books on

one country or another, there is in actual practice no country to-day which can live to itself. The setting up of the International Labour Organisation under the League of Nations testifies, on the economic side, to this fact. It is now realised that labour conditions in China and Japan have an intimate bearing upon labour problems in Great Britain and America. The report of a recent meeting\* in Lahore, to mourn the death of the Lord Mayor of Cork, and to express sympathy with Ireland, illustrates the international influence of any political movement. Facts like these weaken equally the position of the man who holds that it is right and possible to concentrate all Christian efforts on Christendom and to let "foreign missions" wait, and of the man who seems able to forget that the Christianising of the social and international life of the West is an integral part of the foreign missionary effort. Someone has said that it is part of the Christian genius to undertake new tasks before the old ones are finished. History not only shows that this has in fact been so, but it also reveals most clearly the wisdom that inspired this courage.

The only really important objection that can be made to Christian missions to-day is that Christianity is not universally true, and that the world, as a whole, does not *need* Jesus Christ. In order to find an answer to the first part of this objection, the student must be prepared to go, far beyond the scope of this book, into the region of philosophy and of the comparative study of religion. But throughout this book, and more especially in the last chapter, an attempt will be made to suggest some thoughts which may lead to an answer to the question—whether or no the secret of human life and history be in the keeping of Jesus Christ.

\* *The Times*, Nov. 4th, 1920.

# THE HIGHWAY OF GOD

## CHAPTER I

### INDIA

ON August 20th, 1917, the Secretary of State for India made the following announcement in the House of Commons :

The policy of His Majesty's Government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire. They have decided that substantial steps in this direction should be taken as soon as possible. . . .

At the beginning of September, 1920, little more than three years after the former pronouncement was made in London, the Indian National Congress, met in special session in Calcutta, passed by 1,826 votes to 804, the following resolution :

In view of the fact that on the Khilafat question, both Indian and Imperial Governments have signally failed in their duty towards the Musalmans of India and the Prime Minister has deliberately broken his pledged word given to them, and that it is the duty of every non-Moslem Indian in every legitimate manner to assist his Musalman brother in his attempt to remove the religious calamity that has overtaken him, and in view of the fact that in the matter of the events of April, 1919, both the said Governments have grossly neglected or failed to protect the innocent people of the Punjab and punish the officers guilty of unsoldierly and barbarous behaviour towards them and have exonerated Sir Michael O'Dwyer, who proved himself directly or indirectly responsible for most of



the official crimes and callous to the sufferings of the people placed under his administration, and that the debate in the House of Commons and especially in the House of Lords betrayed a woeful lack of sympathy with the people of India and showed virtual support of the systematic terrorism and frightfulness adopted in the Punjab, and that the latest Viceregal pronouncement is proof of entire absence of repentance in the matters of the Khilafat and the Punjab—

This Congress is of opinion that there can be no contentment in India without redress of the two aforementioned wrongs, and the only effectual means to vindicate national honour and to prevent a repetition of similar wrongs in future is the establishment of Swarajya.\*

This Congress is further of opinion that there is no course left open for the people of India but to approve of and adopt the policy of progressive non-violent non-co-operation until the said wrongs are righted and Swarajya is established.

The resolution goes on to advocate a progressive boycott of the Government, beginning with the abandonment of honours and titles and attendance at Government leveés, and proceeding with the withdrawal of pupils from schools and colleges aided or controlled by Government, the boycott of the courts by lawyers and litigants, refusal of service in Mesopotamia, boycott of the new reformed Councils by both candidates and voters, and ultimately a complete boycott of foreign goods. There is a final section advocating the development of Indian cloth and cotton mills, and also the encouragement of spinning and weaving in the homes of the people.

The actual scheme of non-co-operation, though opposed, at least in part, by much of the most weighty Indian political opinion, is not to be lightly dismissed as mere froth. Behind it there is Mr. M. K. Gandhi, perhaps the most remarkable figure in India to-day, and one of the most remarkable figures in the world. He is an ascetic, deeply imbued with the ancient Indian ideals of life, utterly unselfish and unworldly, utterly courageous, and with a long

\* Home Rule.



record of service behind him. It is not too much to say that he is deeply revered by millions. The movement he has initiated may, as a concrete scheme, entirely break down, but it is none the less deeply significant that such a movement could develop on the very eve of the inauguration of the Government of India reforms scheme. It indicates a very widespread and deep-rooted resentment against British rule and distrust of the honesty and goodwill of the Government. This resentment and distrust are not new, but their volume and keenness have immensely grown during the last two years. "The Country is thoroughly disgusted with the present Government of India, here and in England, and though it feels that non-co-operation is the 'most foolish of all foolish schemes,' it does not dare to set itself openly against it, in view of its being conceived as a means—though a futile one—of demonstrating the resentment which the country undoubtedly feels for the unredressed wrongs inflicted on it."\*

To what causes are we to attribute these developments? The Gandhi motion, quoted above, puts two things in the forefront, the Punjab terror of April, 1919, and the Turkish question. A short discussion of these two issues may show what lies beneath, and reveal to us some of the deeper currents that are moving in Indian life.

There is no need here to recall in detail or to discuss the riots in the Punjab and the measures taken by the military authorities, with the support of the Punjab Government, to suppress them. The action of General Dyer at Amritsar was condemned (in varying degrees of intensity) by the Hunter Commission of Inquiry, by His Majesty's Government, by the House of Commons, by a large proportion of the

\* *Indian Social Reformer*, September 12th, 1920. *The Reformer* is one of the most moderate and balanced papers in India.

most influential missionaries in India, and by Indian opinion of every shade and type. It was apparently endorsed by the House of Lords, and by the spoken or unspoken attitude of a large number of British residents in India. It is not merely a question of whether enough or too much force was used in a given emergency. India feels that there has been revealed in the Amritsar shootings and floggings, and in the methods of operation of martial law in many places in the provinces, in the widespread European approval of them (as well as in what, to Indian minds, is the half-hearted disapproval exhibited by the Home Government) an attitude of contempt for India and Indians, of denial to Indians of the rights of human beings, and determination to put the security of the British Raj before any consideration for India herself. Violence has been done to the soul of India. The Reform scheme, it is admitted, breathes another spirit, but we can understand any Indian patriot feeling that Amritsar expresses more truly than Westminster the attitude of Britain to India.

The Turkish issue is more subtle. There is something *prima facie* absurd in a man with Mr. Gandhi's life-long record of resistance to violent methods supporting the claim of Turkey to her dominion over subject races. Moreover, it is the merest nonsense to say that any religious calamity is entailed upon Indian Moslems because Turkish suzerainty is diminished. Granted that Moslems may feel concerned for Turkey (for reasons we have explained elsewhere)\* why should Hindus join with them? It is here that the real issue is reached. Turkey is not only the last great Moslem Power, she is the last purely Oriental Power. Japan, with her industrialism and her education, no longer belongs wholly to the East. If Turkey goes under,

\* See Chapter V.

dismembered by the Christian Powers of Europe, with America standing by, it seems to many Indian minds like a symbol of the complete victory of the materially successful, dominating West, over the peoples of the East. Therefore, let every Indian, Hindu as well as Musalman, assert himself in the cause of Turkey, if he does not want to yield finally to the forces of Western power and civilisation. This feeling, or something like it, lies at the back of the " Khilafat " \* movement.

The consciousness of national dignity, and the self-assertion of the East against the encroaching West, are the two main facts that issue from our discussion, and these have been the fundamental factors in Indian Nationalism throughout its history. They have shown themselves in the constant demand for free entry into the Indian Civil Service, and into fully commissioned rank in the army, in the countenance given to, or the abstention from condemnation of patriots, who were definitely seditious or even revolutionary. They have been strengthened by every act of individuals or of the Government which showed or was taken as showing, that Indians were regarded as " subjects " of the British people.

Indian thinkers and politicians do not believe that the English will ever with full willingness admit their claims of national dignity, or refrain from encroachment on the rights of the peoples of the East.

## I

The modern Indian spirit is a combination of several influences. There is, first, the ancient religious and social heritage of India. We say " religious and social " because the two things are

\* *i.e.*, Caliphate, see p. 114.

woven together in a way that is perhaps unique in the world. Religion enters into the very texture of daily life in India. Both the small actions of everyday private and family life and the greatest institutions of society are founded on religious precept and enjoined by sacred rule. It is because of this that Hinduism is the most difficult religion in the world to reduce to system. It is the record of the religious development of the Indian people. Its inner unity is not formal and logical like that of Islam; it is historical. In the different elements which enter into Hinduism, in the very inconsistencies of Hindu practice, we can see different movements at work in the long history of India, all leaving their mark on the religious thought and life of the nation.

Indians are justifiably proud of the religious and philosophical history of India. It is not necessary to believe that Plato borrowed from the Upanishads, but there can be no doubt of the completeness and splendour of the Indian philosophical tradition. There has never been a more ruthlessly logical exposition of pure pantheism than is contained in the Vedanta. Nor can one doubt the depth and reality of the religious devotion which is shown in the *bhakti*\* schools, and in a wealth of religious literature in the different popular tongues of India. Nor again can we under-estimate the religious genius of a people which instinctively honours the homeless ascetic, the *sadhu* or *sannyasi*, and only yields its unreserved devotion to those who make it plain to all men that they care nothing for the power or gain that this life can give them. If an Indian is proud of Indian religious history, it is this that he has in mind, and we can understand something of his jealous regard for it.

On the social side, the institutions of caste and of the family are founded on religious ideas, and in

\* Bhakti = personal devotion.

their present form date back for many centuries. India has suffered invasion at the hands of several foreign powers, and endured the political domination of foreigners of alien faith, but her social institutions have not greatly changed. The system whereby the different members of the family, including a much larger circle of kinsfolk than we commonly regard as a family unit in the West, are knit together into a close fellowship, acknowledging responsibility for one another, is one of the most important facts in Indian life. It has been criticised as weakening the power of initiative in the individual, but it undoubtedly produces an immensely strong social unit. An Indian who has been brought up in a normal Hindu home is the creature of one of the most strongly marked and characteristic systems in the world, and one in which religious history and tradition are woven closely with every strand of domestic life.

It is the same with caste, which, like such features of the family system as child-marriage, is now suffering vigorous criticism from Indian educated and reforming opinion. Caste is not merely a social growth. It is a religious conception and defended on religious grounds. It governs the main divisions of Indian society, it invests with spiritual significance the state of life into which a man is born, and it serves, for both good and evil, as a powerful uniting force throughout the whole social system, while maintaining the several parts of it in separation. It is responsible for some of the most glaring evils of Indian life, such as the condition of the fifty million out-castes, and the prohibition of inter-dining and inter-marriage (now gradually breaking down) between members of different castes. We are here concerned with caste in its aspect as a vital element in the Indian tradition, and it is an important and significant fact that in spite of the strong attacks



levelled against caste by the reforming party, many Indians who are keen nationalists find it possible to include in their nationalism a strong defence of the ancient caste system as the typical social institution of India.

Into this ancient India has come the flood of Western ideas and civilisation. It is, in the main, the result of education, in schools and colleges, both Government and missionary and private in their management, where English is the medium of instruction, and the pupil or student is brought into contact with a whole world of ideas almost entirely alien from those in which he has been nurtured. History, natural science, English literature, Western political thought, all are available to the student mind of India. There was a fashion (now departed) which valued everything Western above everything Indian, and set a premium upon "Westernisation" in thought and habit and action. This tendency accentuated the difficulty, inherent in the situation, of adjusting the new views to the old. The result was, and still is, a welter of conflicting ideas and traditions in the mind of the educated man and woman. Necessarily much of the old religious teaching had to go. It was superstitious, credulous, irrational, and it did not maintain itself against the new knowledge. But the new education was largely secular, and in thousands of cases the old views crumbled away with nothing to take their place. Similarly it came about that educated men saw it to be absurd that they should refuse to take food together, and the braver of them went farther and broke loose from the caste regulations about marriage. Indian social customs began to be judged at the bar of the world's conscience, and a powerful reforming party grew up which set out to abolish the restrictions of caste, the custom of



child marriage and the *purdah*, to promote women's education and to raise the outcastes.

In all this, Christianity played an important part, both through the direct activity of Indian Christians and missionaries, and through the influence of the ideas of Christianity implicit in much of English literature and conveyed through education and the progress of Western culture. It is most important to remember that this undoubted Christian influence has not always meant, indeed has only occasionally meant, a drawing towards Christianity and the Church as organised institutions. The figure of Jesus Christ, His spirit, His teaching have had, and to-day possess, an influence in India which it would be difficult to over-estimate, but the effect is seen in the way in which Christian conceptions of religion and of society are taken up into and become a part of the outlook of the serious educated man. What is professed as Hinduism or even Islam by many educated Indians to-day is at least as much Christian as it is Hindu or Moslem. The influence of Christian ideas is to be seen not only (nor, some would say, chiefly) in the growth of the Christian community in India, but in the ferment which they have set up in the mind of educated India.

The third influence which we would set beside the ancient Indian heritage and the newer culture, in our endeavour to analyse the present-day India, is the political nationalist movement. Fundamentally nationalism is the spirit of love for India, and it is fed by the deepest springs of Indian life, by religion and the family, art, literature and social life. It is wholly wrong to think of nationalism in India (or anywhere else) as a purely political affair. Nevertheless, the conditions of Indian life have forced nationalism into political channels, or to put the matter more truly, it is political circumstances

which have combined to awaken self-conscious nationalism, although the awakened spirit is a greater thing than politics.

To a large extent the growth of a nationalist sentiment in India is the result of the British occupation, and Englishmen who resent Indian nationalist views should recollect the close connection between the two. India is a continent inhabited by different peoples, professing different faiths, speaking different languages, springing from different racial stocks. The only language which is a *lingua franca* for all educated men and women in India is English and the use of English as a common tongue has contributed greatly to the growth of an *Indian* consciousness. Punjabi, Madrasi and Bengali can, through the medium of English, not only express themselves to one another, but unite in the common sense that they are Indian.

Not less important has been the political example of England herself. She has been the pioneer for the whole world in the exploration of national freedom. She has gradually erected political institutions which have been a model, followed or adapted, by every nation which has taken representative democracy as its ideal. Young India, taught in school and college the ideals which underlie British civilisation, naturally applied those ideals to India, and she was supported in this by some of the most famous Englishmen who have lived in India or worked for India. Men like Lord Macaulay or Sir Herbert Edwardes, to take only two examples, quite definitely looked forward to a self-governing India, and regarded the attainment of that aim as a thing to fire the ambition of Britain.

Anyone with an atom of sympathy and imagination can understand the effects of all this on the mind of educated men in India. Unfortunately,

the harmony which has always obtained between the best mind of Britain and of India in regard to India's future has been marred by other influences. Many of the British in India to-day have no real sympathy with the ideals which animated men like Edwardes, and regard with abhorrence all talk of Indian self-government. The Government of India has been just and efficient, it has preserved order and created a legal system, it has made roads and railways and conduced to material progress, but the movement towards the "Indianising" of the public services and the creation of responsible Indian bodies has seemed to Indians to be very slow. Granted that they are to be "schooled in the arts of self-government," they feel that their sojourn in the infant class has been unduly prolonged.

The war and the peace settlement have very greatly intensified the zeal of Indians for self-government. They have felt that India's offering in the war of 1,000,000 men and great quantities of treasure entitled her to be considered by Britain in a new light. Even more important is the effect of the professions, made by all the Allies, of faith in the doctrines of nationality and self-determination. If Czecho-Slovaks and Poles and Egyptians were to have self-determination, why, Indians argue, should not India have it too?

We have already referred to the epoch-making pronouncement of the British Government in August, 1917. That message came as the answer to the most vigorous demands on the part of Indians for the formulation of a policy, and it was received with enthusiasm. Indians of every shade of political opinion began to prepare for the visit of the Secretary of State to India, and ultimately, along with other schemes, the Indian National Congress (a mainly Hindu body), and the All-India Moslem League

made common cause in a scheme of reform which was presented to Mr. Montagu. The scheme itself was perhaps of less importance than the demonstration it afforded of a measure of Hindu-Moslem unity, and though that unity is only among the politically conscious classes, while among the mass of the two communities the old suspicions prevail, yet all who care about Indian unity will realise the significance of the *rapprochement*, political in the main though it be.

The Viceroy and the Secretary of State put forward in 1918 what is known as the "Montagu-Chelmsford" scheme.\* On the whole it was well received by Indian opinion, and apart from the precise proposals it contained, there was general recognition of the breadth and generosity it displayed.

There was some delay in the production of a Bill, and in the meantime the Rowlatt Acts were passed, giving the Government large powers to

\* There is no space in this short chapter, and the author has not the necessary equipment, to discuss the merits of the proposals for reform contained in the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme and the subsequent Act. The main principle in the Act to which attention should be directed is that of "diarchy," that is, division, in the provinces, though not in the central government, of the functions of government into "reserved" and "transferred" subjects. Reserved subjects are administered, as at present, by the Governor and his Executive Council, composed of members of the Indian Civil Service. Transferred subjects are dealt with by Indian ministers, chosen from and responsible to a popularly elected Legislature. The scheme contains therefore the possibility of expansion, until all the functions of government are under the control of the Indian Parliament. The subjects now to be transferred include Local Government, Medical Administration, Public Health and Sanitation, Public Works, Agriculture, Forests, Excise, Industries, and Education (including Higher Education). Criticism of the scheme has been mainly along two lines, either (*a*) that "diarchy" is unworkable, and that the position of European officials is prejudicially affected, or (*b*) that the reforms are inadequate and in particular that in addition to complete "transference" in the provinces, some element of diarchy should be introduced into the central government of India.

deport and intern without trial in areas where they had good reason to believe anarchic crime was prevalent. The revolt against these Acts was immense, not least in the Punjab. Mr. Gandhi began his "passive resistance" movement, riots occurred, two leading Indians were deported from the Punjab, and then came the Amritsar shooting, the crawling order, and the rest. The result was that while in England public attention (so far as it was directed on India at all) was focussed on the Reform scheme, Indians were thinking rather of the attitude which the Home Government would take to the Punjab events. In the event, the indignation aroused over the Punjab affair and the Hunter Committee's findings, only partly tempered by the Government's despatch, has almost killed the Reforms. There is a large Moderate Party, which means to work the Reform scheme, and contains a number of able and upright men. In the meantime the party which believes in boycotting the Reforms and holds towards the British Government the sentiments expressed in the Calcutta resolution, holds the dominant position.

If we have referred to current or very recent events in India, it is because the inner meaning of the nationalist spirit can only be apprehended in relation to the events and crises which have called it into being and moulded its form. It is necessary to understand why the spirit of nationalism, which, as we have tried to show, owes so much to the British occupation and is not inherently opposed to British ideals of India's future, should now be so passionately moved against us. Opinions will probably continue to differ about the Reform scheme, about the gravity and extent of anarchic crime in India, about the justification of martial law. These issues have to be faced, but whatever opinion is held about them,



it is still necessary to realise that a gulf exists between educated India and the British Government, and to try to comprehend the causes of this estrangement.

In this condition of fervent national self-consciousness, it is small wonder that other departments of life than politics have felt the effects. It is not least noticeable in the realm of religion, where the undermining effect of modern education has in a measure been arrested by the force of patriotic emotion. There has been a rehabilitation of Hinduism in recent years under the influence of nationalism. The spirit which exalted all things Western has vanished, which is a development to be welcomed ; but it has been supplanted by a spirit of adulation of all things Indian, and men who have no real personal belief in Hindu doctrines are found upholding Hinduism as the religion of the Indian race. The Arya Samaj of North India, which stands for a reformed Hinduism, and a return to the Vedas as the national heritage of India, is wholly in line with the modern Nationalist movement.

## II

It is, however, important that we should not allow ourselves to think of all India as " nationalist," and of the task of unifying and educating India as already accomplished. In reality, only a small fraction, less than two millions out of the 315,000,000 inhabitants of India, can read and write English, and the task before the builders of new India is as great as that confronting any politicians or reformers in the world.

It is not, perhaps, necessary here to say more about the reforms needed in regard to caste and also in certain elements of the family system ; not



because they are unimportant—they are immensely important—but because much has been written about them and the subject is almost a commonplace of discussion. All Indian reformers agree that caste in its present form is a fatal hindrance to Indian development. It strikes at the heart of Indian unity, as has been abundantly proved, if proof were needed, by the caste jealousies which have come to the surface in discussions about the Reforms. It is responsible for the outcaste problem, and a strict caste-keeper who is also a Nationalist has scarcely a valid answer to the charge that he demands to be treated with all the rights due to human personality, but denies those rights to 50,000,000 of his fellow Indians. It has no real relation to morality, and strengthens the tendency, powerful in Hinduism in any case, to separate true morality from religion, and resolve ethics into ceremonial and ritual observance.

Similarly, the custom of child-marriage must be abandoned if the Indian nation is to achieve its destiny. Not only is it enfeebling to the national physique, it is fatal to the education of women, and without the education of women no secure and permanent national advance can ever be made. The raising of the age of marriage, the education of girls and women, and the abolition of *purdah* (the seclusion of women), are all reforms which, like the abolition of caste restrictions, Indian reforming opinion strongly urges. The main obstacle is the almost immovable *vis inertiae* of the masses of the people; articulate opposition is only found among staunchly conservative and orthodox Hindus.

In regard, however, to all questions of social reform in matters where religious ideas are involved, it cannot be too strongly emphasised that it is on Indians themselves that the responsibility must lie.

A foreign government, composed mainly of men professing another faith, can only touch such questions with the greatest care, especially in the present condition of feeling. Government cannot enact reforms unless it is backed by public opinion. Two instances may be quoted to show both the strength of orthodox reactionary sentiment and the growth of more liberal opinion. Mr. V. J. Patel, an Indian member of the Indian Legislative Council, introduced a Bill to legalise marriages between people of different castes, without the necessity of their renouncing connection with the orthodox religion. It was strenuously opposed by conservative opinion and a large volume of feeling was stirred up against it. On the other hand, "a sensational pollution case in Calicut, where a Western-trained Indian doctor who happened to be of low caste, was prosecuted for polluting the village tank by walking too near it, ended in the acquittal of the accused, who was the recipient of congratulations from all quarters."\*

It is to education that one must look for the growth of liberal opinion in social affairs, and education is the greatest immediate problem confronting the Indian statesman. Upon it the success of the reforms depends; without it they will accomplish merely the transference of bureaucratic power from one set of hands to another.

Let us consider the main facts. Illiteracy is widespread. At the last census, in 1911, only six persons in every hundred could pass the literacy test, and roughly, ten times as many men could do so as women. In British India, leaving out the Indian States, there are two hundred and forty million people, and in all the educational institutions put together there are only eight million pupils.

\*Report on Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India, 1919, p. 129.

The problem, moreover, is complicated by the high proportion of pupils undergoing higher education compared with that undergoing primary education.

Only . . . 2.9 per cent. of the population is undergoing elementary education of any kind. On the other hand, in secondary schools, no less than .5 per cent. of the population is under instruction, a figure which compares very favourably with .6 per cent. of England and Wales. Considering that, in India, female education is backward, this means that if the male population alone is reckoned no less than nine per cent. is found in secondary schools. This proportion is far greater than the corresponding figures of England and Wales, and approximately equal to that of Germany before the war. More striking yet are the figures for University education. India has .026 per cent. of her population undergoing instruction of a University type. Considering that here again the female population of India has to be almost eliminated, this figure compares very favourably with the .054 of England and Wales. In the case of single tracts like Bengal, it is found that with a population approximately equal to that of the United Kingdom, the proportion of the educated classes who are taking full-time University courses is almost ten times as great as in England. Furthermore, a much higher proportion of the educated male population proceeds to university studies in Bengal than is the case in the United Kingdom. There are then good grounds for the criticisms so often directed against the educational structure of India to the effect that it is top-heavy. While the lower classes are largely illiterate, the middle class, which is the class which mainly patronises higher institutions, is, numerically speaking, educated to a pitch equal to that attained in countries whose social and economic conditions are more highly developed.\*

It may be added that the great bulk of the students of India are engaged in literary studies, and that technological institutions, while they are now being increased somewhat rapidly, are few. Further, the educational standards are low. The whole system is ruled by examinations. "Cramming" and low-grade teaching (and low-paid teachers) are universal. Thousands of students, as the Calcutta University Commission has pointed out, are doing

\*Report on Moral and Material Progress, 1919, pp. 130-131.

University studies of the "intermediate" grade, who ought not yet to be in a University at all.

Education is a "transferred subject," and the Indian ministers in charge of it have a herculean task. They have to undertake University reform; the extension of technical training of all kinds, scientific, engineering, industrial, and, most important of all, agricultural; the raising up, training and adequate payment of an army of teachers; and the financing of a greatly increased number of primary schools.

Certain economic problems have also to be considered. India is poor. The average individual income is estimated at about £2 a year. It has, of course, to be remembered that in the rural districts (which means in the greater part of India) much of a man's income comes to him in kind. Even with this allowance the figures are terribly low. India needs greater prosperity. One important step is the establishment and rapid growth of co-operative credit banks, which are doing a great deal to diminish, and should ultimately remove, the burden of debt which afflicts a very large proportion of Indian villagers.\* These banks, joined with instruction in scientific agriculture and aid in buying good seed and improved tools, are playing a great part in the renascence of rural India. The Y.M.C.A. and the missionary societies are doing invaluable work in applying these methods where they are most needed, and most difficult to apply, namely among the "depressed" classes, or outcastes.

Industry is developing, although still a small thing in India. Jute and cotton are the largest manufactures, wool comes high up, and recent

\* In 140 co-operative societies which have existed for ten years in fourteen districts of the Punjab, twenty-eight per cent. of the members are now entirely free from debt.

months have seen the floatation of many new companies and a considerable extension of manufacturing activity. India's raw produce is enormous, and there are many articles which she exports in the raw and imports again when manufactured, of which she should be able to manufacture at least a part herself.

It is to be hoped, however, that the movement for the development of home industries will succeed. India cannot do without a larger quantity of manufactures, but both the genius of Indian home life and the good of the people as a whole are best served by the establishment of home industries and the application of mechanical and electrical power (as *e.g.*, in Switzerland) to domestic use. Mr. Gandhi's movement for home industries is conceived on other grounds than the purely economic, but there can be little doubt that the success of a "home industries' campaign" would be for the good of India.

The rise in world prices has seriously affected India, but most of all in the industrial urban population, whose income, unlike the rural population's, is mainly monetary, and therefore affected by prices. Industrial combination and strikes are now becoming a feature of Indian life, and we are able even now to discern movements which some day may over-ride the division of the people by caste and community, just as in Britain, Labour is rendering the traditional cleavage between Conservative and Liberal somewhat irrelevant. The application of sound ethical standards to industrial life, conditions, and development, is one of the most urgent tasks facing Young India.

One further problem demands mention, the development of the democratic spirit. The future of the Reforms depends on education, as we have seen, and on the weakening of caste restrictions



and of the limitations set to the advance of women ; but it also depends upon the extent to which political life and thought in India can be charged with new life. India is entering upon the path of representative democracy at a time when the West is passing through a phase of political depression. Many people in Western countries are losing faith in parliamentary institutions and turning to other systems in search of greater reality and force. What is needed in India, as in Europe, is faith in the average man, character and integrity in those called to office, and that spirit of practical responsible earnestness in dealing with public affairs, which is the best specific against both corruption and triviality, and rests at bottom on the belief that action in this world is related to the eternal values, that the " kingdoms of this world " can become the " Kingdom of God." It is here not least that one looks with apprehension to Hinduism, even to neo-Hinduism. As we have said, educated men nowadays believe in Hinduism mainly on nationalist grounds, or have a purely social allegiance to a community. Something more than this is needed if caste spirit is to be replaced by a belief in human equality, and the idea of the unreal, illusory character of existence to yield to earnest labour for the public good.

### III

Christianity in India is a factor curiously difficult to estimate. From one point of view an observer will pronounce it negligible, another with a different angle of vision will see in it the most hopeful influence in all India.

We may recall what has been already said of the indirect influence of Christianity upon the educated



mind of India. Dr. Farquhar's book, *Modern Religious Movements in India*, exhibits on a large scale the double effect of Christianity, first in stimulating reform movements of the Brahmo Somaj type, where there is a clear approach to Christian ideas, and then in creating a reflex movement in defence or in re-statement of Hinduism. The latter type of movement, of which the Arya Samaj is the best known type, now holds the field in the main, and will do so, as long as it seems to be traitorous in the eyes of a patriotic Indian to ally himself openly with Christianity. The "conflict of religions," to use the phrase which Dr. Glover has applied to the clash of religious influences in the early Roman Empire, is to be seen in full swing in India to-day, where ancient Hinduism, modern science, Christian ethics and nationalist pride meet together in the mind of the average thoughtful student or graduate.

It has always been hard for a high-caste man to embrace Christianity, and although it is gradually becoming easier for a caste man to keep his place in Indian society if he becomes a Christian, the feeling that he will be a traitor to his Indian heritage, if he embraces the Western faith, keeps him quite effectually from considering the claims of the Church. Nevertheless, when all this has been stated as strongly as it can be, it remains true that the figure of our Lord exerts a compelling power over multitudes of men to whom "Christendom" and "the Church" and "Christianity" are anathema. There is perhaps a certain amount of shallow patronage of Him as an "Eastern" sage, but it is not difficult to discern in the minds of many men who call themselves Hindu or even Musalman an adoration of Jesus Christ as the best they know. Those who know him say that this is not least true of M. K. Gandhi himself. One finds every

kind of attitude towards Him, from that of interest in Him as an Eastern prophet, to genuine heart-felt devotion. The moral principles of Christ are widely quoted and under the influence of Nationalism are read into Hinduism, so that men can be very easily found who honestly believe that such doctrines as the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man are characteristically Hindu.

It is hard to say what the end of this process will be. It is conceivable that there should be a gradual transmutation of Hinduism. It is also conceivable that under happier conditions the keenness of national pride should be abated and men begin to think differently of the organised fellowship of Christians. Meanwhile, this organised fellowship, the Church in India in its various branches, has its own problems to face.

Of the four million Christians in India 79.4 per cent. are illiterate.\* The reason for this is that the bulk of them come from the outcaste classes, whose literacy, taken over India as a whole, is almost nil. The great mass movements among the depressed classes have had an immense value as a demonstration of human brotherhood and are a social phenomenon of the highest importance. They have also added to the Church a great mass of totally illiterate men and women, and the task of educating the new converts is one to which all parts of the Christian community in India are now giving their closest attention. In the matter of female literacy, the Christians are far ahead of most other communities, and indeed their total educational record is remarkable, when we remember the low cultural level with which most of them have begun. Christian and missionary education, however, partakes of most of the failings of Indian education generally,

\* This figure excludes those under seven-and-a-half years of age.

and the recent Commission on Village Education in India was devoted to discovering the best ways in which the education of the Christian community can be promoted. Like other students of the subject, the members of the Commission lay great stress on vocational education, and have worked out their views especially with regard to agriculture.

The main problem, however, to which the mind turns when we think of the Indian Church in relation to India and India's needs, is that of its apparently foreign nature and organisation. The names by which Christians are known are the denominational labels of the West. The different modes of Church organisation evolved in Europe and America are reproduced in India. Even liturgies and hymns are often purely western. Very many of the Indian Christians grow up without any knowledge of Indian traditions in art or music or literature or religion. Added to all this, there is the fact that a large proportion of the congregations of Indian Christians are dependent, wholly or in part, on the western missions for the support of their ministries, and that the main lines of policy in the extension of Christianity in India are settled by bodies predominantly and often entirely western. There is an increasing number of Indian Christians who are determined to effect changes in these respects, and of missionaries who agree whole-heartedly with them.

The importance of the Christian community in India taking its place in the national life of India is very great indeed. It has perhaps been obscured by the fact that so many of the Christians belong to the classes which, equally in the case of Hindus and Moslems, were little conscious of national sentiment and shared very little of the Indian heritage. It is now plainly necessary that anything which makes it hard for an Indian to feel Christianity to be truly

Indian should be abolished, not merely because of the immediate situation in regard to nationalism, but in obedience to a fundamental law of the Church's being. The place for the Indian Church to-day is in the mid-stream of Indian life, and there never was a time when everything that Christ can give to men, of spiritual power, integrity of character, steadfastness and patience, was more urgently needed than it is to-day.

The western missionary can help in this, and he can help most if he is willing to "get out of the way." The opportunity for men and women who think in terms of "leadership," is small, and growing smaller. For those who are prepared to work with Indians on terms of absolute equality, and when possible under Indian leadership, the opportunity is immense.

#### SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

*Statement on the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India during the year 1919.* (H.M. Stationery Office. 3s. 6d.)

A Government document replete with facts and figures. It contains the text of the new Reform Act.

*The Goal of India.* W. E. S. Holland. (U.C.M.E. 2s. 6d.)

A general text-book dealing with different aspects of Indian life and missionary work.

*Social Ideals in India.* W. Paton. (U.C.M.E. 1s. 3d.)

Deals especially with the contrasting social ideals of Hinduism and Christianity.

*India at the Cross-ways.* Lord Meston. (Cambridge University Press. 3s. 6d.)

The Rede Lecture at Cambridge. A brilliant study of the problem confronting modern Indian statesmanship.

*Village Education in India.* Report of the Commission. (Milford. 5s.) See above, page 39.

## CHAPTER II

### CHINA

#### I

CHINA is one of the most arresting and most truly impressive facts in the past and present life of the world. Its history, as Bishop Roots has said, has no parallel save in that of the Hebrew nation. The peculiar genius of the Chinese people to-day is the heritage, not of the years, but of the ages, during which the "black-haired race" have lived in the Middle Kingdom. One of the Chinese delegates to the recent Peace Conference at Paris was a lineal descendant of Confucius, the Sage who lived five hundred years before Christ. The Chinese labourer, working in France during the war, and the Chinaman with his little shop in Limehouse, represent a civilisation which, in all its essential characteristics, existed, as it exists to-day, centuries before the Franks swept into Western Europe, or the Romans gave the riverside township its name. Until the close of the first half of the nineteenth century, when the process of "opening up" China to western trade was begun, there had been practically no change in the arts of life—of food, clothing, housebuilding and husbandry—for more than a thousand years. To this day the life of the country inland—*i.e.*, apart from the coast-towns and certain inland centres of trade—is organised upon the traditional social system. The large patriarchal family is still the unit of society, and in it, rather than in the individual, the ownership of land is vested. A group of families makes up a village, and the village elders or "gentry" still attend in crude fashion to their traditional business of



poor relief, road-making, sanitation, and, in some cases, of dispute-settling. In the cities, trade guilds still function on behalf of their members, as somewhat similar bodies functioned in Europe in the Middle Ages.

Along with this singular stability of social life and custom, the Chinese people have preserved unchanged their peculiar national temperament. The qualities which held the highest place in Chinese estimation in the sixth century before Christ, and which were embodied in the life and codified in the teachings of Confucius, are still the characteristic virtues of the Chinese people. The five cardinal virtues taught by Confucius—kindness, rectitude, decorum, wisdom and sincerity—still sum up the qualities of the typically Chinese ideal man. The Five Relationships—of ruler and ruled, husband and wife, parent and child, older and younger brother, friend and friend—still express the Chinese theory of life in society. The invasion of China by the Mongols in the thirteenth century, and its conquest by the Manchus in the seventeenth century, meant the pressure of militaristic races upon a singularly peace-loving people. Yet China did not become a military nation, but preserved the old love of peace and the old habit of ranking the military as below the civil government. “One does not use good iron to make nails, nor a good man to make a soldier,” remained among the collection of current Chinese proverbs. Beside a nationality so strong and enduring, with its characteristics of peaceableness, of common-sense, of humour, of decorum, so strongly marked, the mushroom nationalisms of the West verge on impertinence.

China is impressive not only for its antiquity, but also for its size and for the wealth of its resources. Its total area, including Manchuria, but not including



Mongolia, Chinese Turkestan, or Thibet, is about 1,896,500 square miles (twelve times the size of Great Britain), and the population of the country is variously estimated at between 350,000,000 and 400,000,000. Roughly, China contains nearly a quarter of the population of the world. Her resources in man-power are therefore enormous. According to the "Report for the Year 1919 on the Conditions and Prospects of British Trade with China," "almost every form of raw material known in commerce is produced in China, and a list of some of the principal products includes: silk, tea, soya and other beans, cotton, ground-nuts, fibres (ramie, hemp, etc.), wood oil, essential oils, animal and vegetable tallow, hides and skins, wool and hair, tobacco, timber, sugar, cereals of all kinds, varnish, wax, camphor, bristles, strawbraid, egg-products, feathers, cassia, nutgalls, indigo and musk."

The mineral resources of the country, "if fully exploited, would furnish all the raw materials required for the full development of her engineering, ship-building and other industries." The Report is inclined to question the truth of certain wild statements, recently made, about the ability of Chinese mines to supply the whole world with coal for thousands of years to come, but it emphasises strongly the tremendous potentialities of China as an agricultural and industrial nation.

This combination of a national character which has in a wonderful way stood the test of time, of a social order which has survived many successive political shocks, and of vast resources of labour and raw material, makes it impossible for any intelligent observer to turn down, as a mere epigram, the prophecy of a great American and a great friend of China—"China is the key to the future of the world."

## II

Until the middle of the nineteenth century, China stood aloof from the Western States, but beyond that time she could not defend her splendid isolation. The West desired trade with the wealthy, recluse nation, and was determined to secure rights of entry. China's resistance was broken down by Great Britain through the "Opium War" of 1839-42, as a result of which China was forced to open five ports to British trade, and to cede Hong Kong to Britain. Other Powers followed suit, and extorted trade-treaties with China. Following upon the desire to trade, came the determination to exploit Chinese resources directly by means of western enterprise and western capital. Russia in Manchuria, Great Britain on the Yangtze in central China, France in south China, and Germany in Shantung established "spheres of interest." In these territories political and economic rights (dependent upon treaties extorted from China) were somewhat inextricably mixed up, since the investment of western capital in mines and railways was safeguarded by the acquisition of the right to protect such enterprises and interests against all comers. The encroachment upon China's political independence is still better illustrated by the fact that Germany at Kiao-chou, Russia at Port Arthur, and Great Britain at Wei-hai-wei established naval bases to protect their interests in the Far East.

The result of all this was seen in the great anti-foreign rising of 1900. Organised by the secret society of the "Harmonious Fists," the rising is generally known as the Boxer Rebellion. A typical manifesto issued by a rebel leader, Yü Tung Ch'ên, best shows the sort of impression that had been made upon the Chinese by the nations of the Christian West :

These foreigners, under pretext of trading and teaching Christianity, are in reality taking away the land, food, and clothing of the people ; besides overturning the teaching of the sages, they are poisoning us with opium and ruining us with debauchery. Since the time of Tao Kuang, they have intimidated our Court and coerced our officials ; they have eaten our children as food, and piled up the public debt as high as the hills, they have burnt our palaces and overthrown our tributary states, occupied Shanghai, devastated Formosa, forcibly opened Kiao-Chou, and now wish to divide up China like a melon.

Whilst making due allowance for the part played by ignorance and prejudice in the creation of such hatred of the foreigners and acknowledging that the Boxer massacres were not wholly inspired by patriotism, we must admit with shame that the West has made it very hard for China to understand the spirit of Christianity, and this in spite of the many great missionaries who have followed Robert Morrison, and of not a few fine officials of the type of Sir Robert Hart. After the punitive expedition which ended the Boxer affair, the fortified walls of the British Legation at Peking were inscribed with the words "Lest we Forget." No insult to our national pride, and no blood spilt could ever, or can ever, justify such a confession of unbelief in the Christian doctrine of forgiveness.

At the present time, owing to recent political developments in the Far East, the Western States have ceased to count very much *politically* with China. The hatred and fear of the westerner, which rose up and boiled over at the time of the Boxer rebellion, have now another, and more dangerous, object, in China's enemy neighbour Japan. During the last twenty-five years the history of China's foreign relationships has really been the history of the gradual supersession of several European by one Asiatic aggressor. Hopelessly beaten by Japan in 1894-95, China has, since that date, watched the

gradual encroachment of Japan upon her rights, territories and resources. First the camphor-producing island of Formosa went, and Korea, over which China has hitherto claimed suzerainty, was declared "independent," as a preliminary step to its annexation by Japan (in 1910). After the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905), China had to submit to the transfer of Port Arthur to Japan, and the taking over by Japan of the south-east section of the railway built by Russia through Manchuria, in order to connect the Trans-Siberian railway with Vladivostock. Japanese influence thus gained a firm foothold in Manchuria. Finally, in 1915, came the hardest blow of all—the forced lease to Japan of the territory in Kiao-Chou Bay, which had originally been leased by China to Germany in 1897, and had been captured by Japan from Germany at the outbreak of the European War. Together with this, Japan acquired all the railway and mining concessions formerly held by Germany in the Shantung peninsula, important economic rights and preferential treatment in South Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia, and, as the result of a commercial transaction, a very considerable measure of control over China's greatest iron, steel and colliery company (the Hanyehping Company).

The presence of Japan in Shantung is, in most Chinese eyes, a very different matter from, and much more dangerous thing than, the presence of Germany. Germany, a wealthy western Power, with great interests and resources in her own country and in Africa, was comparatively harmless. Japan, full of determination to extend on the mainland, and powerful enough to turn her imperialistic ambitions into actualities, is generally believed to covet paramount influence in Shantung and elsewhere. Apart, moreover, from the very serious

economic and political menace to China created by the treaty of 1915, and the subsequent progress of Japanese influence on the mainland, the situation is further embittered by wounded national sentiment. Shantung is the birthplace and burial place of Confucius—the holy ground of the Chinese nation and a sort of Chinese Zion. That this peninsula of all places should now be dominated by the Japanese increases China's patriotic hatred of Japan.

China hoped and believed that the Paris Peace Conference would insist upon the restoration of Shantung by Japan, thus annulling the Chino-Japanese Treaty of 1915, which was clearly extorted from China by threats, amounting almost to ultimatums. The decision of the Peace Conference to leave the 1915 Treaty undisturbed, upon the understanding that Japan will, subject to certain conditions, ultimately return Shantung to China, has enormously increased the bitterness of the hatred felt by China for Japan, and has raised again the spirit of mistrust and suspicion of the western nations. The secret treaties signed by Great Britain and France with Japan early in 1917, promising to support Japan in her hold on Shantung, make this renewal of suspicion on the part of China not unnatural. Under pressure of public opinion the Government at Peking was obliged to refuse its signature to the Peace Treaty between Germany and the Allies, which contains the clauses relative to the Shantung settlement. Instead, China brought her state of war with Germany finally to an end by a unilateral act, and in signing the Peace Treaty with Austria is understood to have joined the League of Nations. The only real hope of a satisfactory settlement between China and Japan at the present time seems to lie in the submission of the question to and its adjustment



by the League of Nations, since China refuses to accept the offer to negotiate directly with Japan, so great is the general feeling of mistrust.

Such has been, broadly, the character of China's contact with the world outside. Its effect has been to stimulate the Chinese national consciousness to a remarkable extent, especially, as will be seen, during the last few years. On the internal political life of the country, contact with the West has had a far-reaching influence. Western education, the gift originally of the missionary, has already wrought great changes in the outlook of the upper classes upon life. Western industrialism, the gift of the capitalist, is just beginning to revolutionise the social system which has stood unchanged for centuries. From these facts emerge most of the vital problems which confront China to-day.

### III

We and His Majesty the Emperor hereby decide in favour of a republican form of constitutional government. Thus we could gratify, on the one hand, the desires of the whole nation, which, tired of anarchy, is desirous of peace, and, on the other hand, would follow in the footsteps of the ancient sages, who regarded the throne as the sacred trust of the nation. . . . Let Yuan Shih-k'ai organise with full powers a provisional Republican Government and confer with the Republican army as to the methods of union thus assuring peace to the people and tranquility to the Empire, and forming the one great republic of China by the union as heretofore of the five peoples, namely Manchus, Chinese, Mongols, Mohammedans and Thibetans, together with the territory in its integrity" (from the Imperial Edict of Feb. 12th, 1912).

In these words the epilogue to the history of the Celestial Empire was spoken by the Empress Dowager\* Lung Yü, and the imperial blessing given

\* This is not the famous Empress Dowager (Tzu Hsi) of Boxer fame, who died in 1908.



to the new republic of China. This done, the Son of Heaven and his step-mother, went out, figuratively speaking, quietly and with a pension, by the back door, whilst Yuan Shih-k'ai, their late Prime Minister, in the full blaze of limelight, welcomed in the new United Republic of China, and accepted its Provisional Presidency. Half a century of Chinese history lies behind these happenings in February, 1912.

Why and how did the Manchu dynasty, which had supplied China with its rulers since the middle of the seventeenth century, thus abdicate in favour of a frock-coated President? In order to answer this question it is necessary to look back to the latter half of the nineteenth century and to trace to their source two main streams of political thought and tendency which combined to sweep China over the brink of revolution in 1911 and the first months of 1912. These two forces might, for convenience sake, be labelled roughly as the "Constitutional Movement," and "Republican Propaganda." But before entering upon any discussion of their origin, growth and influence, it is necessary to utter a warning against the belief that the downfall of the Imperial system could actually have been brought about in 1911 solely by politicians, relying only upon the strength and persuasiveness of their own political ideas. It is true that the revolution was, first and foremost, a *political* revolution. The influence of the economic factor—that cry concerning bread and taxes which is usually so prominent and powerful as a lever of revolution—was in this case small. But it certainly existed. The political theorists who engineered the rising which began in central China in October, 1911, in order to gain the support even of a small section of the vast masses of the people to whom politics were a closed book, could appeal to them on the grounds of poverty and distress caused

by an increase of taxation and by unemployment. The famine which swept the northern parts of the provinces of Anhui and Kiangsu (in east central China) during the winter of 1910-1911, was an asset to the revolutionary cause, as was also the fact that, in certain of its sections at least, the Chinese army was poorly and irregularly paid. Possibly of still greater importance was the feeling of racial antipathy in the Chinese mind towards the Manchus, as aliens and usurpers who were fattening themselves upon the ill-gotten gains of office.\*

To these and similar motives the political leaders were able to appeal, and, in doing so, to gain a certain amount of very unintelligent popular support. But when this has been said, the outstanding fact remains unaltered. The Revolution was essentially a political revolution. It is therefore with the small number of men—a tiny handful in comparison to the Chinese people as a whole—to whom politics were a live issue that we must chiefly be concerned in our endeavour to trace the causes of the Revolution.

The Constitutional Movement arose naturally, almost inevitably, out of the relationships between China and the Western Powers during the second half of the nineteenth century. Right through this time China was learning that—above all else—the Western States, and the western political system stood for *organised power*. The results of the Boxer Rebellion confirmed that impression. The rebels, though secretly encouraged by the Empress Dowager, could not stand against the armed intervention of

\*The Manchu dynasty began its reign in 1644, following upon a successful military invasion of China from the north. The widespread employment of Manchus in lucrative and powerful official posts was a continual grievance with the Chinese, and, at the time of the revolution, had recently been emphasised by the policy of the Prince-Regent, Prince Chun, in preferring Manchus of doubtful ability to office both in the Central Administration and in the provinces, thus passing over competent Chinese candidates.

the Western Powers, helped, in this case, by Japan. With foreign troops occupying the Imperial palace at Peking, and the Empress Dowager a refugee in Si-an-fu, it was obvious to any politically-minded person that China's existing political institutions were not fit to carry her successfully through life in the larger world of states. Clearly it was useless for China to subside again into a state of impotent hatred of these western aggressors. In order to hold her own she must learn from them the secret of their power. The victory of Japan over China in 1895, and, still more, her victory over Russia in 1905, gave strength to this conviction. For Japan showed that an Oriental Power might put on the armour of western efficiency and beat the white man at his own game. Contact with the West had done more than make apparent the failure of the Manchus to protect China. It had revealed the inherent weaknesses of a system of government based upon a corrupt bureaucracy. Patriotic pride and the feeling that, as a matter of practical necessity, national strength must be founded upon a just and liberal system of government, formed the real driving forces of the Constitutional Movement.

At first it seemed as though this Constitutional Movement need not involve a complete break with the imperial tradition—as though the Empress Dowager herself, having learnt her lesson at the time of the Boxer rebellion, was prepared to make amends for the failure of the throne by allowing the re-organisation of the Empire upon constitutional lines. In 1905 an Imperial Commission was sent abroad to study the constitutions of foreign countries. Two years later an imperial edict promised that “owing to the dangers overhanging the Empire, a Constitution and a Parliament will be granted to the country.” Arrangements were made and edicts

issued for the summoning of Provincial and National Assemblies, with deliberative and advisory functions, and, just before her death (in 1908) the Empress promised the creation of a full parliament in 1917.

During this period a Constitutional Empire seemed to promise China the future she wanted. Yuan Shih-k'ai, once Viceroy of Chihli, but later called to Peking and a seat on the Grand Council, was the most prominent and influential among the official "Progressives." With his abrupt dismissal, a month after the Empress Dowager's death, by the new Prince Regent (Prince Chun), all real hope of a Constitutional Empire vanished. Prince Chun, under the influence of reactionary officials, who loved the flesh-pots of the traditional days, made it clear that, in spite of continued promises of constitutional reform, he had, in reality, no intention of diminishing one whit the sovereign authority of the throne. "The Vermilion Pencil rehabilitates the bureaucracy," wrote the *North China Daily News*,\* early in 1911, and when, in April of that year, Prince Chun declared himself, on behalf of the boy-emperor, generalissimo of all the land and sea forces of China, it became still more clearly evident that the hope of China did not lie with the Manchu dynasty.

The fall of Yuan Shih-k'ai, the Progressive, was the opportunity of Sun Yat-sen, the Republican. The second stream of influence, Republicanism, had for years been gaining strength in China. Its devotees were not numerous; but they were ardent. Their leaders were recruited mainly from students who had imbibed revolutionary ideas abroad—in Japan, the United States, and in Europe. The work of propaganda in China was carried on chiefly through secret societies, and, though full information

\* Quoted by Lawrence Lawton. *Empires of the Far East*. Vol. II, p. 1407.

about the revolutionary organisation created in readiness for a political rising is not available, it seems evident that such organisation was in a flourishing state before the autumn of 1911.

The Constitutional Movement had, to some extent, laid the foundations of a sound political re-organisation of the country. The fact that in Provincial Assemblies and in the National Assembly a certain number of Chinese had already had some sort of preparation for the task of government through representative institutions is important in this respect. The apparent defeat of the Constitutional Movement after the death of the Empress Dowager, and the fall of Yuan Shih-k'ai was one of the greatest misfortunes which could have happened to China. Yuan Shih-k'ai, with all his faults, had done excellent work. He had understood China, and he set a pace, in political evolution, at which she could go. He was essentially a realist—thinking and acting in terms of practical possibilities, with a practical end in view *i.e.*, the establishment of China's national strength upon a basis of good government. Sun Yat-sen and his allies were not realists. They were enamoured with Republicanism as a theory, an ideal system of government. Their patriotism, though doubtless sincere, was sentimental and doctrinaire. Actually, they thought less of China than of "a Republic." And they set a pace in political evolution at which China could not go, because it was, to repeat the original simile, a sheer, mad rush over the brink of revolution. They landed China in a whirlpool. The briefest outline of political events since the autumn of 1911, bears out the accuracy of this simile.

The Imperial Government made plain the paths of the revolutionaries before their face by issuing in May, 1911, an edict for the centralisation of the



railways of China under the direct control of the State. This threatened, or was supposed to threaten, provincial liberties, and the fact that, in order to finance this new venture, the Government negotiated two large foreign loans, increased the indignation of the men who were trying their political wings in the Provincial Assemblies. In certain provinces, notably in Szechuan, in the far west of China, the railway shareholders developed a strong sense of personal grievance over the injustice of the terms upon which the Government proposed to compensate them. The agitation roused by the "Chengtu Railway League," an *ad hoc* body of shareholders and others, formed in Szechuan to demonstrate against the Government, led in September to actual fighting. The embarrassment of the Government, which had to dispatch troops to quell the Railway League, proved critical. It gave political revolution its chance.

The execution of several revolutionaries in Wuchang (in the province of Hupeh, in central China) on the charge of conspiracy, finally put a match to smouldering materials. Within forty-eight hours Wuchang was in the hands of the revolutionary army. Prince Chun, virtually on his knees, besought Yuan Shih-k'ai, whom three years before he had dismissed on a trivial excuse, to return to Peking upon terms which made him, for all practical purposes, Imperial Dictator. Fighting between the Imperial and Republican forces took place in various parts of China, for the success of the revolutionary leaders in enlisting under the republican banners numbers of men of all classes who bore a grudge against the existing order of things, was not confined to the original province of Hupeh. The Imperial forces were, apparently, on the way to victory when, in December, 1911, an armistice was signed and peace



negotiations opened. These failed, however, to produce a settlement between the new Republic (established on January 1st, at Nanking, with Dr. Sun Yat-sen as Provisional President), and the Imperial Government. Finally, Yuan Shih-k'ai, the realist, solved the problem by a compromise which involved the dignified exit of the new Empress Dowager. (Prince Chun had resigned in despair before the end of the year.) Dr. Sun Yat-sen retired from the Presidency at Nanking in favour of the establishment of a United Republic with its headquarters at Peking and Yuan Shih-k'ai as Provisional President.

The history of the Chinese Republic since that date (February, 1912) is not inspiring. The success of Yuan Shih-k'ai's efforts to convert his position into that of an autocratic but benevolent monarch—the rôle for which he was temperamentally fitted—resulted in civil strife between the loyal North and the indignant South, which was ended only by the providential death of the backslider in June, 1916. The brief career of the next President, Li Yuan-hung, is memorable chiefly for the violent struggles between the Radicals and the Conservatives over the nature of the permanent Republican Constitution which was still in process of construction. Li Yuan-hung's tenure of office was ended by the "midsummer madness" of June and July, 1917—the attempted restoration of the Manchu dynasty by General Chang Hsun, to whose protection the President had unguardedly resigned himself in his struggle with the rebellious General Tuan Ch'i-yui. The episode was a dramatic illustration of the utter instability of the whole political erection. Its effects alone are important.

The President (who now resigned) had purchased the help (which he did not receive) of Chang Hsun,

only at the price of the dissolution of the Parliament then sitting at Peking. The remnants of this Parliament reassembled themselves again at Canton, and to this day contend that they are the only legal Parliament of China, despite the fact that another Parliament was almost immediately summoned, by Li Yuan-hung's successor, to Peking, and, likewise, sits to this day. For over three years, therefore, China has been hopelessly divided against itself. War broke out between the North and South—the governments of Peking and Canton—and dragged on intermittently, owing to the failure of the Peace Conference which met at Shanghai in November, 1918, to arrange terms of peace. Besides the difference in political principle,—the North broadly standing for militarism and the South for democracy—the relationship of the Peking Government to Japan complicated the situation. The accusations made against certain high officials in Peking of treacherous conduct, in the pledging of political and economic rights over Chinese territories to Japan in return for loans and bribes, appear largely to be justified. In any case, they made the breach between the North and South still more difficult to heal. Personal feuds and ambitions again have done even more than political differences to divide China. They have added to the complexity of the situation until there seems to be no single plain issue on which parties are divided.

At the time of writing (October, 1920) China possesses three governments: (1) the government at Peking, where President Hsu Shi-chang enjoys the recognition of the Powers, but is himself powerless in his own country; (2) the government at Canton, still claiming to represent the true blue Republicanism of the early days, and to be the guardian of the sacred Provisional Constitution of Nanking, despising

Peking as "militarist" and "pro-Japanese," and (3) the latest creation in the west, *i.e.*, the new republican government in Szechuan, representing secession from Canton and "moderate" doctrine, as opposed to Cantonese radicalism.

Actually, the situation appears to be in the hands of military leaders rather than in the hands of any one of the civil governments. These profit by the general confusion, pursue their own ends unchecked and are a law unto themselves. Lower in the scale, gangs of bandits and robbers follow the example set on high. Writing in the *China Mission Year Book*\* for 1918, Mr. L. R. O. Bevan thus describes the existing state of affairs:—"In former times the memorials of viceroy, governor, official and censor told the Son of Heaven and his advisers what might safely be attempted. At the present day it is the circular telegram of the military leader that informs the government whether it can act in this way or that. . . . Constitutional arrangements which do not suit this or that general have fallen through. In the North, the Centre and the South, the political situation has been overshadowed and complicated, and again and again made impossible because of the opposition or the action of a military leader and those who have rallied to his standard."

Such is, in the merest outline, the internal, political situation of China to-day. The history of its development is, on the whole, a record of confusion and wastage and failure. Partly, as was suggested in the beginning, the failure of the Revolution to unite and strengthen China, was due to the "impossibilist" temper of some of its promoters, to their inability to appreciate and grapple with actualities, their lack of a real historical sense. In their hurry to achieve a Chinese Republic, they

\* *China Mission Year Book*, 1918, p. 15.

forgot China and her centuries of history, and her millions of simple, illiterate peasants, living still under the traditional social system, to whom the village elders or "gentry" assembled in council and the provincial tax-collector represented all they knew of law and government. To the vast majority of those even who fought in the Republican army, the magic word "Republic" meant no more than a promise of no more taxes to be paid. The Republican leaders had gone up to battle without counting the cost. After the initial victory, they found themselves utterly incapable of consolidating their position. The enormous task of re-organising and administering a country twelve times the size of Great Britain was far beyond the scope of the men who planned the rising in Wuchang. Yuan Shih-k'ai, in whom a practical patriotism was combined with a shrewd self-regard, saw pretty clearly some of the actual rocks ahead of thorough-going democracy, but faults of temper and tact—especially in the manœuvring of the royal title for himself, brought conflict with the democrats, when the need was for the peace of the country. Insolvency, verging upon bankruptcy, and complete failure to control the military provincial governors and their troops, have characterised every attempt at government, whether in North or South, since Yuan Shih-k'ai's death.

More noticeable than the failure due to incompetency, has been the failure due to sheer lack of moral integrity, of determination and perseverance in the pursuit of ideals—which, if impracticable, were yet ideals. Lack of moral strength in the leaders in civil government has been countered by the reckless pursuit of private ends among the military governors. In relationships with Japan and in dealings with the Opium Combine (in June, 1918)

members of the Peking Government have given flagrant proof of their untrustworthiness. The first generation of "Young China," now in office, has accepted the "squeeze"\* system of government, as compatible with Republicanism. Yet it is most obviously incompatible with justice and honesty. Its elimination is essential to good government. To eliminate it requires a re-organisation of the system of local government, a high degree of administrative ability, and, still more, a firm and consistent moral purpose.

By far the greatest need of China at the present time is for leaders who combine practical wisdom and statesmanship with real strength of character. Every newspaper, book and magazine dealing with China, emphasises this fact with literally unceasing and almost wearisome reiteration. The second generation of Young China, now mostly in the schools and colleges of the country, has laid upon it a task and a responsibility in many ways greater than that laid on the youth of any nation in the world.

#### SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

*Modern China : A Political Study.* Sih-Gung Cheng.  
(Oxford University Press. 1919. 6s.)

Deals with such subjects as—the historical conception of Chinese Government; The political situation since 1911; Constitution-making; China's foreign relations; new problems since the war.

The author is keenly interested in constitutional history and in economics. He deals admirably with his subject. His treatment of it is somewhat technical but always illuminating.

\* *i.e.*, the system by which officials are paid less than a "living wage," and are expected to augment their salary by any corrupt means they can conveniently adopt.

*The China Mission Year Book.* Published annually.

May be borrowed from the library of any missionary society that has work in China, or obtained from the Rev. W. Nelson Bitton, London Missionary Society, 48, Broadway, S.W.1.

Excellent articles on such subjects as—political developments during the year ; commerce and industry ; education ; medical work ; the trend of Chinese religious thought ; modern Chinese literature ; the Chinese Christian Church.

See also—

*Empires of the Far East.* Lawrence Lawton. 2 vols.  
(Grant Richards. 1912. 18s.)

Vol. I, Preliminary survey, and Vol. II, Book VIII deal with China, and give a detailed and interesting account of the Revolution and the events leading up to it.



## CHAPTER III

### CHINA (*continued*)

#### IV

(a) IN the "Student Movement," which began in Peking in the spring of 1919, arising out of violent indignation over the Shantung settlement, there is much evidence to show that Young China of the second generation is prepared seriously to shoulder this burden of responsibility.

When the decision of the Peace Conference relative to Shantung became known, the students of the Imperial University at Peking arranged a great demonstration of protest on the morning of the 4th May—a day which, in some sense, marks the beginning of a new era in China's history. What actually happened on that morning, when fifteen thousand students from thirty-three schools and colleges in Peking paraded the streets of the city is unimportant. The vital point is that these students demanded the dismissal of three prominent officials who were generally accused of "selling" Kiao-chou to Japan. The Government was adamant in its refusal to dismiss these men, though one of them actually died as the result of the attacks of the crowd. Moreover, official hostility to the Minister of Education and the Chancellor of the University (both of whom sided with the students) was very plainly shown. Consequently, on May 20th, the Student's Union in Peking declared a general strike. Students deserted the lecture rooms, and there followed impressive processions in the streets, accompanied by many addresses "from the Chinese

equivalent of the soap-box." Sympathetic strikes were declared by the students of other cities, and by the end of the month had spread practically all over China. The wholesale arrest by the Government of a large number of student-lecturers in Peking finally ensured the defeat of the Government itself. In order to force the release of the imprisoned students, a general strike of shop-keepers in Shanghai was declared, and was afterwards imitated elsewhere. In consequence, the students were released. The closing of the shops and the demands now made by all classes of the people for the dismissal of the "traitors" forced the Government finally to acknowledge defeat. On June 10th the resignation of the accused ministers was accepted. Backed by the merchants and the population of the cities generally, the students had won a great victory over the Government. Arising out of the events of May and June, the students and merchants began to organise themselves for future action. A "National Chinese Students' Alliance" was organised in Shanghai, as well as a "National Alliance of the Federations of All Classes." One important result of the street-preaching has been the initiation of a fairly widespread boycott of Japanese goods.

In view of the fact that, until quite recently, government has been considered the private concern of government officials, the significance of this new movement in politics, of which, as Bishop Roots says, students are the "spear-head," can hardly be over-estimated. Whereas the notice "Do not talk about Government business" has been commonly displayed in tea-shops, a text of the Student Movement is "The prosperity or ruin of the country is everybody's business."

No matter how crude its expression, the new sense of responsibility for the national life and policy of

China is full of significance, and hope for the future. The general testimony of missionaries and others who witnessed the student strikes is to the admirable earnestness and sanity of the strikers. The real question is, "Will the present student generation maintain its high ideals and its moral earnestness when it comes into office, or will these things be lost, as they were lost by the first generation of Young China when it came into the heritage of officialdom?" Certain cynical prophets have declared that the second generation must and will fail as abjectly as the first. They see no hope for the political regeneration of China from within, and would look rather to the intervention of the Western Powers in the interests of law and order. Speaking generally, however, the saner and more kindly judges of China—including to a large extent the missionary body, with its unequalled opportunities of observation—are very hopeful about the possibilities of the present student generation. Granted the abolition of the "squeeze" system, there seems every reason to believe and hope in the new day ahead of Chinese politics.\*

(b) The purifying of political life is not, however, the only task laid on the rising generation. Large problems connected with education and with social life await solution. Europeans and Americans in China are helping to-day, as they have helped in the past, to grapple with China's educational and social needs, but though the experience and help of the friendly foreigner, be he missionary, diplomat, or merchant, may be an invaluable asset for many years to come, it is clear that, ultimately, China's problems—political, educational, social and economic—can

\* This "Student Movement" is not to be confused with the Chinese branch of the World's Student Christian Federation.

be satisfactorily solved only through the application of Chinese minds and the devotion of Chinese lives.

The traditional system of education in China was based upon the Confucian classics and the voluminous commentaries written thereon. The mastery of language forms, the memorising of texts and the development, through the "eight-legged essay" of a classical literary style, were the objects of the student. The introduction of modern subjects of education, including science and modern history, by missionaries, gradually undermined the old system. Latterly, examinations for government service have been conducted upon western lines, and have included modern subjects.

So far, however, it is higher education, both missionary and government, which flourishes best in China. The contrast between, *e.g.*, a college like the Christian College at Canton, with its carefully graded school-boys and girls and its men and women students, and the educational state of China as a whole, reveals what a vast field of educational enterprise remains to be opened up. In an article in the *Chinese Recorder* for January, 1919, the number of illiterates in China was estimated at eighty to ninety per cent. of the population of the country. Although in certain provinces the provincial educational authorities have in hand plans for the establishment of free compulsory education within a reasonably short space of time, this is by no means true of China as a whole. In a large number of cases the provincial educational bureaux and commissioners of education are scarcely functioning at all, owing to the disturbed state of the country. It is clear, however, that the provision of universal elementary education must be the work of the Chinese Government. The task is far too big for the missionary societies to undertake—even if it

were desirable for it to be in their hands. It would appear that the special contribution of the missionary societies to the work must be the training, in ever increasing numbers, of teachers for the elementary schools of the country. At present, the available supply of good teachers is so small that, even if the Government were in a position to set on foot large plans for the development of elementary education the provision of enough trained teachers would be a matter of very great difficulty.

In one important matter, tending to the spread of popular education, the Chinese Government and the various missionary societies have recently co-operated, *i.e.*, in the adoption of the National Phonetic Script. This script substitutes thirty-nine phonetic symbols for the 45,000 characters of classical Chinese writing. Adopted by the Government in 1918, it was almost immediately adopted also by the "China Continuation Committee" (the committee co-ordinating the work of all the chief missionary societies working in China) and is already proving invaluable as a means of educating the illiterate, and in helping to unify the spoken language of Mandarin-speaking China.

In respect of the future of elementary education in China, it is highly significant and important that one outcome of the patriotic Student Movement has been an attempt to improve the meagre provision at present made for the education of the lower classes. In several College centres free schools have been set up, in which all the teaching is done voluntarily by students in their spare time. It appears that, in many cases, the student branches of the Y.M.C.A. have taken the lead in such enterprises, but the work is certainly not confined exclusively or even primarily to Christian students. This form of practical patriotism is something far more hopeful,



and ultimately more valuable, even than the steady persistence of the anti-Japanese campaign.

Apart from elementary education, the extension of higher education for women, the development of vocational and physical education, and the increase and improvement of medical education, all demand attention in China at the present time. From a statement made in the *Chinese Recorder* for April, 1918, by Mr. R. S. Greene, Resident Director of the China Medical Board, it appears that the greater part of the serious medical work in China is done by missionaries. The Government, it is true, maintains five medical schools, but in staff and equipment they leave much to be desired. Yet with a terribly high death rate, with small-pox common, tuberculosis on the increase and fearful outbreaks of pneumonic plague still possible—there were in China in 1918 only 2,000 qualified doctors, *i.e.*, one for every 200,000 of the population. In the United States, the proportion of doctors is one for 568; in Great Britain, one for 1,107; in Germany one for 2,000. In order to bring China even up to the level of Germany in this respect, she needs 200,000 doctors—just one hundred times more than she has got. The facts speak for themselves. The need for medical education is overwhelmingly great, and the need for qualified American and European doctors, both men and women, who can give such education, as well as minister to the country until the necessary Chinese doctors are forthcoming, is equally pressing. Again, the health of China must ultimately be in the hands of the Chinese people themselves, and the provision of sanitary legislation as well as of medical education is a heavy responsibility laid on the Government of the future. Meanwhile, in the transitional stage which must elapse, the foreign missionary and the Chinese doctor have the best of chances for co-operation.

(c) There are, broadly, three sets of social problems which present serious difficulties to the modern Chinese reformer. The first arises out of trade intercourse; the second out of the beginnings of the industrial system in China, and the third from the traditional social system of the country.

(1) The first is the traffic in opium and morphia. The responsibility for this traffic lies very largely outside China, since the quantity of imported opium is greater than the amount actually grown in China, whilst the morphia used by Chinese comes wholly from abroad. It is clear, therefore, that Young China cannot, unaided, tackle the problem thus set before it.

Take opium first. It is true that, along with forty-three other Powers, Great Britain signed the Hague Opium Convention of 1912, agreeing, along with the others, to take steps to limit the manufacture and sale of opium and its derivatives to medical uses only. Actually this Convention is still ineffective. It is true, also, that, in 1917, the ten years' agreement between Great Britain and China, relative to the opium trafic came to an end, "so that even in the British settlement of Shanghai the last opium shop will be closed by the month of March."\* Yet opium from India and Persia is still pouring into China. According to an article in *The Times*,† this Indian opium is exported indirectly to Japan and Korea, and from thence smuggled into China. Partly, no doubt, responsibility lies with the Chinese Government, and still more with Japan. But the fact that the growth of opium is allowed in India vastly in excess, not only of local consumption, but of the needs of the whole world, lays a very large share of responsibility on Great Britain.

\* *China Mission Year Book*, 1917, p. 38.

† March 27th, 1920.

For the importation of morphia into China we are no less directly responsible. Most of the morphia brought into China is manufactured by one firm in London and two in Edinburgh. From there it is shipped to America, passed in bond across the United States, shipped, unexamined, to Japan, and thence smuggled by a thousand ingenious artifices into China. According to Dr. Wu Lien-teh's figures in the *Peking and Tientsin Times* (April 5th, 1920) the importation of morphia into China has risen enormously during the last eight years. The actual figures are these :—

1911	..	5½ tons
1912	..	7½ "
1913	..	11¼ "
1914	..	14 "
1915	..	16 "
1916	..	16 "
1917	..	22½ "
1918	..	22½ "
1919	..	28 "

When it is remembered that each ton of morphia represents thirty-two million injections, the appalling character of the whole business becomes apparent. Dr. Wu Lien-teh, in a paper read to the biennial meeting of the China Medical Missionary Association in 1917,\* thus describes his own actual observations of the effect of morphia on its victims. He says :—

During my five years in Manchuria, I have seen terrible havoc wrought upon the population by the insidious drug. More than half of our regular jail-birds show needle signs all over their bodies. Professional beggars found in the streets of Harbin, Kirin, Changchun and Tsitsihar are victims of the habit, and thousands of poor people die in the large cities during the winter months, partly from cold, but principally from inability to work on account of their morphine habits. From all sources, I learn that the evil is spreading rapidly.

\* And printed in the *China Mission Year Book*, 1917, pp. 38-44.

It is, of course, worse than opium smoking, for at the cost of four or five cents a coolie can satisfy his craving and obtain immediate satisfaction.

Since the discreditable dealings of certain Government officials in Peking with the Opium Combine (June, 1918) evoked strong condemnation by representative Chinese of all classes, and protests from the British and American Governments, a new and determined attempt on the part of China herself has been made to stop the sale and use of opium and morphia. One of the first actions of the present President, Hsu-Shi-chang, was to order the public burning of twelve hundred chests of opium in Shanghai (January, 1919). The same month an "International Anti-Opium Association" was formed in Shanghai, and now has branches all over the country and a full-time Chinese Secretary. It aims at checking altogether both the smuggling of foreign opium into China, and the cultivation of the poppy in the country itself. It is carrying on a vigorous propaganda and is doing effective work.

Such energetic measures on the part of the Chinese themselves deserve a worthy response from other countries. Our plain duty requires the limitation of the quantity of opium grown in India. Recently the British Government has taken steps drastically to check the exportation of morphia from this country.

(2) Industrialism is, as yet, a very small thing in China. But it has come, and come to stay. China's population forms an almost inexhaustible reservoir of cheap labour, and this fact, combined with the lack of any labour organisation adequate to the new situation (the old guilds were erected under widely different circumstances to meet entirely different needs) threatens China with "all the evils which marked our own Industrial Revolution before the Shaftesbury Acts—often in an aggravated form."

A quotation from Mr. J. B. Tayler,\* Professor of Economics at the Christian University, Peking, best illustrates the sort of problems arising out of the new industrialism :—

In the factories little boys from eight to nine years of age are employed for long hours—in the cotton mills they work for twelve hours for  $\frac{1}{2}$ d. Or the boys carry coal up long inclines out of the mines in loads that tax and over-tax their strength. In thriving industries there is much sweated labour ; work is put out to be done by the women in their homes—*e.g.*, the spinning of asbestos thread or the making up of match-boxes. There is a continual growth of casual labour at the ports, *where five men can be hired more cheaply than a mule*, and almost all the haulage of goods is done by coolies. . . . Unhealthy conditions prevail—fumes from the yellow phosphorus used there for matches (which has long been forbidden in this country because it is so poisonous and causes “ phossy jaw ”), make the air thick in a mixing room ; dust, so thick that it is difficult to see across a fair-sized room, is sometimes found, and the men breathe with difficulty through sacking tied over the nose and mouth.

Fortunately there is evidence to show that the dangers arising out of such a state of affairs are already keenly felt by the best section of the educated young men and women of the country. The desire for social service—seen in the establishment by students of free schools in various educational centres—extends to the study of industrial welfare. Again it appears that the Christian forces in the country lead the way. Most prominent among efforts for reform is the Yangtzepoo Social Centre in the mill district of Shanghai, conducted in connection with, and as the laboratory of the Department of Sociology of Shanghai (Baptist) College. The work of the Centre is supported by several mill-owners as well as by students and includes the running of continuation schools for firms in the district, of elementary schools

\*To Mr. Tayler the author is very largely indebted for information in this section.



for boys and girls and of a play-centre; the provision of concerts and entertainments by the students of the college, and the conducting of Sunday Schools and religious services for the mill-hands by the students. Finally, the Centre has a Department of Research, through which the students of the college conduct a thorough investigation of social conditions in the mill-district, entering into questions of population, housing and sanitation, wages, hours and conditions of labour, welfare efforts in the mills, etc.

It is for Young China to decide whether, in the future, factory legislation and the development of trades-unions after the western pattern (phenomena which have already begun to appear in Japan) will suffice as a check upon the evils of the capitalist system of industry, or whether a more radical treatment of the situation be not necessary and possible. China's era of industrialism is, as has been said, only just dawning. The vast area and tremendous potentialities of rural inland China make the character of China's future system of production a matter of momentous importance. Already roads and railways are beginning to open up remote districts, and the application of modern methods of mining and agriculture (the former often backed by foreign capital) is beginning to tell on the life and social organisation even of country districts. How is the efficiency in production, which China needs to remedy her national poverty, to be combined with social justice and the retention of the best and most characteristic features of China's ancient civilisation? The search for an answer to this question alone offers boundless scope for the moral purpose, the thought, energy and ability of Young China. A citizen of London or Leeds or Sheffield cannot but desire for the future Chinese economists and captains of industry a bolder faith, a more disinterested

patriotism and a keener insight and ability than were employed in the building of our western systems of production.

(3) Of the social problems arising, partly out of China's traditional social system, partly from the cosmopolitan frailties of man, it is not possible to speak at length here. The evil of foot-binding for women, though practically dead in the big towns is still very widespread in country districts—and China is still mainly a "continent" of rural villages. Concubinage, or the system of "secondary-wives," is firmly rooted in the social system, and forms a knotty problem for the Chinese Church. The whole question of the position of women in the national life of the country is an important one to-day, and must be so for many years to come, despite the enormous progress made in the status and opportunities of women under Christian influence. The fully educated woman with an independent life of her own, is still a pioneer in China, taking the country as a whole. In a land so poor as China, with all her untapped resources, is at present, the actual waste involved by ancestor worship is a not unimportant question.

The Peking Social Reform Association, launched in May, 1915, to combat three main evils—concubinage, immorality, and gambling—and similar movements in different parts of the country, show that the conscience of Young China is awake to the evils inherent in China's national life, as well as to those which arise more directly from her contact with the West. Once more the influence of Christianity in provoking and intensifying the desire for reform is clearly marked. Practically all the officers of the Peking Association, for example, are Christians, although the society has no definitely religious basis. The "Health Campaigns" promoted in

several centres by the Y.M.C.A., form a similar example of Christian influence and initiative.

Mr. Tayler tells of a fine instance of social enthusiasm and service among the engineering students of the Anglo-Chinese College at Tientsin. Though provoked by the behaviour of the Chinese rivers (which occasioned the terrible North China floods of 1917) rather than by a "social problem," the instance is noteworthy as an illustration of the prevailing temper of social service among students. Many of these engineering students, when they leave college, choose river-conservancy work, though the remuneration is much less than for railway or other engineering work, because they feel it to be vital for the country's welfare. Moreover, some students give up their winter holidays to surveying the land covered with sand by previous floods. In so doing they have to put up with the inconveniences of a remote countryside and the hardship of working in the open-air with metal instruments, when the thermometer registers ten to twenty degrees of frost.

Facts of this kind promise much for China in the future.

## V

Behind the student strikes of 1919, the boycott of Japan, the efforts to promote free education, industrial welfare and social purity, lies a single great movement of thought and desire, as yet in its initial stages. In its best aspects the Student Movement and the co-operating agencies for social reform express a genuine passion for national righteousness. The best ambitions and most real self-devotion of the rising generation centre in the hope of China's "greatness" in every sense of the word.

The possession of any high ambition, or ideal hard of attainment, often brings, to the possessor, a sense of weakness and failure—in some cases, of impotence. To some extent at all events this is happening to the young Chinese patriot to-day. The failure of the first generation of Young China to “make good,” when actually in office, has revealed, pretty clearly, a fatal weakness somewhere in the national character. At the present time a widespread desire for moral power exists among the younger men and women of the country, and leads to a fairly general willingness at all events to examine the fundamental ideas of any religion which professes to be a “gospel of power.”

Partly as a result of this desire to explore religion as a source of power, probably still more, in the case of Confucianism, from a desire to raise the standard of the national religion of China against an invading western faith, there are signs to-day of renewed vitality in the two most important religions of China—Confucianism and Buddhism. Taoism, having degenerated from a pure and beautiful religious philosophy into a matter of spells and incantations and ceremonies, performed by its priests for their clients of any religion, does not really count to-day as a religious force. Islam, with its chief centre in the province of Karsu, is not sufficiently strong nor widespread to exert much influence in the country as a whole.

In the recent formation, however, of a Confucian Association, the influence of the new nationalist movement in China is clearly marked. For Confucianism is, *par excellence*, the religion which expresses the national genius of China—combining with a sense of a somewhat remote Supreme Being, a very practical, decorous code of social ethics, and a strong sense of family and national

loyalty, extending to the worship of ancestors and national heroes. The history of Confucianism is bound up with the history of China's great past and ancient civilisation. This attempt, therefore, through the Confucian Association, to propagate the fine humanitarianism of Confucius, is a very natural outcome of the patriotic movement. It does not, however, appear that this effort is at present exerting a very deep or widespread influence throughout China, since, broadly speaking, Confucianism is, and must remain, unless radically altered, a religion for the educated. With all its virtues, it is essentially a literary and aristocratic religion. Self-control, duty, balance, courtesy, were the predominant qualities of its founder, and the appeal of Confucianism has always been primarily to the cultured. In this, apart from its lack of spiritual driving force obtained in immediate communion with God, lies one of the great practical weaknesses of Confucianism as a "religion of power." The task of raising a great country to the heights of national righteousness can never be accomplished by its intellectuals only, on behalf of the people as a whole. The leaven of power must work through the whole mass, and it is difficult to believe that Confucianism, the religion of the Courtier-Sage, can ever act in this way.

The recent revival of Buddhist activity, reported from several districts in China, but by no means general, springs, probably, less from nationalist motives (since Buddhism is not an indigenous Chinese religion, but was introduced, and largely altered in the process, from the first century A.D. onwards), than from a deeper craving for spiritual satisfaction. Possibly this longing for inward peace and unity and for converse with the divine is due, in many cases, to a sort of reaction from the political strife and unrest,



the feverish eagerness for "service" and the general atmosphere of unquiet now prevailing in China. Through faith in the saving power of Amitabha, the great and pitiful Buddha of the Western Heavens, through self-sacrifice in imitation of his sacrifice, through striving after communion with God, the devout Buddhist, be he priest or lay devotee, comes very near to that complete reconciliation with God and man, which is the goal of religious effort and the real source of power. But there is an incompleteness even in Northern Buddhism (*i.e.*, that found in China and Japan). It lies in the lack of a living faith and hope in a Kingdom of God on earth, arising from a more fundamental unbelief in the reality of the time-process and of human activities conditioned thereby. Yet in the strength of its conviction about God and in its emphasis upon communion with Him, Buddhism, at its best, is real strength to China and a fine foundation for the fuller faith of Christ.

Alongside of these tendencies, in certain parts of China, to turn for fresh strength and inspiration to Confucianism and Buddhism, a certain open-mindedness and tolerance on the subject of religion generally is, as has already been indicated, a very clearly marked characteristic of the thinking people of the country at the present time. An obvious illustration of this was given in 1916, when the establishment of Confucianism as a state religion was under discussion by the "Conference on Constitution," then sitting to draft a permanent constitution for China. The establishment of a Society for Religious Liberty, divided into five sections—Greek, Roman and Protestant Christians, Moslems and Buddhists—and the support of many prominent Confucianists, sufficed to defeat the proposal, and was certainly significant of the prevailing religious temper.

This attitude of open-mindedness, characteristic of the educated people, offers certain great advantages and opportunities to the Christian Church in China at the present time. It is evident moreover that, broadly speaking, the Church is responding magnificently to the opportunity thus offered; that extraordinarily successful evangelistic work is being done; and that among the students, as well as among the poorer and less educated, or uneducated classes, Christianity is progressing steadily.

One of the most striking Christian missionary efforts of recent years in any part of the world has recently (January, 1920) been initiated by the Chinese Church. It is called the "China for Christ Movement," and its aim is a nation-wide evangelistic campaign. The movement is essentially a *Chinese* movement, originated by Chinese Christian leaders, irrespective of western "denominations," and organised by them without need of much assistance from the European and American missionaries working in China. The spirit of unity and devotion with which the leaders of the movement are fired, and the administrative ability which they are already showing in the planning and carrying through of a vast programme, stand out in striking relief against the background of political chaos. Within the whole movement for national righteousness, the China for Christ Movement is doing something of fundamental importance for the nation.

Yet in this very opportunity of success that is offered lies a real difficulty and temptation for the exponents of Christianity in China. The general cry is, as has been said, for *power* to overcome national and social evils and to deliver China from "poverty and moral weakness, foreign encroachments and official corruption." Christianity can and must do this. It must inspire and strengthen the whole

movement for national righteousness in China. The Church must rejoice in the manifestation of working of the Spirit of God outside its own bounds and must co-operate with all the agencies for good in the national life.

All this is absolutely true and right. Christianity is a social gospel and in it is power for the healing of national wounds. To any student of the New Testament this is absolutely undeniable. Yet in the anxiety of the preacher to extend the visible bounds of the Christian Church, it is easy to preach, almost unconsciously, a rather cheap, superficial version of this social gospel.

A study of the missionary situation in China just now forces one to the conclusion that, in some quarters, owing to the use of a somewhat misleading, though splendidly earnest, form of missionary propaganda, the general impression created in the minds of Chinese hearers is that Christianity is primarily an effective and inexpensive nostrum for all the national ills. (In passing it should be said that the China for Christ Movement is wholly free from such tendencies ; and, in fact, expresses, in some sort, a reaction against them.) It is difficult to elaborate this point without appearing to be casuistical, or at least hypercritical. In addressing mass meetings of patriotic students it must be extraordinarily hard to resist this particular temptation to take evangelistic short-cuts. At the end of the day the harm is done not so much, probably, to those who, under the influence of the stirring speech, decide to accept, or at all events to study Christianity, but through the creation in the most keenly perceptive and most drastically honest minds, of a prejudice against the methods of Christian "conscriptionists."

Despite the undoubted response now being made by students and educated men generally to the

Christian message, there is still a very large body which, partly for the sort of reason named above, partly for other motives, is still untouched. Numbers of men, no doubt, stand aside merely from apathy, but a great number do so for genuine intellectual reasons. The attitude of the latter has been thus described by Professor T. C. Chao, of Soochow University\* :—

There has been a rapid spread of scientific knowledge and an increasing demand for the scientific treatment of all branches of learning, philosophy and religion not excepted. More and more does one perceive the working of a real scientific spirit in the magazines, an open-mindedness unknown a few years ago and an attitude of liberalness and tolerance, together with a persistent demand for a reasonable explanation of things. . . . The danger lies in the unpreparedness of the Church to meet this growing scientific scholarship with an equally able scholarship and an equally tolerant spirit.

Facts like these indicate the need for first-rate Christian apologetic work in China. Ideally, of course, the Christian apologists for China should be themselves Chinese, and in time, doubtless, these will be forthcoming. The important thing is that the Christian Church in China should possess the ability to satisfy the mind of the student, who, though filled like his fellows with patriotic zeal and the desire for moral power, asks first about the new religion, *Is it the truth?*

When all is said and done, the plain and simple fact remains that for China, as elsewhere, the heart of Christianity is the Personality of Jesus Christ. It is He who makes Christianity something more than a fine series of truths about God and the world, something more than the most perfect way of life known to men, something more than a gospel of power for the individual and for society. It is He who arrests the attention and compels the love

\* *Chinese Recorder*, May, 1920.

both of those whose critical faculties will not yet allow them to accept Christian "doctrine," and of those who are too illiterate and undeveloped mentally to grasp dogmatic theology at all. In spite of all the failings of His exponents, the direct and compelling nature of His appeal to an able, keenly perceptive mind, is seen in the following quotations from an article on "Christianity and the Chinese People," by Mr. Chen Tu-sen, a well-known progressive scholar and thinker, who would not call himself a Christian, and who writes in *La Jeunesse*—the leading organ of the agnostic, cultural movement in the University of Peking.\* Mr. Chen first urges his readers to treat Christianity seriously, as a real factor in the life of the country, in spite of certain discredited "superstitions" associated with it. He says:—

At present, the natural sciences have made wonderful progress and certain theological teachings of Christianity, like Creation, the Trinity and miracles, have lost their force and the ordinary person thereby concludes that Christianity is refuted. My idea is that Christianity is a religion of love, and unless we accept the doctrine of Nietzsche condemning the love of fellow-men, then we cannot lightly say that we have done with the Christian religion. . . . Our attitude towards Christianity should not merely be one of superficial understanding, with a view to removing causes for future trouble, but one of deep-seated appreciation. . . . We should try to cultivate the lofty and majestic character of Jesus and imbue our very blood with His warm and sympathetic spirit.

Here follows a detailed description of the "wonderful personality" and spirit of Jesus, well documented with quotations from the Fourth Gospel. Mr. Chen then proceeds to show Jesus in relation to China and her national problems. He goes on

Our greatest fear is that politicians, nowadays, are trying to make use of Christianity for their own purposes. They

\* A translation of this article appeared in the *Chinese Recorder*, July, 1920.



raise such catch phrases as "Christianity to save the country," to oppose a neighbouring country. They have forgotten that Jesus came not to save a country, but to save the entire human race for eternal life. They have forgotten that Jesus teaches us to love our neighbour as ourselves. They have forgotten Jesus' command to love our enemies, and to pray for our persecutors. They attack communism as "the greatest evil of the future," and the "doctrine of chaos." They have forgotten that Christianity is Good News for the poor and Jesus is the Friend of the poor.

Clearly this is a vision—if not a complete vision—of the real Jesus, who is greater and more beautiful and more compelling in His attractiveness than the whole sum of Christian doctrine and ethics. It is He who is the centre of the China for Christ Movement. Its wide organisation and comprehensive programme are subordinate to a single aim. Its leaders believe that the greatest need of China, with all her heavy problems and unquiet strivings, is to see Christ clearly, with her own eyes. They aim at lifting up the real Jesus.

### SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

*The China Mission Year Book.* Published annually.

May be borrowed from the library of any missionary society that has work in China, or obtained from the Rev. W. Nelson Bitton, London Missionary Society, 48, Broadway, S.W.1.

Excellent articles on such subjects as—Political developments during the year ; commerce and industry ; education ; medical work ; the trend of Chinese religious thought ; modern Chinese literature ; the Chinese Christian Church.

*The Three Religions of China.* W. E. Soothill. (Hodder and Stoughton. 1913. 6s.)

A scholarly, but very readable, analysis of the main religious ideas entering into Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism.

*The Regeneration of New China.* W. Nelson Bitton.  
(United Council for Missionary Education.  
1914. 1s.)

Deals with such subjects as—religion and the character of the race ; Christianity and the new order ; the Christian Church and the heritage of the past in China ; the Christian Church and the problems of the nation.

Although much has happened since 1914, this book is still most valuable.

## CHAPTER IV

### JAPAN

#### I

THERE is a real need to-day for some fresh attempt to understand the special genius, with its attendant possibilities and temptations, of Japan. Wholesale criticism and almost equally general condemnation of the Japanese people and their rulers have, for some time, practically comprised the mental attitude towards Japan of such Europeans and Americans as think and talk at all about the Far Eastern question. To those who look only at the surface of history, this appears perfectly justifiable. But in that it is purely critical and negative, such a body of opinion does not merely fail to help towards a better state of affairs in the Far East, but actually hinders progress and deadens the effect of those liberalising and purifying influences which are undoubtedly at work. One of the first results of any serious, open-minded study of Japanese life and thought for the last sixty or seventy years, is to make one very chary of joining the host of those who indiscriminately fling stones. Further, such study opens up some large questions connected with the meaning, possibilities, and limitations of patriotism, the relationship of economic need to Imperialism, the possibilities of state education, the bearing of democratic ideas upon a nation's political and economic pre-eminence, and the influence of unqualified material success on moral progress.

In order to understand imperialist and industrial Japan of the twentieth century it is essential to gain some sort of idea of Japanese society as it existed at

the time (1853) when Commodore Perry and his squadron knocked at the doors of the country and delivered a letter from the President of the United States of America, demanding the opening of ports to American vessels. For there has been no clean cut with the past in Japanese history, and, in spite of her intense "modernism," the chief elements in the life of Old Japan are still among the main determining influences in the life of the country to-day.

For two hundred and thirty years before Perry's visit, Japan had been closed to the western world. With a slight exception in favour of Holland, no western traders had been allowed to enter her ports since the early part of the seventeenth century. Society was organised on a feudal and military basis, and had been so organised since the twelfth century. The Emperor represented a royal line which had supplied Japan with rulers for two thousand years, and was to be traced back ultimately, so it was believed, to the Sun Goddess. Actually, during the feudal period, his power was nominal, though he still served as a symbol of the divinity of the Japanese people. Real power was in the hands of the Shogun, or supreme Military Governor. Since 1603, the Shogunate had been held by the heads of the powerful Tokugawa clan, whose first representatives had expelled the foreigners (mainly Jesuit missionaries) from Japan, persecuted their disloyal followers (the Christian converts) and united the country in a strict obedience to themselves. Next to the Shogun in rank stood the "daimyos," or feudal princes. Below them were the "samurai," or two-sworded men, the rank and file of the warrior class, owning allegiance to the daimyos as to their feudal superiors. Below the military classes were the artisans, merchants and farmers and below them again the "eta," or outcastes, being mostly workers in hides, and the

“hinin,” or beggars, a word meaning literally “not human.”

The samurai was the characteristic product of Old Japan, and loyalty the outstanding virtue of the national life and the cardinal principle of Bushido—the code of chivalry. The popular ideal was, as Dr. Harada reminds us, summed up in the “story of the Forty-seven Ronin who revenged the death of their prince in the face of the greatest difficulties, each, in order to accomplish his object, hating his father, mother, wife and children, and, when it was accomplished, committing hara-kiri in calm satisfaction.”\* In the perfection of military virtues Japan had reached a place as high as that attained by any warrior-nation in history.

Such was the civilisation which, owing to the desire of the American traders to harbour in Japanese ports on their way across to China, was to be brought in touch with the civilisation of the Western States. For Europe followed on the heels of America and demanded rights of trade with Japan. The year of Perry’s mission was the year of the outbreak of the Crimean war. England, for fear lest Russian ambition and power might, if unchecked, threaten her Indian Empire, France, because Napoleon III. hoped that, as a military hero, he might dazzle men into forgetfulness of how he had set up the Second Empire, were combining to bolster up Turkey against Tsar Nicholas, and to do so were sending men to die in thousands in the long winter siege of Sebastopol (1854-55). For roughly thirty years during the time when Japan was learning her first political lessons from the West, the personality of Bismarck, the greatest exponent of Treitschke’s political philosophy, dominated Europe. The importance of such a fact, in combination with another fact, *i.e.*, the

\*T. Harada, *The Faith of Japan*, p. 121.



Japanese facility for imitation and assimilation—is undoubtedly great. Lafcadio Hearn summarises one version of the “gospel of power” as it was presented by Europe to Japan :

No people so ruled by altruism as to lose its capacities for aggression and cunning, can hold its own in the present state of the world, against races hardened by the discipline of war. The future Japan must rely upon the least amiable qualities of her character for success in the universal struggle ; and she will need to develop them strongly.\*

Together with the general contribution made by feudal Japan and militarist Europe to the development of the modern nationalist and imperialist spirit of the country, it is possible to trace, more precisely, the working of two further influences tending in the same direction. The first of these was the literary and religious movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In 1715 Prince Mitsukuni and the group of scholars working with him published his great history of Japan. In 1851 the history was printed for the first time, but, during the interval between those dates, the work “was copied from hand to hand by eager students, like the Bible by mediæval monks or the works of Plato and Aristotle” (Prof. Iyenaga).† The influence of this study of history was to give renewed emphasis to the belief in the divine origin and nature of Japan and her Emperor. Tested by the light of history the Shogunate appeared as a mere usurpation of imperial power. Alongside of the study of history, went a revival of the ancient Shinto faith of the country—the Way of the Gods and heroes of Japan, among whom the descendants of Jimmu Tenno (the first “human” Emperor) held high place. As against the prevailing Chinese culture and Chinese Buddhism, the Shinto

\* Lafcadio Hearn, *Japan : An Interpretation*, p. 505.

† Quoted by Lawrence Lawton in *Empires of the Far East*, Vol. I, p. 150.

scholars preached the revival of *Yamato Damashii*, the spirit of Japan, and a return to the ancient religion of loyalty to the Gods and Emperors.

Two direct results of the historico-religious movement are to be seen in the "Restoration" of the Emperor to full sovereignty and the abolition of the Shogunate in 1868, and, in the following year, the surrender by the daimyos of all their feudal rights, leading to the complete abolition of the feudal system, *i.e.*, of the existing "imperia in imperio." It is true that the jealousy of the Satsuma and Choshu clans for the Tokugawa family played a part in bringing about the fall of the Shogunate, but, fundamentally, the Restoration sprang from a jealous devotion to the Emperor, buttressed by a violent anti-foreign feeling, which did not wholly die away until the last decade of the century. "Expel the barbarian" was one of the mottoes inscribed on the banners of the revolting clans in 1868, and, in effect, both the Restoration and the abolition of feudalism formed part of a single movement for national unification against the foreigner. The grant by the Emperor of a Constitution in 1890 marked a further stage in the same movement. But of this more will be said later.

Alongside the literary religious revival, a second formative influence in the development of modern Japan is to be found in the pressure of economic need. It was this, primarily, which gradually converted Japan's increasingly self-conscious nationalism into a frank imperialism. A few facts relating to the present day best illustrate why and how the economic factor has been of such great importance in directing Japanese policy.

Japan has to-day a population of fifty-seven million, increasing at the rate of 800,000 a year, but her territory is smaller than that of California, which

has a population of only five million. Moreover, the islands of Japan are highly mountainous. Only about seventeen per cent. of the total area of the islands is arable land. Lacking also adequate supplies of coal and iron, the foundations of modern industry, Japan is worse off to-day, economically, than any civilised country in the world. Moreover, various restrictions and disqualifications, expressly intended to keep out "coloured" emigrants, and the competition of cheap labour which they represent, have put a severe check on the possibilities of Japanese emigration to California and British Columbia. Australia has, for the same reasons, been closed absolutely against it.

The existing state of affairs—as sketched above—is the outcome of a gradual process of development. During the years of this development Japan was, on the one hand, learning more and more of western standards of living, and the standard of comfort of her own more prosperous classes was rising accordingly. On the other hand, she was watching the scramble for "spheres of interests" in China among the Western Powers. The combination of a super-abundant population, paucity of material resources, and a consciousness that she possesses all the enterprise and ability necessary for carrying on the business of a far larger and wealthier Empire, accounts very largely for Japanese imperialistic tendencies to-day. The provision of an outlet for her surplus population and energies, and the control of adequate supplies of raw material in the Far East have been among the aims which Japanese statesmen have set before them. With this in mind, recent events in the relations of Japan with China and Russia fall into a coherent line of policy.

Korea offered the first field to Japanese ambitions. The victory of Japan over China (1894-95) ensured the recognition of Korea's "independence" of

China. In reality it meant that Japan obtained fuller opportunities to pursue her own interests in the peninsula. The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) secured Korea against the menace of Russia (by now fairly established in Manchuria), and established Japan's "permanent political, military and economic interests" in the country. The acquisition of Port Arthur and Dalny in the Liaotung peninsula (formerly held by Russia) and of certain Russian railway and mining privileges in South Manchuria completed the fruits of Japan's victory. The annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910 merely sealed a long process in the relations of the two countries. Finally, the forcing upon China in 1915 of the "Treaty of the Twenty-one Demands," has meant a great step forward in the extension of Japan's economic and political interests in China.\* Wars and dramatic incidents, similar to the presentation of the 1915 treaties, have not comprised the whole of the movement whereby Japan has been seeking an outlet for her population, enterprise and capital on the mainland. "Peaceful penetration," including the settling of Japanese on the mainland, the investment of Japanese capital in joint Sino-Japanese or purely Japanese concerns in China, and the lending of large sums to the Chinese Government, since the Revolution, has throughout been steadily pursued, and has been equally a part of imperialist policy.

The concentration of purpose with which Japan has pursued the policy towards which her natural genius, the example, and to some extent the fear of the West, and the urgency of economic need, impelled her, are not short of marvellous. Setting aside for the moment any considerations of the badness or goodness of the policy and of the

\* See pp 46 and 91.

philosophy on which it is founded, it is undeniable that the success with which it has been crowned has been extraordinarily hard won and well-deserved. The carrying out of the plans of statesmen has meant the sacrifice of hundreds of lives, laid down in passionate devotion to Japan and her sacred ruler, and in fearless contempt of death. Alongside of the story of the forty-seven Ronin must be placed the later story of a Japanese soldier in Manchuria at the time of the Russo-Japanese war. He was found one day "reading a letter from a woman and shedding tears. He was rebuked in scorn by a lieutenant for his weakness of character; but was discovered to be reading a letter from his mother telling him of her deep affection for her only son, of her fear lest he might not be brave at the front because of his love for her, of her determination to take her own life that he might be free from all anxiety and the more ready to give himself for his country."

The formation and maintenance of such an exalted spirit of patriotism among the people as a whole has been possible largely through the Japanese system of State education, by which the ideas of the leaders have entered into the texture of the people's minds. The Imperial Rescript on education, issued in 1890 by the Emperor Meiji, best characterises the spirit of Japanese education. The fact that free compulsory education, lasting now over a period of six years, is given, indicates the scope of the imperial teaching. The Rescript runs as follows :

Ye, our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends true; bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore, advance public good and promote common interests; always respect the constitution



and observe the laws ; should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State ; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth. So shall ye not only be our good and faithful subjects, but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers. The way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors, to be observed alike by their Descendants and subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all places. It is our wish to lay it to heart in all reverence, in common with our own subjects, that we may all attain to the same virtue.

It is easy to point out the contrast between the ideal and the actuality. Beyond doubt Japan has played a selfish game in Korea. Not all the stories of atrocities committed there by Japanese officials are true, but some undoubtedly are, and in any case Japan's policy has been somewhat unimaginative—the provision of roads and sanitation and general “tidiness,” but the wounding of national susceptibilities and of national pride. The Twenty-one Demands were, undoubtedly, forced upon China with unfair pressure, if not with actual threats. Moreover, the contents of the fifth group of the demands (contained within the original twenty-one, but not acceded to by China, and not embodied in the treaty) would, if carried, have placed China, almost literally, “under the tutelage of her neighbour.”\* This “fifth group” and the spirit which

\* Latourette, *The Development of Japan*, p. 194. The main demands made by Japan in the fifth group included the following :

(1) The employment by the Chinese Government of Japanese political, financial and military advisers.

(2) The placing of police departments in important places in China under the joint administration of the two nations.

(3) The purchase by China of fifty per cent. or more of her munitions of war from Japan, or the establishment of a joint arsenal, using Japanese experts and Japanese material.

(4) The right of Japanese churches, schools and hospitals to own land in the heart of China, and the right to propagate religious doctrines.

(5) Railway concessions in the Yangtze valley ; the employment of no foreign capital in Fukien without permission from Japan.

prompted it involved a flagrant attempt to trample upon the rights and independence of another nation.

All this is true. But it is not worth saying and not worth the paper it is written on, unless it drives us, not to an easy condemnation of the wickedness of Japan, but to a more thorough examination of current political ideals and of our moral standards of value in international, as well as in individual, life. One of the most effective contributions which can be made by anyone to the solution of the "Far Eastern question," as part of the wider problem of general international welfare, is to submit the ideas lying behind three words—"Power," "Wealth," "Patriotism"—to a most searching and sincere analysis.

## II

(a) At the bottom of Japanese Imperialism, with its centre in devotion to the Emperor and its outcome in wars and "peaceful" aggressions, lies a fundamental unbelief in the value of human personality as an end in itself. On no other basis could the ancient custom of *hara-kiri*, or the more modern talk of "human bullets" stand. The creed of a Japanese citizen, as taught in the schools of the country, actually consists of a reiterated belief in the need for absolute obedience to the Imperial will, and for the absolute subordination of the individual to its accomplishment. "Personality has worth as it can contribute to this end. . . . The motive in life is this and this alone."\*

From this same unbelief in the final value of any human being, this habit of valuing men with reference to some idea or purpose external to themselves,

\* *The Christian Movement in the Japanese Empire*, 1918 p. 215 (forming part of a summary of the teaching on this subject contained in some of the text-books used in Middle Schools).

spring also the problems connected with Japan's internal political organisation and social life. A liberal and humane foreign policy can be achieved only as the forces of democracy gain strength inside the country, and eventually succeed in re-organising the political and social system. The three-fold task depends ultimately upon the victory of a new faith in human personality over the old unbelief.

At the present time the political situation shows certain hopeful signs, relating both to foreign policy and to internal affairs.

The original Constitution, granted by the Emperor Meiji to his subjects in 1889, though a striking document, has never been, and was never intended to be, an instrument of democracy. As Mr. Byas of the *Japan Advertiser* has put it. "The prime cause of the transformation of Japan was not the pressure of an oppressed class for more power, but the necessity of strengthening the Government in face of the foreign danger. The inclusion of the people was an afterthought, inspired by the enthusiasm of Itagaki, and some others, for the liberal ideas which they observed to have sway in the most powerful nations of the West." As at present constituted, the powers of the Lower House are fairly narrowly limited to the rights of criticism and question, and to a control of finance which is hardly more than nominal. The House of Peers is solidly aristocratic and conservative, and the Cabinet is liable to be over-ruled by the Privy Council, if, in any matter in dispute, the latter is supported by the Emperor. The Emperor himself is still the divine law-giver to his people, and the Constitution is, at all events in theory, his gracious gift to the nation. The group—now very small—of Elder Statesmen, or *Genro*, although unknown to the Constitution, still exercise great power by reason of their influence

with the Emperor. The fall of the liberal Okuma Cabinet in 1916, and its replacement by the reactionary cabinet headed by Count Terauchi, afforded a recent dramatic illustration of the power of the *Genro*, working behind the scenes, to overturn, when considered necessary, the whole spirit and work of Parliamentary government.

In spite of a governmental system of this character, the spirit of revolt and the determination to capture freedom is most certainly working among the people of Japan to-day. No matter how strictly the children of the primary schools be drilled and disciplined in obedience to the Emperor, the rapid growth of higher education in all branches and an increasing familiarity with democratic movements in Europe and America are generating a new force in the national life. Worthless as the Constitution may appear, and narrow as the franchise may be, it is still an important fact that some sort of elective system has been in working order for thirty years. Evidence of the effectiveness of the new democratic spirit was given in September 1918, when Count Terauchi and his cabinet were forced to resign, owing to the popular clamour of indignation caused by their failure to control the soaring prices of food and other necessities. The new premier, Mr. Kei Hara, was the first commoner to form a cabinet in Japan. The tone of the new Government is distinctly more liberal than that of its predecessor. In 1919, after the anti-Japanese uprising in the spring, a civil governor was substituted for the military governor in Korea. Although it is impossible to say that the Military Party in Japanese political life, advocating expansion on the mainland, and a "thorough" policy at home and abroad, is as yet very seriously weakened, it is possible hopefully to welcome the new Liberal movement in the country.

(b) The task of re-ordering the social life of Japan centres round two main problems—the status of the labourer and the status of women.

The enormously rapid growth of the factory system in Japan is perhaps the most striking fact in the history of the internal evolution of the feudal, agricultural islands into a modern nation. A few bare facts best illustrate what has happened. During the last ten years the population of the industrial suburbs of Tokyo increased 425 per cent., and in two years the number of her factories has been doubled.\* Thirty-five years ago there were only two hundred factories in Japan, employing 15,000 people. In 1919 there were 25,000 factories, employing 2,000,000 persons. The European War caused a great “business boom” in Japan, since, owing to the inability of European and American firms to continue to supply eastern markets with manufactured goods, a sudden demand was created for Japanese manufactures in many new quarters. Among the other industries, ship-building especially progressed by leaps and bounds.

Industrialism, especially under the influence of the war “boom,” has, on the one hand, produced the “*narikin*” or mushroom millionaire. Profiteering in Japan during the war was, in many cases, flagrant. Enterprise and capital have been rewarded out of all proportion to their actual service to the country. For example, the average dividends of the Cotton Spinning and Weaving Companies were, for the first six months of 1918, 50.27 per cent. and for the first six months of 1919, 49.9 per cent.†

\* The figures are taken from an article by Dr. Axling in *The Christian Movement in the Japanese Empire*, 1919, pp. 165-172.

† *Report on the Commercial, Industrial and Financial Situation in Japan*, 1919, by Mr. Hugh Horne, Commercial Secretary to the British Embassy at Tokyo.



On the other hand, the position of the employee is still, taking Japan as a whole, a very unenviable one. A super-abundant population makes labour cheap. As a labouring man said scornfully to Miss Caroline Macdonald, a prominent missionary and social worker, "Why should Japan be concerned with protecting the life of the ordinary man and woman? There are so many of us now that we are a nuisance. What are a few more or less anyway?" As in every country which has suffered an Industrial Revolution the first steps for the protection of the worker have been slow and difficult. It is true that in 1916 a Factory Act came into force, which takes twelve hours as the ordinary basis of the working day. But the Act is so full of exceptions and is so limited in its application that "its practical effect up-to-date is inconsiderable." For example, the act applies only to factories employing fifteen or more persons. Conditions in the smaller factories are still absolutely unregulated. At the recent Labour Congress at Washington (October, 1919), the Japanese delegates promised on behalf of the Government to adopt the principle of an eight-hour working-day, and to put it into practice as soon as should conveniently be possible. This must involve the lapse, not of months, but of years. Meanwhile a seventy-hour working-week is common. As to the conditions of work, Dr. Axling, writing in 1919, states that :

From the standpoints of sanitation, ventilation and everything that concerns the welfare of the employees the conditions are most vicious in the majority of cases. In the building of these factories seemingly no thought has been paid to the welfare of those who were to toil. . . . The employees are treated as so many machines, in common with the other machinery that goes to fit up the factory for its work. Last year there were 271,000 cases of disease and accidents in the large factories that come under the jurisdiction of the Factory Law. Of these 110,000 cases were caused by imperfect

conditions of factory accommodation or the lack of accident prevention devices. And conditions in these factories far surpass the multitude of smaller factories that do not come under the jurisdiction of the Factory Law.\*

Of the conditions of women's labour, Dr. Axling says :

Throughout Japan there are 850,000 female workers ; of this host 300,000 are under twenty years of age. There are day and night shifts and the hours are heartbreakingly long. These factories have the dormitory system for their female operatives. In some cases, like the Fuji Spinning Company, and other first-class companies, the conditions in these dormitories are very commendable. But too often the conditions are most vicious. In some factories half of the girls go wrong morally before the first year of their employment is ended. According to investigation, every year 80,000 of the female workers in the industrial plants of Japan have to leave the factories on account of illness. 14,000 are annually victims of consumption. In fact, the government reports say that " in villages and provincial towns tuberculosis is mostly brought in through operatives from factories." This loss is made up by recruiting 200,000 new women and girls every year. Of these 120,000 never return again to their homes. Of those who do return one in six is ill.†

The growing self-consciousness of Labour in Japan is a hopeful sign. Rice-riots (as in August, 1918) and strikes may be a crude form of protest against the deep-rooted system which produces the profiteer at one end of the scale and the slums of Osaka at the other. But at all events they show that the spirit of social democracy is stirring in Japan. There are already the beginnings of a genuine labour organisation in the country. Since the downfall of the Terauchi cabinet, men have been less afraid to discuss socialist theories, and Japan possesses some ardent Marxians. Mr. Galen Fisher relates how, at one time of extreme imperial

\* *The Christian Movement in the Japanese Empire*, 1919, pp. 166 and 167.

† *The Christian Movement in the Japanese Empire*, 1919, p. 170.

nervousness of anything approaching socialism, a police inspector went so far as to confiscate a copy of *The Social Instincts of Animals* which he found in a foreign bookshop in Tokyo !

Alongside of a certain number of genuine attempts, made, often under Christian influence, by the best employers to improve factory conditions, there is observable also a somewhat nervous tendency on the part of Capital to promote organisations for the preservation of its old feudal relationship with Labour. Moreover, besides these so-called "labour-associations" promoted by employers, the Government is itself trying to encourage the formation in each factory of a local organisation which is to harmonise the respective claims of the labouring man and his employer, in the hopes that, through the establishment of such local groups, it can prevent the development of a strong national labour organisation. It does not however appear that these efforts will ultimately be successful. The genuine Labour Movement promises to become too strong to be thus cajoled.

The problem of the position of women in Japanese life is a really serious and difficult one. The rush of women into industry and the unsatisfactory character of the conditions under which they work has already been touched upon. There is not space here to enter into the need for more and wider opportunities for the higher education of women in Japan. There is as yet no Government college for women (though the four Imperial Universities have a handful of women students) and the enormous sums assigned by the Government and given by the Emperor and private persons for the extension of higher education during the years 1919-1925, are, apparently, to be devoted mainly, if not exclusively, to the extension of higher education for boys. A fact like this

is indicative of some defect in the general estimation of women.

The most serious evil arising from this defective view of womanhood is that of prostitution. On this point it is useless to speak other than plainly. According to Miss Caroline Macdonald there are nearly twice as many licensed prostitutes, *geisha* and restaurant girls in Japan to-day as there are girls in the high-schools. It is impossible for a Londoner to speak or write in condemnation of Japan without turning in thought to the streets and brothels of his own city. But prostitution is more than a mere fact in the social life of Japan. It is a legalised fact. Practically it amounts to a special "industry." In a forceful article Miss Macdonald described the licensed quarters of Tokyo, "the infamous Yoshiwara," with its "magnificent houses, the like of which are not to be found in any other part of Japan—a striking contrast to the squalor which exists within shouting distance of the place." "One sees," she says, "little girls wandering about on the streets, gazing longingly on all the beauty they see in the windows. No wonder if these little mites, brought up in the surrounding squalor, are fired with ambition to live in these beautiful houses and wear elegant clothes, and be, as they think, grand ladies. It is not difficult, they say, to keep these places recruited."\*

Again, it would be wrong to say that the outlook for the purification of Japan's social life, and the raising of the position of women in it, is wholly dark. Serious as the present situation is, it is certainly not hopeless. The social conscience of the country shows signs of stirring over these evils, even though such uneasiness is as yet by no means widespread nor actively influential. Partly, so we are told, the

\* *The Christian Movement in the Japanese Empire*, 1919, p. 224.

constant stream of criticism poured out by Europeans and Americans concerning the industrial and social evils in Japan, accounts for the growing sensitiveness of Japanese to the rottenness of their social system in some of its aspects. The national pride of the country is highly susceptible to such outside influences. There seems, as a result, to be an increasing tendency among the conservative nationalist leaders to call upon the nation to return to the ancient paths of its primitive virtue. An interesting illustration of this is given by a Memorandum and Appendix on Education, addressed by Viscount Hirata, Chairman of the Special Commission on Education, to President Hara in the early spring of 1919.\* Viscount Hirata calls attention to the necessity for "improvements in social conditions if it is desired to reap the fullest benefits from the work of education in schools." He goes on to suggest that "To remove the evil tendencies of the times, nothing can be of greater importance than to give national thoughts and ideas a trend along a unified course leading to the realisation of a national ideal." This implies a return from western materialism to "the simplicity and sincerity which both in theory and practice have been traditional with us." Viscount Hirata goes on: "To be more definite, the fundamental principle underlying the organisation of our Empire should be clearly defined and published at home and abroad." In the appendix to the memorandum this is further explained as implying "the strengthening of the people's veneration and adoration for our national polity, the beautiful habit of piety towards Deities and ancestors" and the encouragement of that sense of obligation for requiting favours received, which "constitutes the foremost principle of Oriental morality."

\* And quoted in the *Japan Evangelist*, March, 1919.



As a matter of fact, the remedy here proposed seems hardly adequate to the magnitude of the task to be accomplished. It is very difficult to see how the necessary driving force for the eradication of deep-seated evils, is to come even from a historic and beautiful habit of piety towards Nature-Gods, national heroes and ancestors. Moreover, as a matter of history, it must be admitted that the appeal for inspiration and strength to a mythological "golden age" of the past has seldom, if ever, succeeded in accomplishing among the mass of the people any permanent reform, though such appeals have frequently been made by would-be reformers of different countries and different ages. It does not appear therefore that the backward-looking movement in Japanese thought to-day promises any hope of real progress in morality. A new faith in the future, and a new view of the value and possibilities of the individual man or woman, springing from the vision of the perfect human life, are the only forces strong enough in the world to-day, to draw men away from selfishness and lust, and fill them with the passion for service. In any case this revolution in national life cannot be accomplished without a long and hard struggle. The real hope for Japan seems to lie in what few indications there are that, apart from the negative dislike of criticism and from any appeal to the past, this struggle is beginning, here and there, promoted by a few individuals through the power of a new and creative faith in the future.

### III

From the foregoing it must be clear that the real religious problem of Japan centres round Shinto. Japanese Buddhists are numerous. The

number of Buddhist sects is large, and the multitude of their tenets bewildering to the outsider. Certain of the sects, notably the Zen sect, emphasising contemplation and discipline, and appealing mainly to the educated mind and to the instinct for military discipline, the two Amida sects, Jodo and Shin, emphasising faith in the saving grace of Amida-Buddha, and the Nichiren sect, are distinctly influential to-day in the lives of individual Japanese. But, for anyone who would take account of the Japanese *nation* as a whole, and would seek to understand its genius and its tendencies, the main subject of study must be Shinto, and the most prominent religious figure the sacred person of the Emperor. For round the place of the Mikado in the Shinto religion, and the real meaning of "Emperor worship" centre, at the present time, the most interesting and important questions concerning Japanese thought. The attempt to answer them must take us very near to the heart of modern Japanese life. It should be added that Buddhism and Shinto are by no means mutually exclusive in the minds and lives of the Japanese.

*The Times* of November 4th, 1920, contains an interesting account, by Prince Yamagata, of the impressive ceremonies recently performed in Tokyo, before huge and reverent crowds, in the dedication of the shrine of Meiji Tenno, the late Emperor. After a brief statement as to the unique relationship existent between Japan and her Imperial House, and a warm tribute to the personal character and achievements of the late Emperor, the article ends as follows :

It is the ancient custom of Japan to deify men who in life served the State with great distinction, and thus eternally bind their spirits to the hearts of posterity. It is altogether natural and proper that the Japanese people should desire to enshrine

the soul of the Emperor who, in his own person, led his race, dedicating his life to national advancement. In this sense we devoutly participate in the consecration of the Meiji shrine, and do believe that the spirit of the great monarch is actually among us.

What exactly do the word "deify" and the final sentence of the description mean? Some reference has already been made to the old belief in the descent of the first Emperor of Japan from the Sun Goddess, of the revival of Shinto, preparing for the Restoration of 1868, and of the way in which loyalty to the Emperor has been taught in the State schools of the country. The Imperial Rescript on education, which is read annually, with great reverence and solemnity, in the schools, has been quoted. In 1889, during a period of general opposition among Japanese leaders to all religions as "superstition," Shinto as a "National cult"—*i.e.*, a cult of patriotism advanced by the reverencing of national heroes at national shrines—was officially distinguished from the various religious sects of popular Shinto, with their worship of Gods many and Lords many. The former was put under the control of a special Bureau of Shrines in the Home Department; the latter under a Bureau of Religions in the Education Department. Is such a distinction true or possible to-day, and do the ceremonies described by Prince Yamagata fall under the heading of a "National Cult"—patriotic, but non-religious?

This is a question which has been hotly debated by Japanese missionaries of recent years. The answer to be given to it is of real practical importance for the Japanese Christian and for the missionary, in their perplexity about the right attitude to be adopted by the Emperor's Christian subjects towards the national shrines. An article in the *International Review of Missions* for July, 1920, by Dr. Albertus

Pieters, throws much light on the whole subject. The article is really a review of a book\* recently published in Tokyo by Dr. Genshi Kato, the lecturer on Comparative Religion in the College of Literature of the Imperial University of Tokyo. From this article and from the quotations given from Dr. Kato's book, it is clear that the most up-to-date interpretation of the Emperor's relation to his people insists upon the full and complete deification of the Mikado. Dr. Kato speaks without any ambiguity on this point. The old distinction between patriotic and religious Shinto falls utterly to the ground under the force of his unreserved attribution of divinity to the Emperor. Dr. Pieters quotes from Dr. Kato: "From ancient times to the present the Emperor of Japan has occupied the position which among the Chinese was accorded to Heaven, and among the Jews to Jehovah." Loyalty and filial devotion—*chu-ko*—to the Emperor is equivalent to the religious faith of Abraham or of Job in Jehovah. The worship of the Emperor does not, it is true, exclude the worship of other gods, since the Japanese conception of deity is, ultimately, pantheistic; but the Mikado "takes the place of Jehovah as the supreme object of worship. He is entitled to receive from every Japanese such absolute trust and self-surrender as is identical with religious faith. He prescribes not only what they ought to do, but what they ought to think" (Dr. Pieters). Moreover, by the extension of Mikadoism to its extremest limit, Japanese economic imperialism, which has already been discussed, finds a powerful counterpart in a religious imperialism. Dr. Pieters informs us that one of the newest of the popular Shinto sects—the Ten-ri-kyo—has a missionary in London, sent to preach the world-Messiahship of the

\* *Waga Kokutai to Shinto*, Dr. Genshi Kato. Feb., 1919. Can be obtained through the Methodist Publishing House, Tokyo.

Japanese Emperor, and a quotation from the *Japan Advertiser* of May 9th, 1919, tells us that "the Imperial Family of Japan is the parent, not only of her sixty millions, but of all mankind on earth. . . . All human disputes therefore, may be settled in accordance with its immaculate justice." We are further informed that the hope for the League of Nations lies in placing the Imperial Family of Japan at its head, armed with the strong punitive force which the functions of the League require.

Even if we discount somewhat the more extravagant claims of the Shinto imperialist, the extremely serious nature of Japan's religious problem to-day is manifest. Up to a certain point the parallel drawn between the Jewish attitude to Jehovah and the attitude of the fanatically loyal Japanese to the Emperor may hold good, but there is none the less a contrast of fundamental importance between the two. To the Jews, Jehovah was a great Idea—at first, apparently, a crude Idea, a tribal god of war, but an Idea which, as it was gradually apprehended more fully, revealed more and more of truth and moral beauty, until, in the perception of a universal moral law, the Jewish people came to worship the one Ruler of the whole world, the source of all they knew of truth and goodness, yet infinitely transcending the bounds of their own conceptions of Him. Mikadoism, on the other hand, has no place for divine transcendence, since the source of morality, as of religious truth, is the human ruler of a very imperfectly moralised State. Emperor-worship contains no thought of progress towards the perfection of a transcendent God, but rather provides for the ordering of all life by the dead hand of imperial tradition and of the laws of State.

Meanwhile, the need for a deeper spiritual satisfaction than is offered by the national religion is



expressing itself in modern Japan in many spontaneous and interesting ways. A general study of the religious situation of the country to-day impresses one with the sense that, in reaction from the wave of materialism which swept over Japan during the last years of the nineteenth and opening years of the twentieth century, and in protest against the powerful propaganda of Mikadoism, little groups of thinkers in different parts of the country are "experimenting" in more deeply spiritual forms of religion.

As yet there is nothing sufficiently big or imposing to be dignified with the name of a "movement" to show for this spiritual striving and unrest. The Christian Church in Japan does not as yet, unfortunately, seem to offer a home to the rebels up and down the country, who, disgusted alike with politics and social conditions, and with the poverty of the imperial creed, are striving after spiritual reality. Though there is undoubtedly much real devotion within the bounds of organised Christianity in Japan, it is admitted by missionaries and Japanese Christians alike, that as a system and an organisation, Christianity does not at present possess the attractive power that it ought to have. Two writers\* in the *Christian Movement in the Japanese Empire* for 1919, suggest among the causes for this failure, the prejudices created by the teaching during the nineties, and to some extent at the present time also, of a theology which was out of harmony with modern knowledge; the lack of a practical social programme for the whole Church of Christ in Japan; the western form of organisation; the

\* Mr. T. Kagawa and Mr. J. Merle Davis, to whose article on "Christian Movements outside the Christian Church," the author is much indebted. See *The Christian Movement in the Japanese Empire*, 1919, pp. 211-219.

dominance of foreign leadership, etc. More important even than these things however seems to be some sort of failure to appeal "to the deep religious mysticism, the craving for the experience of God," and to the spirit of sacrifice and service.

In the opinion of these two writers "there are scores of thousands in Japan who understand and are guided by the spirit of Jesus in their daily life, but who, for various reasons, are not connected with any Church." Over those in Japan, as in all parts of the world, who rebel against spiritual barrenness and unreality, the personality of Jesus Christ exercises a strong charm and attractiveness. "The Temptation of Christ" is the name of a recently-written Japanese play, and is typical of a school of dramas on Christian subjects. A group of artists, musicians, writers and philosophers living together in a village-community in Kyushu, with the object of trying to re-order society through such means, have taken the Lord's Prayer as the motto of their group. In "Neo-Buddhism" there is a marked tendency to draw inspiration from the life of Christ. Witness a leader of this Neo-Buddhist movement, Ito Choshin, who, "strongly influenced by Tolstoi as well as by Christ, taught non-resistance, love of enemies, and salvation by faith, with a frank approach to Christianity."

Within the Church itself there are signs of a new spirit stirring. The Federation of Japanese Churches has undoubtedly made efforts to promote better relations between Japan and Korea, and between China and Japan. There *is* real Christianity within the Church, and there is no need to fear for the future. But the uniting of the different branches of the Church and the real subordination of the foreign missionary to it, are two objects which are still to be realised. The Church of the Future in Japan

waits for their achievement, and for the drawing together of the confessed and unconfessed followers of Christ.

### SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

*The Development of Japan.* K. S. Latourette. (Macmillan, New York. 1918. 8s.)

A good historical account. The latter part is especially useful.

*Japan: the Rise of a Modern Power.* Robert P. Porter. (Oxford University Press. 1918. 6s. 6d.)

*The Christian Movement in the Japanese Empire.*  
Published annually.

Can be borrowed from the library of any missionary society which has work in Japan (e.g., C.M.S., S.P.G.), or obtained from the Religious Tract Society, St. Paul's Churchyard, E.C.

Similar in contents to the *China Mission Year Book*.

*The Faith of Japan.* T. Harada. (Macmillan, New York. 1914. 7s. 6d.)

An interesting sketch of the Japanese religious genius, rather than a systematic account of Buddhism, Shinto, etc.

*Studies in Japanese Buddhism.* A. K. Reischauer. (Macmillan, New York. 1917. 10s. 6d.)

A very valuable and scholarly study in a fascinating subject.

*Emperor-Worship in Japan.* Albertus Pieters.

An article in the *International Review of Missions*. July, 1920.

Reference may be made also to

*Empires of the Far East.* Lawrence Lawton. 2 vols. (Grant Richards. 1912. 18s.)

Vol. I, and Vol. II, Books IV-VI, deal with Japan and Korea.

## CHAPTER V

### THE MOSLEM WORLD

To every student of the world and its peoples to-day there are two regions which present both the most fascinating problems and the most perplexing enigmas. The one, as we have already seen, is China, the other is the Moslem World.

What is meant by the phrase "The Moslem World"? The very name is significant, for it suggests that the huge populations in Africa and the Near and Middle East, although divided in respect of political sovereignty, are united in a common religious bond, and that the unity is of greater moment than the difference. This has been true in the past, it is probably true to-day, and the question how far it is likely to be true in the future is one of the most difficult and important that confront us at the present time.

There are, roughly, two hundred million Moslems\* in the world, and they are found everywhere from the Atlantic coast of Africa to China and Siam. In India there are sixty-six million Moslems, more than one-fifth of her entire population. The vast majority of the Malays, in the Federated States and in the Dutch East Indies, are Moslems. The peoples of the Middle East, Afghanistan, Persia, Mesopotamia, Arabia, are almost solidly Moslem. The Near East—

\* "Moslem," "Muslim" or "Musalman" are participial forms meaning "one who submits." "Islam" is a verbal noun meaning "submission." The religion and its followers should strictly be denoted "Islam" and "Moslem," and not "Mohammedanism" and "Mohammedan." The latter description, though very common, is distasteful to Moslems, because it suggests that Mohammed stands to them in a parallel position to that of Christ to us, *i.e.*, is Divine.

Asia Minor, Turkey, Syria, Palestine, Egypt—has for centuries been the chief seat of Moslem Government, and along the North African coast from Egypt to the Atlantic practically the entire population is Moslem. Inland, throughout the Sudan, in Nigeria and other parts of West Africa, in the Congo, in Abyssinia and Somaliland, in Zanzibar and the East Coast, in Central Africa right down to the Zambesi, we find Islam either already in possession or rapidly increasing in numbers.

All the great races of the world are found in the "House of Islam"—Aryan, Semitic, Tatar, Malay, Mongol, Negro. Not only are there these profound racial differences, but the Moslem populations are divided in political allegiance from one another, and by far the greatest number—over four-fifths of the whole—are under the sway of Christian Powers. Britain alone includes more than ninety million Moslems in her Empire. This divided political allegiance has been dramatically shown in the war, where Moslems from India fought Moslems from Turkey, and that in a war where the unity of Islam was made a battle-cry on one side at least. It is necessary to understand the very real obstacles that stand in the way of Moslem unity if we are not to under-estimate or fail in appreciating the singular and permanent kinship of sympathy and faith which enables, or rather compels, us to speak of the "Moslem World."

That which is common to the whole Moslem world is neither race nor government, but religion. There is a brotherhood among Moslems, not only among particularly devout Moslems, but among *all* Moslems, in virtue of the faith they all profess. Those who knew the Indian troops in France saw the genuine delight shown by Moslems from Hindostan on meeting Moslems from other parts of the world.



The negro races of Africa, where Islam is advancing so rapidly, are received into the brotherhood when they accept the faith, and there is no doubt whatever that one powerful reason for the spread of Islam is the fact that the pagan tribes are incorporated into a society of a higher level in prestige than that which they had previously enjoyed. But if proof of this world brotherhood of Islam is needed, it has been dramatically provided in the efforts made by Indian Moslems to defend the Turks against the dismemberment of their Empire, and in the widely-felt uneasiness which Islam has somehow created in the world outside, lest this consciousness of Islamic brotherhood should issue in some common political action. Behind the thing vaguely called "Pan-Islam," about which more will be said later, there lies this fact of the world brotherhood of Islam, and a Christian cannot help contrasting it with the lack of enthusiasm displayed by the average English Christian abroad towards the "brother in Christ" whose colour is brown or yellow or black.

## I

It is only possible here to discuss the religion of Islam so far as it issues in social and political consequences, but some such discussion is essential if we are to understand the real meaning of what is happening to-day.

The fundamental reality in Islam is its stark assertion of the unity and sovereignty of God. Mohammed himself, in his later life, was, in some respects, a far from admirable character, but to the very end of his life, and especially in the earlier period of his prophetic work, he was a man possessed by an overwhelming sense of God, Creator and Judge. Carlyle is right when he answers those who ascribe

Mohammed's success solely to the power of his sword, "But where will you get your sword?" Mohammed certainly used the armed might of his followers to induce conversion, but he had first to gain his followers and weld them together. The force that united the tribes of Arabia, and in a few years made Rome and Persia tremble, was the force of belief in One God, Almighty. The strength of Islam, whether against the metaphysic-ridden, speculative Christianity of the seventh century, or against African polytheism to-day, lies in this conviction, and it is the foundation of much real piety and quiet, unhasting trust.

This austere monotheism, however, has certain grievous defects, and they may be seen most clearly as they issue in social and political consequences. The very name "Islam" illustrates the limited nature of the revelation both of the divine and of human nature in the Koran. "Submission" is man's duty to God, and God is not one with whom man has loving fellowship, He is one to whom man submits. God has revealed Himself finally and completely in the Book, and His will is to be obeyed. His character is ill-defined, He is arbitrary, He is not invested with that absolute holiness which the Jews saw in Jehovah, and so He tends to become simple Force, without any worthy conception of Love to explain and define His might. Similarly, man's duty, as an individual and in society, is laid down eternally in the Koran, and there is no "Spirit leading into all truth," which should supply a principle of progress. Hence it is, that Islam has always tended to autocracy in government.\* The Turks had Sultans in Tartary before ever they knew

\* It is only just to add that the austere Deism of Islam has been qualified in practice by the mystical school of Sufiism, which in extreme forms has run into Pantheism

Islam, but the Sultan found in Islam a most congenial home. Canon Gairdner tells how, at a debate in Cairo, one young student boldly said that "the autocratic ideals of the East were the result of its monarchic theology, intending to defend both by saying so."\* Along with this autocracy in government has gone a largely stationary civilisation. European culture, it is true, owes a debt to the brilliant days of the Caliphs of Baghdad and to the Moslems of N.W. Africa and Spain, yet on the whole Islam has been a barrier to culture and progress. The civilisation of the Near East and North Africa, where Islam has had the field to itself for centuries, shows almost no sign at all of the power to develop.

There is another reason for this, in addition to the "monarchic theology" already mentioned. The character and views of Mohammed, enshrined in the Koran and Traditions, have become the moral ideal and social rule for millions, and strangely enough in the case of so sternly monotheistic a religion, something remarkably like a deification of Mohammed has taken place. Of the greatness of Mohammed there can be little question, but his life is stained with gross lapses, even from his own codes. For the race to be tied to the moral example of Mohammed is to stereotype for centuries the weaknesses and limitations of a man. Nowhere is this more seen than in the position of woman under Islam. The laws affecting marriage and divorce are terribly lax, the system of the seclusion of women behind the *purdah* makes education difficult and contact with the outer world virtually impossible, so that illiteracy among women and girls is almost universal. It is common in educated Moslem circles to represent the teaching and practice of Islam as different from what we have suggested. Here is the

\* *Rebuke of Islam*, pp. 146-7.

witness of a young Egyptian Effendi, who writes with the ferocity of a reformer :

The neo-Moslems who are confronted with a world that expresses its disgust at the degradation of women in Islam, have sought by all means to prove that Moslem women have the same position as their Christian sisters. . . . The life of a Moslem women is full of miseries. Deprived of education, she is given at an early age to a husband she does not love or even know. Looked upon as a plaything or a slave she loses all self-respect. She may be the third or fourth wife of her husband. She may be divorced at any time and without any reason. These are the actual conditions under which Moslem women live to-day, and, as long as they cling to the Book of the Arabian prophet, they will remain so.

Viscount Bryce remarks :

The social institutions of the Moslems are almost as great a hindrance to progress as the comparative stagnation of their intellectual life.

Another doctrine, deeply rooted in Islam, and with great practical consequences, is that of the unity of the temporal and spiritual power. Ideally, Islam is a theocratic state, governed by the Caliph as the successor of the Prophet. The range of the faith should be co-extensive with the political sovereignty of the Moslem. This has long been impossible in fact, but it has never been abandoned in idea, and it is an element in the situation which no student of the Moslem world can afford to forget. Islam, so far at least, has never been a purely spiritual religion. It has been, in theory, a state. The importance of Turkey has lain here, that the Sultan, though not of the tribe of the Prophet, did represent to the Moslem imagination the temporal authority which is proper to Islam. The Caliph is not, like the Pope, a spiritual officer. Islam is a highly democratic religion in some ways, and matters of doctrine are settled by doctors of the law, who arrive at a sort of consensus of opinion. But the

Caliph is the temporal ruler who sees that the law is carried out. He must therefore be an independent monarch, and a Caliph who is politically in tutelage to a Christian Power is to the Moslem a contradiction in terms.

In estimating the significance of Islam to-day, there is another element of which we must take account, namely the history of Islam and its relation with other faiths. It is a conquering religion and it is rich in symbols of its conquest. St. Sophia and many another Church turned mosque; the mosque at Benares built of the carved stones of Hindu temples that Aurangzeb cast down; Jerusalem, where till lately the Turk kept the peace between the Latin and Greek Christians; these and many others are symbols to the Moslem of his history as a conqueror. As history goes, it is not long since he was at the gates of Vienna, or the fall of Constantinople shook the world, and only a few centuries further back, and that Mediterranean coast of North Africa, now a Moslem stronghold, reared Augustine and Tertullian and other memorable figures in Christian history. Who can look at the mighty fortresses and tombs of the Mughal kings in India and not realise something of the pride of Islam? The Moslem world has never altogether forgotten these things, and the present political state of Islam has to be considered in relation to the past.

Moreover, this Moslem prestige and pride is a not inconsiderable element in the missionary and proselytising power of Islam. We have mentioned already the sense of brotherhood in Islam, and the power lent to its appeal to the pagans of Africa by the inclusion into this brotherhood which it promises. There is nothing racial or local about Islam. It is a world-faith, and it is in no way abating its claim. Doubtless much of the African advance can be



explained as due to causes not entirely creditable to Islam, but one cannot withhold admiration from the manner in which Islam not only advances but produces indigenous Moslem communities which hold fast their own faith and propagate it in their turn.

## II

It is now time to examine the extent to which modern movements have affected and changed the Moslem world, and particularly the changes wrought by the war and by the settlement which followed it.

There are two cardinal influences which have to be considered, the gradual lowering of the prestige of Turkey, the principal Moslem Power, and the entry of non-Islamic ideas and cultural movements into the Moslem world. Our attention will mainly be fastened upon the effects of the war in these respects, but it is always to be remembered that the process, of which the war was the culmination, began long before. The "disintegration of Islam," which is visibly taking place to-day, has a history, and in some ways the war, great as its influence has been, has simply strengthened in volume, or brought to the surface, tendencies already present, though little noticed.

The Young Turk revolution in Constantinople was in many ways disappointing. Mr. G. K. Chesterton has somewhere crystallised a not uncommon view in the phrase that "he would as soon have his throat cut by an old Turk as by a Young one!" Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to dismiss the Revolution as a mere political adventure. Socially, it had real results. Ideas, political and social, derived not from the Koran or the Traditions of Mohammed, but from Western Europe, began to spread. The effects on the upper classes of women

were noticeable; more of them began to seek education, women's newspapers started, women lawyers were found practising (among Russian Moslems), and women doctors and women teachers increased in numbers.

This mingling of new ideas and culture with the old has been vastly accelerated by the war. Men from every part of the Moslem world found themselves thrust into intimate contact with races which to them were new, and sent to visit lands enjoying totally different social customs from those they had known. The armies and the labour corps brought much misery with them, but they also brought experience and new horizons. This has been proved true in country after country, in North Africa, Egypt, Arabia, Syria, and wherever men were taken away from their old surroundings. A new openness of mind has come to them, a reluctance to be content with ancient paths, and a questioning of what was never questioned before. Moreover, the weakening of the Moslem temporal power has meant a greater freedom for inquiry and discussion, restrictions have been broken down, and sentiments which, under former conditions, it might have been dangerous to express, can now be uttered without fear or reserve.

This new contact between Moslem society (or certain strata of it) and the outer world has had one notable effect, that Moslems have become more conscious of the judgment passed by the world on Moslem institutions. Polygamy and the seclusion of women, illiteracy, obscurantism, despotism, are all seen against the background of the scorn of the educated world, and Moslems are acutely conscious of the attitude towards their social customs which is virtually universal throughout Europe and America, to go no farther. The effects are seen partly in efforts (already mentioned) to represent the teaching of the

Koran and essential Islam as far superior to the actual social practice of Moslem lands, and partly in a real spirit of reform. An interesting example of this double tendency was seen in a conference of Indian Moslem ladies, held in 1918, who protested strongly against polygamy, and when met by the difficulty, "But the Koran allows it," found ways of explaining what the Koran, in their view, really meant. In such cases, the attempted allegorising or spiritualising of Koranic teaching is of little importance, what matters is the solid ethical progress which all the time is being made.

It is, however, in the realm of politics that the larger results of the war are to be seen, and the central fact is the position of Turkey, around whose relation to the war settlement so many anxious questions gather.

The Sultan of Turkey has for centuries been the Caliph of the orthodox Moslem world. He is not of the blood of the Prophet, and there is no necessary connection whatever between the Caliphate and Constantinople. But Constantinople is one of the most famous cities in the world—it is, indeed, as its Turkish name, Stamboul\* indicates, "the City" *par excellence*—and it has an imperial tradition second only to Rome, and in the eyes of the Near East superior to it. Moreover, of all the Moslem states, none but Turkey could claim to be a great power in the eyes of the world. Persia was under the control of Britain and Russia, Afghanistan was dangerous, but out of the main stream of the world's life, Egypt was under British control, all the North African States were under French or Spanish or Italian tutelage. Turkey alone represented the old Moslem tradition of power. Nowhere else could the Caliph enjoy that "assured

\* "Stamboul," or "Istambol," is simply the Greek "eis ten polin," "to the City."

political independence" which Lord Cromer has described as essential to his position.

Before the war, Turkish prestige had begun to ebb. During the latter part of the nineteenth century the diplomatic skill of her rulers had used the jealousies of the Christian powers to maintain her in place, and to postpone the day when her own internal weakness should be manifest. Then came the Italian descent on Tripoli, and then the Balkan wars, in which, though in the end Turkey retained most of what she had previously held in Europe, her reputation sadly declined.

Her political and military leaders in the Great War were nationalists. They cared about Turkey, but they did not, as will shortly be shown, particularly care about Islam. Following out tendencies which had manifested themselves before the war, they began a Turanian or Tatar policy—usually referred to as Pan-Turanianism—which consisted in a conscious endeavour to emphasise the racially and linguistically Turanian nature of the Turkish people and rule, to unite the Tatar elements in and out of the Turkish Empire, and then to "Turkify" the non-Turk or Tatar portions. It is not unlikely that in this Pan-Turanian policy is to be found one at least of the causes of the terrible massacres of the Armenians. They were a markedly non-Turanian as well as non-Moslem people.

But the Pan-Turians cared little about Islam. The Young Turk *coterie* of French Positivists appear to have treated religion exclusively as a tool to be used, and the religion they patronised was simple Turkish racial pride and faith in the old tutelary gods of the Tatar race. The following prayer was circulated in 1917 by Enver Pasha to the Army, to be recited by every Turkish soldier. "Almighty God, grant the Turks health, and unite all the

brethren in the benevolence of the Sultan. That Thy power may be glorified, grant us the favour of the White Wolf. Thou, young Turan, thou, beloved Fatherland, we beseech Thee to show us Thy path. Our great ancestor, Abhouz, calls us. Almighty God, shed upon the Turks the blaze of Thy light, that the path of Turan may be plain, and dwellings be illuminated in every place and corner with a rosy glow." The White Wolf is a pre-Moslem deity of the Tatar steppes! It is not hard to understand why the recent rulers of Turkey have not convinced the Moslem world of their orthodoxy, and why a *jihad* (holy war) called by them with the backing of the Germans lacked somewhat of conviction.

The Pan-Turanian movement did not succeed, partly because there was too much Islam in the Turkish Empire for a blatantly non-Moslem appeal to meet with much response, and partly because of the growing spirit of Nationality in the several parts of the Empire. The attempted "Turkification" came too late. The day has now passed when the nascent forces of nationality in the realms ruled by the Turks can be forcibly restrained within a single political structure, and that, too, based on a racial idea.

The next sentiment to be exploited by the Turks was that symbolised by the phrase "pan-Islam." We have already seen that the Moslem world is united by a real sense of common brotherhood, and it is here that the tangible reality of pan-Islam is to be found. This common religious sentiment the Turks sought to convert to their own uses, and to rally all the forces of Islam in defence of Turkey and the Caliphate. The theoretic Moslem ideal of a Church-state, where spiritual and temporal power are co-extensive, could not be realised, but, at least the power of Islamic sentiment could be united to



defend the last great Moslem sovereignty from disintegration at the hands of Christian nations.

At a time when this movement is still in process, it is hardly wise to give any confident estimate of its power or its likelihood of success. We can, however analyse it. There is, on the one hand, the great and undeniable shock which Moslem prestige has suffered, both in the year preceding the war and in the war itself, through the weakening of Turkey. Indian Moslems have been second to none of the communities of India in their allegiance to the British Raj, but the widespread restlessness which may be discerned among them, while it has many causes, is in part to be attributed to the shock of Turkish defeat and the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire. Islam, less than any other religion, can contemplate calmly the disappearance of world-power, and the Turks, as we have pointed out, stood to Islam for the political power and independence of Islam. They were keepers of the Holy Places. The thought of Baghdad and Mesopotamia under British control, of Palestine a Zionist Kingdom under British suzerainty, of Syria a French "zone," and Turkey in Europe reduced to the City and little else, could not but be highly disturbing to any thinking Moslem. He saw in it the disappearance of his faith from the world-stage, on which it had for so long played a great part. We need not let our loathing for the Turkish rule over subject nationalities blind us to the realities underlying this widespread Moslem uneasiness. The true significance of the Indian Moslem movement has been obscured by the fact that the cause of Turkish imperial rule, when all is said, is a hopelessly bad case to fight.

Against this undoubted feeling that they are menaced with political extinction, we have to put

the distrust felt by Moslems for the Islam of the Turk. His Turanian move showed the accommodating nature of the Young Turk religion, and there were other things. The Turks had been notoriously lax in keeping the great fast of Ramadhan, the pilgrimage to Mecca had been stopped, and very orthodox Arabs, like those of the Hedjaz, do not hesitate to declare the Turks bad Moslems. Educated and informed Moslems know quite well that Turkey, having been inveigled to her ruin by Germany, is trying to use the prestige, sentiment and fanaticism of Islam to get her out of her difficulties.

The chief difficulty, however, in the way of Pan-Islam as a political factor is the rise and growth of the spirit of nationality. As long as Islam stands, there will be "Pan-Islam" in the sense of a religious kinship among all Moslems, but the power of nationality is rapidly rendering impossible any pan-Islamic political or military movement. The Moslem world, and the Turkish Empire within it, contain strongly marked types which can and ought to work out their national destinies. Arab and Kurd, Persian and Syrian and Egyptian are quite separate types, and they will, in the end, with or without the assistance of "mandatory" powers, achieve national distinctiveness and national life.

The case of Egypt is much to the point. No one can attribute Egyptian nationalism simply to Islam, because the Coptic educated class has evinced as strongly Nationalist feelings as the Moslem Egyptian majority. Egyptian nationality has, in a large measure, been created in recent times by the unifying influences of the British occupation, strengthened by the fervid profession of faith in nationality made by all the main participants in the war. It has grown by repression, which suggests that while resistance to Western domination may, as we have

seen in Turkey and India, produce Pan-Islamic sentiment, it may also tend to strengthen nationalist feeling.

It is, therefore, to nationality rather than to "Pan-Islam" that we should look for the most vital political influence in the Moslem world. The sense of common religious kinship will continue among Moslems, but political development will be shaped by other forces.

### III

The effect of recent history upon Moslem religion can be separately discussed, but it has to be remembered how closely Moslem religion is related to Moslem society and politics. There is a good deal of evidence to show that the military weakness of Islam has aroused doubts as to its religious authority. This is an excellent instance of the difficulty of forming a judgment about Moslem affairs. Superficially, it appears a contradiction to say that the lowering of Turkish prestige has created something of an anti-Western Pan-Islamic sentiment, and also that the military weakness of Islam has created doubt as to the spiritual truth of it. Yet both tendencies are going on simultaneously. A religion in which conquest, pride and material power bulk as largely as they have done in Islam cannot readily brook humiliation, and it may be that "there is a very short step from the arrogance of the conqueror to the cringing of the beaten" in Islam. This has been detected in Nigeria and in Tripoli and Morocco. If it results in nothing more, it will at least reduce fanaticism and the dead weight of orthodox opposition to inquiry and reform, and it will mean that openness of mind will be more possible all over the

Moslem world. The unquestioning faith of the Moslem in Islam has been shaken in one quarter, and the unsettlement is not likely to cease there.

Not only defeat in war, however, but the whole progress of modern ideas is radically modifying the religious outlook of the educated Moslem, alike in Egypt and Persia and India. Here are two testimonies, the first from an Egyptian Moslem scholar, recently become a Christian. "Real belief in Islam among educated Moslems is almost non-existent. I mean to say that the old blind belief that Islam is the only true religion, and Mohammed is the apostle and prophet, however black his life record may be, is no longer tolerable among educated Moslems. In their hearts, judging from modern ethics under whose influences they have come, they cannot believe that Mohammed is the exemplar of all time." The second is from an experienced European who has lived for years in Persia. "A *mullah* brought his son to my school some years ago, and brought a Persian Bible, which he put into the boy's hand, saying 'There, you will find in that all you want to know about God.' . . . My impression, which has been growing for some years, is that the educated classes in Persia are largely devoid of any real faith in Islam. They give as one reason that, as soon as you do any scientific study, you come up against Islam. This is one of the arguments usually advanced by Bahais who are, as a rule, keen on education."

Here we have stated the two main points at which Islam is feeling, and in the future will still more feel the corroding power of modern education and culture—the person of Mohammed and the infallibility of the Koran. The educated world of Islam is a sea of conflicting currents of thought, and not least conspicuous are those modernist movements which seek, either by allegorising and

spiritualising Mohammed's life and the Koranic teaching, or by representing Islam as no more than an enlightened Theism, to retain for Islam the faith of cultivated men. The famous Aligarh College—now the Mohammedan University—in North India was founded by Sir Syed Ahmad, to provide a Western and modern education for Moslem youths on the basis of a rationalised and reformed Islam. Sir Syed did not go so far as to question the verbal inspiration of the Koran, but once the scientific method has been applied, it can be restrained only by the limits of the truth which it seeks. The attempt to justify Islam at the bar of the world's conscience, to keep a place for Mohammed and the Koran, has set in motion forces which in the end will subject the whole Moslem scripture, theology and tradition to the ruthless searchlight of historical and scientific criticism.

What will be the result? The same thing has happened in the case of Christianity, and the general consensus of opinion among those who are conversant with the results of criticism is unquestionably that the spiritual nature and message of the Christian religion, and above all the Person of Christ, have been invested with a new clearness, and stand out unobscured by what is secondary or non-essential. Will it be so with Islam? We doubt it.

We may expect in this century to witness new reforming movements in Islam, which will present modes of belief combining elements in the old Mohammedan view of the world with modern views. If, however, any reforming movement in Islam seeks to fall back simply on those enduring elements, its difficulty will be that there would be little to distinguish such a purified Mohammedanism from any other Theism; the things which give its distinctive character to Mohammedanism as it has existed in history are just those which a reforming movement would tend to give up.\*

\* Mr. Edwyn Bevan, in the *International Review of Missions*, July, 1920, p. 336.



This is, in fact, what is beginning to be evident in educated Moslem centres. The distinctiveness of Islam disappears. There is a great deal of agnosticism or vaguely theistic belief, and a moral outlook, drawn in the main from the literature, and not least the Christian literature, of the West. The main influence which prevents this tendency from going further is the power of community and national conservatism and pride. Where the disappearance of Islamic ideas can be represented plausibly as a victory for a foreign or politically dominant culture and religion, nationalist sentiment is awakened. Alike in Cairo and Lahore, there is a defence of Islam, not on its merits, but on racial and community grounds.

Islam is likely to retain its hold as a religion over those more primitive communities where modern influences have not yet penetrated, and nothing is yet felt of the lessening of Moslem world-prestige. Its place in the educated world will depend in the main upon its ability to transform itself into a purely spiritual religion. We have sketched some of the difficulties which lie in the path of such transformation. The outcome only the future can prove.

#### IV

What of the Christian message to the Moslem world? One is conscious of an element of hostility in the average Christian attitude to Islam, which is curiously different from the outlook usually held towards the other non-Christian faiths. There is a history behind it, the ranging of Christendom against Islam as a political power, the Crusades and all the stored-up memories of a secular conflict. Even people who are passionate believers in the

missionary enterprise lapse rapidly into military metaphors when discussing Islam ; it is a " menace " to be " combated," an " invasion " which must be stemmed by a barrier of mission stations, and so on. There is widespread disbelief in the possibility of Moslem conversion, and few people seem to have faith in the power of Christ to win Moslems and transmute Islam as He wins Hindus and transmutes Hinduism.

The challenge of Islam to Christendom is fundamentally a challenge to demonstrate the true Christian spirit, the Spirit of Jesus Himself. Nowhere is there more definite need for what is most distinctive and peculiar in Christianity. We have not room here to work out in detail\* the way in which Christian teaching echoes what is noblest in Islam, and supplements it when it falls short, nor to show with adequate care the manner in which the central weakness of Islam, its legalistic, static view of God, of man, and of human society is met in Christianity by the Gospel of Life. It is often said that the main struggle between Christianity and Islam is dogmatic, and we are urged to send more missionaries to Moslem lands well equipped in metaphysics. It is far from our purpose to deny the importance of the doctrinal issue between the Christian doctrine of God in Christ, and the Moslem doctrine of Allah and his prophet. But theology should be subsequent to religion, and no comprehension of the intellectual meaning of Christ's Person is possible, or worth anything, unless it is based on some experience of His life and spirit.

Meanwhile, our doctrinal contentions hardly get a fair hearing in the Moslem's ears, because he has so little conception of the true spirit of Christ. He can argue with the best of us about Trinity and

\* Gairdner's *The Rebuke of Islam*, should be read for help on this point.

Deity, but he needs to see embodied in life that Love of which St. Paul says: "God commendeth His love toward us in that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for the ungodly." This utter self-giving love of God in Christ is the very heart of our Faith. Of this love, Christians and the Church and Christendom should be ambassadors. It can win Islam, but it has not only to be preached and written about, it has to be incarnated in life.

There needs, for instance, to be in the political attitude of Christendom to Islam nothing that savours of any desire to humiliate the Moslem nations. Most people are convinced on the merits of the case that the Turkish Empire ought not to continue in its old form; but it is all the more important that the future of the liberated peoples, Moslem or non-Moslem, whether in Armenia or Mesopotamia, should be protected and safeguarded with absolute honesty and disinterested care.

Again, the great colleges, hospitals and schools, which the missions, especially the American ones, have established all over the Near East, have a unique opportunity of showing in practice what the Christian spirit is. Such institutions are enabling thousands of Moslems to gain some insight into the meaning of Christ, not in doctrine only, but in life. During the last six terrible years these institutions, their alumni and the men and women who staffed them have been tried to the full, and there is abundant evidence that the witness of their practical Christian spirit has had its effect.

In this connection, it is important to remember the vital place of the ancient Eastern Churches, Armenian, Coptic, Syrian and others. They have, of course, all the advantages of deeply rooted traditions which no mission emanating from England or America can have. They have the disadvantages

of all the ancient communions that some admixture of error and overlaying by tradition has obscured the essential Christianity they enshrine. But in regard to Islam they have one immense advantage, and that is that they have been persecuted by the Moslem. If the Copt, living alongside the Moslem in Egypt, with all the memory of the last thirteen centuries upon him, can exhibit the spirit of Jesus, he will be invincible. We have suggested that Islam is truest to itself when it is a conquering faith. Most certainly the Christian is truest to his Lord when he is overcoming evil by love.

There is a beautiful story told of some Turkish soldiers who had been engaged in the terrible operations in Armenia. They were wounded and in hospital on the coast, and they were nursed with much tenderness by Armenian Christian girls, who had escaped from the massacre and outrage to which these men had subjected their kinsmen and women. It is recorded that the effect produced on the Turkish soldiers by this act was profound. And who can doubt it? For "I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto Me."

#### SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

*The Rebuke of Islam.* W. H. T. Gairdner. (U.C.M.E. 3s.)

A general sketch of the rise and progress of Islam, its significance as a religion and a social system, of recent movements in Mohammedan countries, and the relation of Christianity to it.

*Aspects of Islam.* D. B. Macdonald. (Macmillan. 6s.)

A scholarly work dealing with the inner strength and meaning of Islam. Contains highly interesting material on Moslem mysticism.

*The Round Table.* A Quarterly Review.

Contains from time to time important articles on the Near East.

## CHAPTER VI

### AFRICA

WITHIN the last forty years practically the whole of Africa has passed into the possession or under the control of European powers. Before that time there were British colonists in the south, and all the northern states—Egypt, Tunis, Tripoli, Morocco, Algiers—were to some extent within the orbit of European diplomacy, but the great mass of the African continent and its peoples were as they had been since time immemorial. Africa was still the great unknown land, of which anything might be true—tales of incalculable wealth in gold and precious stones, of trackless forests and half-human creatures. It was not part of the European world. To-day it is part of that world, and the lifetime of the average Englishman to-day has seen the great change wrought.

It is not, perhaps, so easy to realise the immense importance of the African continent in the world to-day as it is to apprehend the place of India or China or Japan. The peoples of the East can speak for themselves, but Africa is still silent, and perhaps for that reason her importance is little understood by many people who are awake to the claim of India or the Far East. Africa to-day provides the great test of the Christianity of Christendom. Her vast populations and resources are in the control of the white man. The full importance to the world of her wealth in raw material and in the labour which can make it available, is realised by the rulers of the world's commerce. The penetration of Africa by



the influences of the white man's civilisation, already great, is certain to increase very largely, and it will test to the full all the belief in human brotherhood which the Christian peoples possess if the Africa of the future is to escape the dangers which menace it, and the development of the human resources of the Africans is not to be utterly swamped by the forces of exploitation and money-getting which have made themselves only too plain in the white man's dealing with Africa.

The bringing of Africa within the European world is not only fraught with great danger to Africa, it is fraught with great danger to Europe. One of the causes of friction and ultimately of war between the European states has undoubtedly been the competition for African influence. African territories have been pawns in the diplomatic game. Zanzibar is exchanged for Heligoland, there is a "deal" in the Cameroons, due note is taken by the Powers outside the "deal," and one more is added to the causes of suspicion and distrust out of which war comes. It will infallibly be the same again, unless the new hopes vested in the League of Nations are fulfilled, and Africa and her primitive peoples are treated by the nations of Europe no longer as the victims of their own covetousness, but as a "sacred trust of civilisation."

## I

It is part of the gravity of the problem that the full force of the economic impulses of Europe has been hurled upon peoples low in the scale of culture, proverbially childlike and undeveloped, and, therefore, even more unprepared to meet the new dangers than the populations of Asia, with their ancient and developed civilisation. Leaving out of

account the Moslem regions of the north, and the extreme south where white men have lived for longer and native society has been more gradually affected, there prevails over a great area of Africa on both sides of the equator a society with all the characteristics of primitive culture.

Such a society is, of course, in reality highly developed; the lowest grade of human culture known on earth is exceedingly complicated and intricate, and whoever leads the "simple life," it is certainly not the savage! It is, nevertheless, a *tribal* society, where the unit is the tribe, where ownership of land is communal and the paramount chief exercises a real, if not always defined, authority over the life of an entire tribe, where religion, too, is social, and morality has little meaning apart from the dictates and sanctions of tribal custom. In such a society, the individual necessarily counts for less than he does in more developed communities. He has always thought of social duties in terms of the tribe, he has never been taught to think of moral or religious laws as appealing to the individual conscience, and taken away from the social environment which he knows, he does not find it easy to maintain his bearings. He can be easily victimised, or if he gets education, and the education is crude or wrongly directed, he may very quickly become utterly unsuited to the old social environment of the community, and yet not adapted to the newer society into which he has been thrust.

The most fundamental thing in all society is religion, and the religion of the African throws much light upon the nature of African life, its dangers and its strength. Leaving on one side both Christianity and Islam, it may be said that the religion of Africa is "animism," that is, the belief in and worship of spirits. There are spirits of the mountains and

rivers, the lakes and the forests, great spirits of the sun and moon, lesser spirits of the birds and creeping things. Anything that is strong or mysterious, or endowed with the power of affecting man, may be to the primitive mind indwelt with a spirit. The spirits are not thought of as having defined characters, they are capricious ; man cannot enter into stable fellowship with them, but he can appease and placate them. There is sometimes underlying all this world of spirits and powers of the air the thought of a great God, the Supreme Father, which some would call the relic of a purer faith, and others the preparation for a nobler faith waiting to be born. But there is no doubt at all that one dominant emotion in the life of the savage is fear, and that the atmosphere of uncertainty and terror which invests so much primitive society is directly to be traced to the thought that men have about God, and therefore, about life and death.

Mr. J. H. Harris points out that this is most strongly evident when the African is faced with loss of liberty, sickness or death. "It is because loss of personal liberty and sickness walk hand in hand with the dread spectre of death that the African suffers collapse upon the approach of either. Death is not a release to the African, it is an ever-present terror ; the creaking of a beam, the night-cry of an owl in the forest, the ripple of a stream, the rustle of the leaves upon the trees, are but too often the solemn warning of departed spirits summoning the listeners to the land without hope, the land in which there are many evil, but few angel spirits."\*

Beside this, we must put the fascinating traits in African life and character. It is a cant phrase to say that the negro is lazy ; those who know say that he works hard. "The theory that the South African

\* *Africa, Slave or Free?* p. 12.

natives are hopelessly indolent may be dismissed," says a Government Report, "as being not in accordance with facts. . . . The representation of the native living in his own village a lazy and luxurious life, supported by his wife or wives, is misleading."

Sir Sydney Olivier writes of the African native :

Why do the white men who devote their lives to the welfare of the African people do so? . . . It is because those who have to do, disinterestedly, with the negro races, come to love them—find them above the average rich and responsive and sympathetic in some of the most characteristic and delicate qualities of essential human nature. . . . In some of the qualities that are best to live with the African is on the average far ahead of the average industrialised European. He is singularly patient and forgiving, very delicately sensitive in all matters of courtesy, acutely logical, warmly sociable, humorous and kindly ; and in any physical difficulty or danger a most devoted, brave and unwearied comrade.

## II

What took the white man to Africa ? There is little doubt of the answer. In 1815 European powers ruled not more than half a million square miles in Africa : Cape Colony, Portuguese East Africa, and the settlements on the West Coast. In 1880 the total was only one million square miles, and the increase is almost entirely due to the French acquisition of Algeria (we have seen that the northern coast early came into European politics), and the extension of Cape Colony. In 1890 the total had risen to six million square miles ; the changes in north and south were comparatively small, but the whole of the East and West Coasts had been seized and divided up. By 1914 the hinterlands of those Eastern and Western territories had been occupied and over eleven and a half million square miles, practically the whole continent, was thus engrossed.

The dates are significant. In 1874-7, H. M. Stanley made his famous journeys in the course of which he "found Livingstone." Then followed his alliance with Leopold of Belgium, the formation of the "Comité d'Etudes du Haut Congo," and a year later the "Association Internationale du Congo." In 1880, the Association became a purely Belgian enterprise and the first "station" was founded at Vivi. It became manifest that the objects of the Association were economic; "a tremor ran through the political and commercial circles of Europe,"\* England, France and Germany grew alarmed and the signal was given for the dividing up of Africa. In 1884 the Congo Conference met at Berlin, at Bismarck's invitation, and it may serve to remind us nowadays of the danger of fine words if we recall some of the language used in those days about the settlement:

There have been laid down the bases of an economic legislation applicable to the central zone of the African continent, but destined in fact to a wider application. This system, inspired by the most liberal ideas, which removes every thought of selfish exploitation, will protect at the same time both the natives and the Europeans in their relations with the colonising powers; it provides a sanction for the principles of religious and civil liberty, of loyal and pacific commerce, and openly breaks with the obsolete traditions of the old colonial system.†

The motive behind the rapid and immense expansion of European rule in Africa was "economic imperialism," *i.e.*, the extension of political sovereignty with the object of obtaining economic advantage for the State. The speeches made by statesmen in these years make it perfectly obvious that the economic motive ruled. They were aware of the commercial

\* L. S. Woolf, *Empire and Commerce in Africa*, p. 38.

† E. Bonning, *La Partage Politique de l'Afrique*, quoted by Woolf, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-44.



possibilities of Africa, with her vast stores of natural resources, and they desired to obtain control of those resources for their respective states, and in the case of certain European Powers, to the exclusion of all others. It is perhaps worth adding that no imputation of personal dishonesty or avarice is here made against these statesmen. The financiers and great commercial magnates knew what they wanted, but the politicians seem honestly to have believed that this policy would actually redound to the advantage of their respective countries. They were actuated by patriotic or imperialist motives, but the real driving force came from the syndicates of commercial magnates.

Our concern here, however, is with Africa, not with European economic advantage, and we must now consider what the result of all this "development" of Africa has been for Africa and the African. Let it be said at once that some great gifts have come to Africa from the occupation of her territory by some at least of the powers. David Livingstone, that great lover of Africa, spoke of the slave-trade as the "open sore of the world." The days of those long caravans of African slaves, their path through the forests marked by disused shackles and whitening bones, are gone. The dim history of Africa gives glimpses of constant inter-tribal war, and from that, too, Africa has been freed. Some African territories have waxed prosperous, education has spread, and a happy, contented people have built up a life of far greater security and freedom than they could ever have known apart from the white man.

It is, nevertheless, to the other side of the picture that it behoves us especially to look, and it is not pleasant to consider. The basis of all African social development is the *land*. The indigenous system of

tenure is, as we have seen, communal; the land belonged to the tribe, and was administered by the chief, but while no native had individual tenure, he had in practice security, and the chief would not interfere with it. Over great tracts of Africa to-day no native has a foot of land, either in individual tenure or through the tribe.

Let us take some examples. The Congo atrocities are still fresh in our memories, but we do not perhaps realise that the fundamentally evil thing in the Belgian *régime* in the Congo was the seizure by the Belgians of all the land and natural wealth, leaving the native with nothing but his labour. When that has once taken place the mischief is done. Benevolent administration may mitigate the severity of the consequences, but it is always quite certain that the black man will suffer simply because the virgin wealth of Africa cannot be harvested without him, and he will be compelled to work on the land which has been alienated from him. In the Congo the natives were left with no land and no wealth, they could not be taxed as they had nothing to pay taxes with, so they were "allowed" to pay taxes for the upkeep of the administration which had filched their country from them—in labour. The fact that the overseers and officials were mainly ruffians added to the horror of the situation.

The Congo is the most flagrant instance of the harm wrought in Africa by seizure of the land, but it is by no means the only one. A more common method is to seclude the native population in "reserves." When the reserves are adequate, and the quality of the soil is good, and where the security of tenure, whether for the tribe as a whole, or for individuals, is complete, this method of reservation is not open to serious criticism, at least in areas like South Africa, where there is a large white

population which can make its home in the country. General Botha worked out a scheme for the separation of territories between white and black (not the segregation of races), which, some think, fairly met the needs of both parties. In such regions as British East Africa, however, the same cannot be said. There, the title to the reserves themselves is insecure. No native has any individual title, and the only tribe which has any sort of legal title is the Masai. It is possible for Government (and powerful influences are not wanting to urge them) to move a tribe from a Reserve to some other piece of land, and allocate the land originally reserved for native use to white settlers. Meanwhile the best land in the Protectorate has been alienated to white settlers at the rate of 300,000 to 600,000 acres annually, land which before the British occupation belonged communally to the tribes.

The consideration of land leads immediately to that of labour. It is commonly thought that Africa is a land of inexhaustible multitudes and that the reservoir of potential labour can be drawn upon indefinitely. The truth is that nearly everywhere there is a shortage of labour, and behind this lies the sinister fact that the population of Africa is probably only about half what it was a century ago. The causes of this depopulation are not exclusively to be traced to the white man. The old slavery certainly came first in its deadly effects, and internecine war has carried off multitudes, but modern labour systems, the loss of lands, the effects of sexual diseases fostered by the breakdown of the primitive social organisation, and the liquor traffic are very greatly responsible for the diminution of the human population of Africa.

Man-power, therefore, is short, but the vegetable produce of Africa, its oil-nuts and rubber vines,

need the African to garner them, and the white settler needs the African if his plantation is to be of any value to him at all. Therefore, we find in different parts of Africa the demand coming from the settlers that measures shall be taken to compel, cajole or persuade the natives to work. "Forced labour" can take two forms, compulsion for public works or for private enterprises. The former has its counterpart in African native custom, where works of public necessity, such as the building of a road or a bridge, or service on a warlike expedition, were carried out by labour enjoined by the chief or the council. But such works (except the military expedition) would be performed close to the tribal home, and the chief's power of compulsion was tempered by tribal custom, so that the work demanded would not interfere with the tribesman's own seasonal occupation on his own land. In theory, forced labour for Government under modern conditions may be justified as a form of taxation. It is, however, necessary to point out that the practical dangers involved in the plan are very great. Labour on roads and bridges erected by modern engineering processes cannot easily be intermitted to allow the harvest to be gathered, and the interference with native life is, therefore, necessarily great. Moreover, there is a good deal of evidence to show that Government is not being driven to the expedient of forced labour simply by its own necessities. The real cause of the demand lies in the desire of the private owners of plantations to secure sufficient labour for themselves; they do not wish to have Government as a competitor in the open market, and when labour on private plantations is accepted as a ground of exemption from Government forced labour, the latter institution is a positive boon to the settler.

The controversy now going on in regard to forced labour in British East Africa\* (now known as Kenya Colony) illustrates the whole question perfectly. For public works the Government, under the Native Authority Amendment Ordinance of 1920, provides that natives may be required to perform paid labour for the Government up to a maximum of sixty days in any one year, the purposes being defined as "the provision of paid porters for Government servants on tour, and for the Government Transport Department, and of paid labour for the construction and maintenance of railways and roads wherever situated in the Protectorate, and for other work of a public nature, *whether of a like kind to the foregoing or not.*"† The objections to this are: (1) that the provisions are dangerously vague and in matters of personal freedom legal vagueness is intolerable; (2) that compelling men to work possibly at a great distance from their homes is directly conducive to immorality. Even if it be granted that there is a theoretical justification for forced labour for public works, clearly the safeguards which should be demanded are not present.

Even more serious are the Government circulars in which officials are instructed to bring pressure to bear on the chiefs to supply labour for the farms and plantations. There is no legal compulsion, but "advice," "encouragement," "insistent advocacy" are to be used. As the Bishops and missionaries say, in their memorandum of protest, "technically there is no compulsion; practically, compulsion could hardly take a stronger form."

\* We choose this instance deliberately, not because conditions in Kenya Colony are any worse than in the protectorates of other nations (they are probably better), but because readers of this book should be aware of both the good and the bad that is done in the British name in Africa.

† The italics are our own.



It is argued in defence of these regulations that "it is in the interests of the natives themselves for the young men to become wage-earners, and not to remain idle in their reserves." It may be cynical to suggest that such zeal for the moral well-being of the natives coincides not inconveniently with the economic advantage of the white man, but in any case this problem is one of education, and no one is educated by compulsory labour or low wages.

The third region, in addition to land and labour, in which the effect of the white man's influence is seen, is that of social life and relationships. Everyone knows something of the appalling ravages of alcohol in Africa. The African has his own fermented liquors, and these have done harm enough, but nothing in comparison with the havoc wrought by cheap gin imported by traders. No one denies the facts, and men like Sir Harry Johnston and Mr. C. L. Temple, late Lieutenant-Governor in N. Nigeria, are out and out abolitionists. But can alcohol (or at least spirits) be abolished for the black man and not for the white?

The racial issue confronts us again and again. The standards of sexual morality are not perhaps very high in primitive society, but there are definite checks and regulations which have a real value. The contact of white and black often results in the destruction of those native standards, and in ultimate debauchery which is far worse than anything in native society. In all areas where black and white live in proximity to one another much is heard of the licentiousness and eroticism of the negro, but there is little doubt that the laxity of morals of the white men has been largely responsible for the trouble. The best negroes bitterly resent the liberties taken with their women, and are not blind to the frankly double standard which the white man accepts.

Racial cleavage is one of the terrible gifts of the white man to African society. The Latin races, such as the French and the Portuguese, have been less guilty of this, but the British, the Dutch and the Germans have all maintained an attitude of racial exclusiveness, shown in denial of the franchise, in regulations affecting social intercourse, travelling and transport, and in many other things. In South and East Africa there is the further complication of Indian immigration. The Indian trader and coolie has played a very important part in the development of these regions, and in Africa Indians were present long before any white man appeared, though now it is sought virtually to drive them out of the country altogether. In South Africa Mr. M. K. Gandhi fought a notable battle for the rights of Indians, who were threatened with a £3 poll tax and other racial disabilities. He succeeded in his efforts; Lord Hardinge, then Viceroy of India, defended the rights of Indians in a famous utterance, and eventually a Commission was appointed and its report, in which the principle of legal racial equality was maintained, was accepted. But the racial problem remains to-day, and the relations between the races, white, Indian and African in South Africa, are exceedingly far from any standard with which a Christian can be content.

### III

We turn now to a brief consideration of the practical measures for which the situation calls, and we must begin with the clause of the League of Nations Covenant which should be the charter of all the backward peoples. Article 22 of the Covenant provides that :

for those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the

States which formerly governed them, and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation, and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

“Mandates” do not, of course, apply to territories in Africa other than those formerly owned by Germany, but no Power could publicly deny that it acknowledged the principle embodied in the Covenant when applied to its own territories, and the present Secretary of State for the Colonies\* has publicly endorsed the principle as applied to all the Crown Colonies and Protectorates. We may, therefore, accept this provision in the Covenant as the standard by which the Great Powers propose to direct their activities in Africa; and our attitude towards it will be one of genuine thankfulness that so great a principle is publicly acknowledged, mingled with resolve that the necessary practical steps shall be taken, without which the fine words are of little value. The statement of the evils affecting land and labour has necessarily suggested lines of action, so that the treatment here may be brief.

*Sovereignty.* “Trusteeship” means that the territory is held in trust for the inhabitants, which involves not only equitable government, but ultimately *self-government*. Potentially, the natives of the land are declared sovereign. There should therefore be set up in suitable districts or provinces native governments, where none exist, responsible within large and defined limits to the Mandatory or Protecting Power. If there is determination to work for native self-government, endless ways can be discovered of making autonomy real, and there is

\* Lord Milner, speaking in the House of Lords on May 13th, 1920.

no training for self-government except the gradual exercise of it. Mr. C. L. Temple shows how in N. Nigeria the system of "indirect rule," that is, government through existing institutions, can be the most effective way of governing a country. The conduct of direct rule by white officials is highly expensive, and although it may be efficient, it is of little value as an education for self-government.

*Land.*—The best existing system is that of N. Nigeria, where *all* the land is declared to be native land, and control vested in the Government, subject to native rights and customs. The prime necessity is that the natives shall have security of tenure. In the more primitive regions communal ownership by the tribe is the most natural system, and where native reserves exist alongside of lands alienated to white settlers, if the reserves are too small, justice would seem to demand that they should be extended at the expense of land alienated to white men. Individual tenure in such areas means in practice that the door is opened to the concessionaire, who will find ways of persuading the natives to part with their lands to him.

In regions like South Africa the problem is far more complicated. General Botha tried the separation of territories where land can be held by white man and by black men, but the law has been a dead letter, largely because vested interests and established conditions proved too strong. South Africa still awaits a just and equitable system of land tenure. The same is true of the Rhodesian territories of the "Chartered Company," where the lands, claimed on the most preposterous grounds by the Company as their property, are now declared by law to be the property of the Crown. There still remains the necessity of working out a system of land-tenure for the natives.

*Labour.*—Freedom of contract is the keynote of a true labour policy. The history of West Africa, where the finest ideals of British statesmanship have been exhibited, and a large and prosperous population lives on land securely held, cultivating its own crops on a commercial basis, shows that there is no inherent impossibility in the labour problem. If great areas of Africa can be established where the vestiges of the old slavery are totally abolished, modern forced labour is also absent and freedom of contract prevails, labour will flow towards them, and other territories will be induced to revise their policies.

*Education.*—Here is perhaps the greatest immediate task of all. It is one of the counts in the indictment of the white man in Africa, that he has done so little to educate the African. Over ninety per cent. of the education of the African natives is conducted by missionaries, and apart from missions almost nothing is done. Mr. Loram, in his book "The Education of the South African Native," shows that the governments of the four provinces of the Union impose a smaller tax per head for education than the native government of Basutoland. The comparison is most striking in the case of the Orange Free State, which imposes a tax amounting to 7s. 8d. per head, against Basutoland's 19s. 8d. This illustrates the most important point, namely that whether or not the white man wants the native educated (and a very large number of white men expressly want him to be kept uneducated) the native wants education, and many instances could be given of the enthusiasm shown by native chiefs in the cause of educating themselves and their people.

Money is the first requisite, and no government can pretend to be acting in the "trustee" spirit unless it sets aside an adequate sum for education.



The education again has to be of the right kind ; as in other countries it is apt to be exclusively literary, and Africa needs institutions of the type of the famous Hampton Institute in America, where education has been thought out in relation to the whole need of the life of the negro.

An experiment of the highest hopefulness for both the educational and the commercial future of Africa is that known as the Commonwealth Trust, a corporation which has acquired the industrial concern attached to the former Basel Mission on the Gold Coast (and in India). The profits of the large industries carried on by the Trust are limited by its constitution, and all surplus profits are devoted to the establishment or assistance of enterprises for the benefit of the African people. Considerable sums will thus be made available for education, and at the same time an invaluable example set to the world of the spirit in which it is even to-day possible to conduct a commercial undertaking.

#### IV

It hardly needs saying that the crude spirit-worship and tribal morality of the primitive society cannot sustain the edifice which has to be reared in Africa. It cannot maintain itself in the new world and it cannot produce the men and women who are needed by Africa to-day. Its place is being taken rapidly by either Christianity or Islam.

Many people hold that Islam is the religion for Africa. It is unquestionably spreading with great rapidity. Not only so, but it is able rapidly to become indigenous and self-propagating, and there is good

evidence for the view that at least in certain tribes it has meant a rise in the scale of self-respect and culture.

“Islam supplies what tribal life in decay cannot give, a bond that transcends the tie of blood relationship. It spreads by the mere attractiveness of a simple creed and ceremonial. Nothing less simple could spread in the automatic way it does spread. It is not tribal restraint that the de-tribalised native misses, but the loss of tribal solidarity; not the claim his tribe made on him, but the support his tribe gave him. It is just that solidarity which the embryonic Mohammedanism of Africa offers. Thousands of those even whose homes are in their native villages, will still, when asked their tribe, call themselves ‘Mohammedans.’ ”

Yet Islam has the great weakness (though it is a positive strength in propaganda) that it makes an easy moral demand just where the African nature most needs to be challenged and strengthened. Polygamy has nothing to be said for it morally, and nothing from the point of view of population, as anyone may discover who will examine the facts. Islam will never help Africa in this department of life, and yet the very practice of polygamy gives the Mohammedan the chance of demonstrating the brotherhood of Islam by inter-marrying with African women. Sir Sydney Olivier says :

Islam is a fine synthesis; it is educational and usefully disciplinary; but it was not for nothing that Christian Europe threw itself into the Crusades. Armenian massacres are congenial to Islam: the negro has capacity enough for mad cruelty in his animal nature, but he knows quite well that his humane nature is better, and Christianity answers to this. As between Islam and Christianity, therefore, for the negroid African, I do not think that any intelligent man who is himself religious and knows what religion is, can doubt for a moment which is the more suitable for proselytising or encouragement.

The Christian forces in Africa are still small. There are probably 120 million people in Africa, and the native Christian population is not more than three millions at the outside. The greatest need in the Christian Church is for education, for trained leaders and teachers, and again let it be said, the education must be of a kind that will produce leaders attuned to African life, and a Church truly indigenous, self-propagating and self-subsistent. The relation of Christianity to native society and social institutions needs a great deal more thinking to be given to it than it receives. It is disquieting to the missionary enthusiast to find a man of the stamp of Mr. C. L. Temple defending the exclusion of missions from parts of N. Nigeria on the ground that they make the task of government impossible. We believe that he carries to extreme lengths his theory of supporting native institutions at all costs, and certainly any missionary would have to examine with great care the practical implications of the maxim he suggests, that the missionary should "inculcate in all his pupils and every kind of native over whom he exerts his influence, that ready and willing compliance with all the lawful orders of the Emir or chiefs and observance of all sanctioned tribal customs and manners is their first duty, and should place such secular institutions in the forefront of his teaching."\* There are "sanctioned" customs and "lawful" orders in Moslem States of N. Nigeria which a missionary can never urge his followers to obey. Yet there is a point of great importance in the contention urged in Mr. Temple's book, namely that the task of the Christian missionary is not to impose a system on Africa, nor to wrest individuals from their environment, nor to create isolated Europeanised Christians who have no anchorage

\* *Native Races and their Rulers*, p. 217.

among their own land and people, but to raise up a community which will grow and develop on its own lines.

Moreover, the task of presenting Christianity is not a matter only of the missionary, and less to-day than ever before. Africa has had the Great War in her midst, thousands of her sons have fought with or against the white man, have been in Europe, and have lost much of the reverence they had for the European. The agony of the war waged in African territory hardly bears description. All this is stored up in the long memory of Africa. European statesmen promised a new day for Africa, and it seems that the promise is to find fulfilment in increased subjection and in forced labour. A condition of affairs has arisen where the mere preaching of Christianity will be futile unless backed by courageous action such as that taken lately in East Africa by the Bishops and others. The planter and trader, the doctor and government official, are in daily close touch with the African, and he will judge Christianity by them.

There are some ugly forces stirring in Africa, and in Africa over the seas. The Ethiopian movement\* in the African churches has in some manifestations been harmless enough, in others shown a deeply smouldering racial passion. Books like Dr. du Bois' *Darkwater* show a passionate race hatred and a glowing anticipation of the day when yellow and white will be at death-grips, and the black race will arise and come to its own. One may dismiss this as the utterance of a passionate fanatic, but one cannot dismiss the fact that Africa is no longer the passive, unresisting victim of the white man's aggrandisement. Her sons are denied higher education in Africa, and they go to America or Europe for it; but they return with burning hearts. It is in

\* An attempt to build up an African Church on the basis of race.

these days, when Africa is becoming conscious of herself and new forces are stirring within her, that Christendom, in the League of Nations, has publicly resolved to treat Africa Christianly. Africa will await the issue.

### SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

*Africa, Slave or Free?* J. H. Harris. (S.C.M. 3s. 6d.):

Deals particularly with the problems of land, labour, commercial development, education and government.

*Empire and Commerce in Africa.* L. S. Woolf. (George Allen and Unwin. 10s. 6d.)

A detailed study, carefully documented, of the effects in Africa of economic imperialism.

*The Future of Africa.* Donald Fraser. (U.C.M.E. 1s.)

A general study of African life, with valuable chapters on primitive society and religion.

*Economic Imperialism.* L. S. Woolf. (Swarthmore Press. 2s. 6d.)

A new and shorter treatment of the subject dealt with more fully in the book already quoted.



## CHAPTER VII

### THE CROSS IN THE WORLD

A RECENT issue of *The Athenæum* contained a review of a group of missionary books, in which the writer closed with the following passage: "Amid such varied efforts does the labour go forward, the labour of imposing a single religion upon the terrestrial globe. It is an extraordinary ideal, whatever one's personal sympathies, and it will bulk more largely than we realise in our history, when that history comes to be written. To what extent Christians still hope for their universal harvest, it is not easy to say. They think it right not to give up hope, but that is rather different. They can scarcely ignore the double blow that the war has dealt to Missions—cutting off their funds and discrediting the Gospel of peace at its source. And even if they ignore it, the heathen does not. As an Egyptian remarked to a well-wisher in a moment of exasperation: 'But for what you want to visit my country for? Visit England, Scotland, Ireland first; yes, and Wales.'"

We have tried to make it plain both in the first chapter of this book, and in all that has been said of the outlook and the moving influences among the peoples of Africa and Asia, that we are fully aware of the challenge to the very idea of a world-mission which the un-Christianity of Christendom constitutes. The idea that Europe and America exhibit "Christian civilisation," while Asia and Africa present all the evils of "heathenism" cannot be maintained in its

simplicity by anyone who cares about truth, and the tacit superiority with which the civilisation of the non-Christian peoples is usually viewed is to the cultivated Oriental exceedingly irritating. There is need enough in Asia and Africa, but it is not to be met by any message which has learnt nothing from the grave moral and social peril of Europe. It is not only Asia and Africa, but Europe and America, too, that need to be saved.

So far then we agree with the critic, but in the passage we have quoted there lurks a common and most fallacious idea. It is widely believed by many opponents of missionary work, and also by many devotees of missionary work, that the object of missions is to "impose a single religion upon the terrestrial globe," and not only a single religion, but virtually a single type of religious civilisation; in other words, that missionaries are engaged in the task of making Japanese Buddhists or Egyptian Moslems as much like English or American Christians as possible. While some missionaries and certain missionary activities do give ground for this charge, it cannot be too strongly asserted that it is not only not essential to the true Christian ideal, but at bottom incompatible with it. The naïve self-confidence of the late Victorian period of Anglo-Saxon Protestantism was yielding, even before the war, to a growing sense of a fundamental un-Christianity in the social fabric. The war itself and the settlement of the world which has followed it, have left no sensible man still obsessed with the view that he has a culture or a religious civilisation so manifestly superior to all others that he should seek to "impose" it on the world. Such a view would be un-Christian, because it would suggest that Christianity is a system of ideas, intellectual, moral and social, which is to be thrust upon mankind, and

this is totally to misapprehend the Christian point of view.

What, then, is the ground of the world-wide Christian mission ?

## I

It is the historical reality of Jesus of Nazareth. We have noted once or twice in the foregoing chapters the all-important fact that in countries where "Christendom," or "Christianity" are viewed with apathy or distaste, Jesus Christ Himself is sometimes found to exercise a compelling influence of singular power. Not even Christendom is able to conceal Him. This fact is of the most far-reaching importance, because it both gives us ground on which to stand, and points us to a true method. The true hope of the missionary is not to "impose" a system but to help men to see Jesus Christ for themselves, and having seen Him, to follow. Let us consider more in detail what this means.

The historical origin of Christianity is altogether of its essence. The Christian faith is bound up with something that happened at a certain place and at a certain time, and it does not consist merely of general truths which may be apprehended abstractly without any necessary reference to the Person through whom they came into the world. "Nobody wants a biography of Euclid," but we cannot dispense with the Life of Christ. This sense of the actual historic fact dwells in all the New Testament writers. They may be more, or less, interested in the facts of the story of Jesus Christ, and the outline of His life ; some are more concerned with the explanation of what He was and did ; but all are agreed that certain facts, certain events that took place in

Palestine, are essential to the Gospel and that without those events there would have been no Gospel. In the same way the early statements of the faith that have come down to us contain passages that are almost obtrusive in their historical emphasis. He was born of a woman, and they give her name; He was put to death by a particular Roman Governor and he is named. Moreover, with the lapse of centuries and the growth of corruptions in the Christian community, we have seen again and again Christians going back to that historical Figure, and reviewing their own practice and that of their time by the standard they find in Him.

In contemplating the "fact of Christ," as it has been called, we are at the very centre when we touch the Cross. The older evangelicalism is often criticised because it concentrates attention on the death of Christ. It is true that some people have treated the death of Christ in such a way as to take almost no account of His life, and, again, that the Passion itself has often been stripped of all its living human reality, and represented abstractly as a necessary part of a scheme of salvation. It is because of this mode of thought, perhaps, that so many people in our own day frankly do not know what they think, and do not think very much at all, about the Cross.

Yet it is the very heart of the story which the evangelists tell, and the significance with which Christian devotion has always invested it corresponds to actual historic fact. For it is the act in which, beyond all others, Jesus Christ revealed Himself. We can see it foreboded as the first days of His preaching to the multitude and the early success and popularity pass away, and opposition gathers and enemies begin to organise their plans. As the shadows deepen, and He sets His face to go

up to Jerusalem, we can see Him consciously embracing what awaits Him there. The Passion, when it comes, is not merely a stupid tragedy, the meaningless cutting short of a good life, for He has made it a part of Himself, so that His mind and purpose are never so clearly set forth as they are in the supreme moments of sacrifice. When we look back over His life, we can see how marvellously the Cross lights up the record of the life and ministry. It provides in the language which all races of mankind understand best, the simple language of human suffering, a final expression of all that is deepest and most real in the attitude of Jesus Christ to God and man, and the world and its life. We have to see the death of Jesus in relation to the life which prepares for it, and equally we need the consummation of the Passion, if we are rightly to understand the meaning and power of the life.

What is the secret that thus stands revealed? Let us put away any dogmatic pre-suppositions which may hinder our view, and look at that story and that supreme Act as the disciples did. Here is one who went about doing good, put to death by His enemies. Here is one who knew Himself to be the Messiah of the Jews, the founder of a new world-era, not crowned with glory and honour, but dying like a thief on a gibbet. Here is one who always lived in an intimate communion with God which no sense of sinfulness ever tarnished; to whom sinful outcast women came and were cleansed, because He did not treat them as members of a condemned class, but saw in each one of them a soul seeking freedom, and entered into knowledge of their shame as only love can, so that they were set free; one who, Himself pure, drew the sinners in confidence to Him, so that the very sternness of His moral teaching carried hope and not despair, in the moment of His death praying



for His tormentors : " Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." It is more than meek surrender, it is more than courageous dying or extreme self-sacrifice, it is love overcoming sin, by suffering for it to the uttermost.

But we have not yet reached the heart of the Gospel. Nothing is a Gospel to men that is not concerned essentially with God. On the view that we have taken of the passion of Jesus it is open to anyone to say that this is a splendid story, but irrelevant to the eternal question which all history asks, of the mind of God toward sinful humanity, of the character that inspires and indwells the world. Was Jesus just an exception, or is He the supremely revealing Man? This is perhaps the greatest question in the world, and we will here only suggest two considerations upon it. In the first place the idea that Jesus Christ is Divine is grounded in the most authentic parts of the evangelists' narrative. He is shown as one who has, as we have said, an absolute and unbroken communion with God, a complete oneness with the Father in mind and heart and will. He speaks with a certainty born out of this inner life. He has all the humility of the saint, but He makes absolute claims on the allegiance of men. The most intimate converse of a saint with his God is mingled with the knowledge of sin, and of the forgiveness of sin ; but there is no hint of this in the communion, so far as we are able to comprehend it, of Jesus with His Father. There is no clouding of vision, or breach in fellowship ; the mind and heart of Jesus are the mind and heart of the Father. So the words with which in the fourth evangelist's record Jesus answers Philip, express what is the main impression left on the mind by the whole picture. " He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father."

The second consideration is the volume of testimony from Christian men and women from the days of the Apostles until now, who have by faith, that is, by venturing their lives on it, proved for themselves that "God is like Jesus," and that it is the incredibly glorious truth that He is not the splendid exception in a world to which chance or selfishness or hate is the key, but the very revelation of God Himself. If a man says "I have found God in Jesus Christ, and I prove it every day in my life," that may not be to any other man absolute proof of the truth of his statement, but it is evidence which any other man will be a fool to ignore, and as we have seen, it corresponds to something that is undeniably present in the historical record.

We have, therefore, grounds for holding (and in the limits of our space we can do no more than indicate these grounds) that in Jesus Christ we have the revelation of God. It can never be a merely intellectual conviction, and it is not to be arrived at by an empirical inspection of the world. It is a thing which a man will put to the test of life, upon which he will stake his very soul. No one has a right to say that Jesus Christ is God, unless he is willing to venture everything on the truth that the very heart and meaning of the world is Christ, that the only true guide through life is Christ, and that, in spite of all appearances, to follow Christ's way is to follow the way to victory.

Now let us return to the Cross. We saw in it before the supreme example of the self-giving, suffering love that overcomes sin. We can see in it now the very mind of God. That purity, which challenges and yet gives life, is God. That pity, which enters into the knowledge of our shame, and so entering, looses us, is God. That love, which not only suffers but embraces the full malignity of our

sin and hate, and loves us while we are yet sinners, and prays for us in our sin, is God. God is shown to us as Love ; not immoral leniency, nor impersonal law, but holy, suffering Love, revealed in an Act which is the crisis of history.

So the answer to the question of all history joins with the answer to the cry of the individual heart. The meaning of life, in men and in nations (most certainly nations, for Jesus saw consummated in Himself the destiny of Israel in the world) is shown in the Cross ; the value of worldly success, the standard by which strength should judge itself, the way in which evil is to be overcome, are all set out there. And for the individual who comes to the Cross burdened with guilt, or restlessness, or the sense of being out of harmony with the world, there shines out the forgiveness of God through Jesus Christ, who loved him and gave Himself for him. " So I saw in my dream that just as Christian came up with the Cross, his burden loosed from off his shoulders, and fell from off his back, and began to tumble ; and so continued to do, till it came to the mouth of the Sepulchre, where it fell in, and I saw it no more."

The knowledge of this is life, not simply a view of life, but *life*. No one who has it can doubt that it is a thing infinitely worthy of acceptance by all men. But it is not a complicated structure of our reasoning or imagination. It is the answer of God in Christ to the cry of mankind, and what a Christian should desire is that India, China, Japan, Africa, men and women of every kind and race, should find Him for themselves, and gain from Him the life which is always His and yet can be for every race of men most truly their own.

## II

From the central fact of the Gospel we can draw out general principles, and it is important to do so, but it is even more important to grasp the fact that there is really only one Christian principle, and that is contained in the Cross. We cannot fill with adequate meaning the general truths which are commonly held to be "Christianity" unless we come to them by way of the Cross.

We suppose that there is no one who would not assent to the proposition that in the Christian faith are contained the two principles of the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. As with all very familiar phrases and ideas, even so great words as these are often used with little thought of the depths that lie within them. When we say that we believe in the Fatherhood of God, we are asserting that mighty thought of God which glows in the words and life of Jesus: "The God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ"—that is the kind of God whom Christians have to preach to the world. If we put that against the fear-ridden world of the devil-worshippers in Africa, or beside the impersonal pantheism or the imperfect incarnation teachings of India, the simplicity and power of the teaching of Christ becomes apparent. Or let us think of Christ's thought of God as graciously near and approachable, one to whom it is natural to pray, one in whom the reality of the spiritual is near at hand, in relation to China, with its self-centred morality and lack of any compelling sense of God and the need for God. Or contrast the Japanese worship of the Emperor with the Christian view of God as altogether holy, knowing no priority of race or nation, but judging all alike,

The brotherhood of man, in the Christian view, is based on the Fatherhood of God. Men are separated by many things, race, language, colour, civilisation, but the greatest thing about man is that God is his Father, and here all men are at one. To say that men are brothers is not to say that there are no differences between them, but it is to say that their fundamental nature and destiny as spiritual beings is the same. The differences between men are so great and real that it is only possible to transcend them when one is in the grip of some overmastering truth which makes everything else seem small. To a Christian who has the Cross in mind, other men are not primarily Egyptian Nationalists, or uncivilised Africans, or yellow or black or brown; they are "my brothers, for whom Christ died," and that indicates a fundamental spiritual equality. We could hardly find a better instance of the centrality of the Cross to all Christian thinking.

It is perhaps another way of saying the same thing if we describe as one essential Christian principle the value of the individual soul. The value of human personality is the value that God sets on it, and the Christian view is utterly and finally opposed to all who set material values before spiritual, property before personality, industrial efficiency before human well-being. The intimate kinship which an unprejudiced observer will discern between Christianity and all the best thought of Labour in the West, springs largely from this fact. In a world where the organised power of material wealth is so gigantic, the clearest testimony to the ultimate value of the human soul is given in the teaching of Christ, and one need only mention without elaborating the immense significance of this for China and Japan, and India also, with their developing life.



A fourth principle which may be mentioned is the Christian teaching about society. It is often disputed whether Christ had any message for human society, as such, or not ; some hold that He viewed the world as wholly evil, and taught a message which is entirely "other-worldly" ; others, that His message of the Kingdom is to be worked out entirely on the plane of this life and is in essence a "social message." Does not the truth lie between these two extremes ? The ultimate values of the Christian life are eternal, but time is a preparation for eternity, and the Christian's duty is, so far as he may, to create in this world an order of society animated by the principles and inspired by the power of the world to come. Most certainly the religion of Christ is a religion of fellowship. Not only does His teaching continually insist on the imperative duty of expressing love to God in service to mankind, but the Christian life itself is one to be lived in fellowship, and men grow in the knowledge of God as they progress in fellowship with one another. The most beloved of all Christian rites, in which countless worshippers have found themselves nearest to their Master, is that most simple of all acts of fellowship, the breaking of bread in a common meal.

This fellowship of Christians, created by the Gospel, is the Church, but it is in the world to carry on the work of Christ, and to bring in His Kingdom. It is perhaps here that we begin to see how clearly the Christian conception of society differs from some others. Hinduism thinks of this temporal world as illusion, it has a doctrine of release from the world, but hardly of redemption. Contrast with this the Moslem ideal of the Church-State, where the temporal power is used to enforce spiritual rule. The Christian idea is of a society drawing its power from the

unseen world, but by the strength and quality of its life, transmuting the world-order. Sometimes the progress made will be gradual, by slow and imperceptible stages, sometimes it will be in mighty catastrophes, but always the Christian society is there to serve and witness, believing that God has shown it His purpose for the world He made.

### III

In the course of this book reference has been made repeatedly to the importance of the Church in the changing life of Asia and Africa. We return to this question now, because we believe that it is in many ways the key to most of the problems outlined in the previous chapters. The Church in its true ideal is essential to Christianity, as we have just tried to show, but its significance is doubly clear when we consider its relation to these world-issues.

We have already said that we believe the only hope for the world to be Christ, and that there is nothing that any Christian can so earnestly desire for a man or a nation as that they should find their way to Christ and make His life their own. But it must be *they* that find, and *their* life which is captured by Christ. It is here that the importance of the Church becomes clear. India can only get the spirit of Christ into her life if Indians live for Him and witness to Him. China and Japan and Africa need Him, but they can only receive Him into all the recesses of their life and make Him truly their own if He is presented by the men and women of Africa and Japan and China. Unless this principle is kept steadily in mind there is no safeguard against the expansion of Christianity becoming a matter of the "imposition of a single religion upon the terrestrial

globe." The Christian Church should be as various as humanity.

It is, unfortunately, not to be denied that throughout Asia and Africa the Church is often very far from doing what we have suggested is its true task. It is sometimes even a bulwark of Western influence and representative of a Western system. It may be said in some cases that the truest Christian influence is being brought to bear on national life not by the Church at all, but by the indirect permeating effect of Christian ideas. If we are not to be blind to realities we must remember this, but it does not affect the main argument. If the goal of our effort is that the nations, with all the movements and influences that are surging within them, should find Christ and renew their life in Him, nothing can alter or diminish the importance of the Church.

There are certain consequences of this which are to be taken very seriously. It is not always realised how revolutionary to a great deal of missionary thinking, both at home and in the mission-field, a whole-hearted acceptance of the central importance of the indigenous Church must be. Consider theology. We have no space here to enter into controversial topics, but it will hardly be denied that all our credal statements contain both essential fact and also interpretation, and that interpretation is necessarily in terms of the intellectual ideas of the day. Obviously the latter is secondary to the former, and while the question what in Christian doctrine is permanent and what is transient is one of the nicest problems that anyone can pose, it is also of the most practical importance in the mission-field. For while earnestness and devotion can make even a borrowed theology live, in the end the mind of a nation is not persuaded unless the essential message is presented by those who have made it their own

and are able to clothe it in forms of thought and language which are not borrowed, but their own. If the Church in India or China is to do its work, it must have large powers of stating and interpreting its message in Indian and Chinese ways, and this will sometimes mean the abandonment of thoughts and language dear to the missionary from the West. A distinguished Indian Christian leader said to the writer: "The duty of the missionary is to preach the historic Christ. India has her own philosophic tradition, and will interpret Him in terms of that." There is danger in this, but no greater than is involved in teaching a stereotyped Western theological system.

What is true of theology is true also of worship, of hymns and liturgies, and, we venture to add, of Church order and government. If there is in such a thing as Order an ideal unity, then let it be one which the Spirit teaches to the Churches. It is interesting to note that while signs of distinctive Oriental Christian thought in the sphere of theology are as yet few, there are abundant signs that Indian, Chinese and Japanese Christians are determined to shape their Church life along lines of their own, without in any way severing themselves from the historic Christianity of the West. When the history of the re-union of Christendom comes to be written, it may confidently be prophesied that a very large part will be ascribed to the vital movements in the mission-field. In it all we can see something far deeper than mere organisation, the spirit of Christ finding appropriate instruments by which He may be expressed to the world.

There is no man whom this question of the Church in the mission-field more nearly touches than the missionary. It is easy to say in general terms that the object of the mission is to create a

self-propagating Church. No one denies it; the principle of the primary importance of the Church is everywhere admitted. The difficulty lies in carrying the principle into practice. The missionary often represents a Christian body in the West which, compared with the Christians among whom he is working, is opulent and powerful. He may belong to the race which also exercises political authority in the land where the mission is conducted, as in the case of a British missionary in India. He has, probably, been accustomed by training and is disposed by temperament to take the lead, to manage and administer efficiently. He will not improbably be working with men whose patriotic feelings run high and who labour under a sense of wrong. In such conditions (and they are already common and will increasingly become so) more than the enunciation of principles is needed. No man can do the work of a missionary there unless he is determined to explore very fully the Christian idea of service and subordination, and to enter into the meaning of the Cross.

This problem is especially acute in lands like India or Egypt, where there is strong racial and political bitterness, but it is not confined to them. China is facing it, and even Africa, with its less developed communities, finds it growing in urgency. There are parts of the mission-field where, unless bold and wise steps are taken in time, a great part of the missionary organisation may become useless lumber, and the life of the Christians of the land move on lines totally estranged from it. Both missionary boards in the Western countries and missionaries on the field have before them to-day no more urgent and difficult problem than this of the relation of the foreign organisation, money, and men to the growing Churches in the East. Let us recollect again



that what underlies the whole discussion is nothing less than the growth of the Church as the free embodiment of the spirit of Christ.

#### IV

If we have dealt at length with the functions of the Church and of the missionary, it is because within the fellowship of the Christian community the distinctive spirit of Christianity should be most clearly seen, and a lead given to the world in the application of the Christian spirit of service and self-oblation to the actual problems of life. The calling of the missionary has this special glory and arduousness, that in the very nature of his calling he should be the servant of others. The same spirit, however, is needed on the widest plane of public service and secular activity. We have tried to show how in all parts of the world Christendom and the non-Christian world are interacting and affecting one another, and everywhere the white man is mingling intimately with the life and development of great races of different culture from his own. The questions of race and industry and politics that we have sketched do not lie in his power to settle, but he can vitally help or hinder, and the practical expression of his Christianity is urgently called for to-day.

For instance, the working out of the principle of "trusteeship" in African territories may be difficult, but the difficulty is one of laborious application to concrete issues. The question of principle is simple, what is needed is more men who will apply the Christian principle in practice, never rest content with phrases, and never waver in the belief that it

is possible to translate into action maxims which many will sneer at as "idealist."

Again, the future of Indian government does very largely depend upon the spirit of the British officials who serve in India during these eventful years. India is impatient of being "ruled," but Indians know very well the help they still need and will need for years to come, and even in these days of high and bitter feeling there is welcome for men who will give themselves to the tasks of government in the spirit of brotherly service. The venture to which Britain is committed in India is one of the most arduous and difficult ever undertaken by any people, and there is no chance whatever of the venture being successful unless to the labours of government and public service there is brought in larger measure the spirit and outlook which without any cant we may call Christian.

In a third instance, the future of China provides a test for the wisdom and still more the moral sincerity of the Christian peoples of the West. The Shantung settlement is both the ending and the opening of a chapter in the history of China. The strength and latent potencies of China must sooner or later manifest themselves, and there is need to-day for the statesman who will try to gain justice and liberty for China, and for the humbler men in government and in the professions who will join themselves with the young life of China and help in the renascence of that mighty people.

We have spoken of problems of government, but the Christian witness is needed not only there, but in the every-day life of the ordinary white man abroad, and in the ordinary routine of his activities and relationships. Engineers and doctors, men in business, teachers and professors and barristers, soldiers and police officers, Government officials,

planters, men and women in the private life of their homes, are all in some way or other working for or against the great central principle of love which we have seen in Christ. Only too often the little community of Indian or African Christians, or the larger multitude of those who are not Christians, but know what Christianity is, are found to wonder wherein lies the Christianity of the white men they see. Just because Christianity is a way of life and not merely a theory about God, it spreads by contagion even more than by preaching, and preaching is apt to be very futile unless it is backed by the force of example and the power of life.

We come back, therefore, in the end to personal courage and faithfulness to Christ as the great need of the world to-day. It is easy to talk and write of the application of Christianity to national and international problems in such a way as to lose Christ in the problems, or to resolve the Christian faith into general truths which are both palatable and harmless. The true spirit of Christ is revolutionary and redemptive, and it is exhibited in the world by those who have seized something of the unique glory of Christ and put their faith to the test in daily service at the common tasks of life. The world in which we live contains much to make the spirit quail. It is sometimes difficult to maintain hopeful enthusiasm for the "new world," of which so many men have dreamed and died without beholding it, when we look at half Europe famine-stricken, at race-riots in America and political tension in India, at the world-wide ramifications of commercial enterprise and the new slavery of the black peoples. But the Christian has looked into the face of a more

terrible scene, a more complete denial of God and of goodness than even our world to-day. He has looked at Jesus Christ put to death on the Cross, and found there, with amazement and gladness, that "the victory remained with Love."

#### SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

*The Christian Adventure.* A. H. Gray. (S.C.M. 2s. 6d.)

*The Reasonableness of the Christian Faith.* D. S. Cairns.  
(Hodder. 3s. 6d.)

*Jesus Christ and the World's Religions.* W. Paton.  
(U.C.M.E. 1s.)

*Some Alternatives to Jesus Christ.* J. L. Johnston.  
(Longmans. 3s. 6d.)

*The Christ of Revolution.* J. R. Coates. (Swarthmore  
Press. 3s.)

## SUGGESTED TOPICS FOR UNITED DISCUSSION

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### CHAPTER I—INDIA

1. What do you consider to be the things most needed in India if the scheme of Government reform is to be a success ?
  2. How far do you think that nationalism is an enemy to Christianity, and how far that it can be reconciled with it ?
  3. In view of the conditions now prevailing in India, what do you think are the most valuable things that Christianity has to give to India ?
- 

### CHAPTERS II AND III—CHINA

(For the purposes of discussion it will be advisable to take Chapters II and III together, though, thus taken together, they may, probably, furnish enough material for two discussions.)

1. What would you select as
  - (a) the outstanding facts, and
  - (b) the outstanding needsof the present situation in China ?
2. Either (a) Discuss—with reference to modern China—the relation of religious belief to political and social life. How far do you consider Confucianism and Buddhism adequate foundations for political re-organisation and social reform ?  
Or (b) How would you estimate the relative opportunities of the western merchant and the western missionary to interpret Christianity to China ?
3. What seems to you to be the main significance of
  - (a) The Student Movement ?
  - (b) The China for Christ Movement ?



4. What seems to you to be the specific contribution of Christianity to China ?
  5. And of China to the world ?
- 

## CHAPTER IV—JAPAN

1. What would you single out as the most hopeful features and influences in modern Japanese life ?
  2. Either (a) Is "Imperialism" an idea which is capable of being "Christianised" ?  
Or (b) In the light of this chapter, how would you try to persuade some supporter of a missionary society to join the League of Nations Union, and to study international politics ?
  3. On what main grounds would you
    - (a) Make out a case against Emperor-worship
    - (b) Justify the existence of the Christian Church in Japanwith special reference to the establishment of democracy in government and social life ?
  4. What sort of qualities and qualifications do you think are likely to be most necessary to the Christian missionary in Japan ?
- 

## CHAPTER V—THE MOSLEM WORLD

1. What do you think are the main elements of strength and of weakness in the Moslem conception of God ?
2. What resemblances and what differences can you trace between the Moslem idea of the Church-State and the Christian idea of the Catholic Church ?
3. What elements in Christianity would you try especially to urge upon a Moslem, and what do you think should be the chief qualifications for a missionary to the Moslems to-day ?

## CHAPTER VI—AFRICA

1. What do you think have been the main effects in Africa of the contact of the tribal system with European civilisation ?
  2. Do you consider that Africa has gained or lost more by her relations with European powers ?
  3. What would be the effects in the spheres of
    - (a) Government
    - (b) Commerce
    - (c) Social developmentif the principle of the "Mandate" were sincerely followed ?
  4. Do you agree that it is better that Christianity should be the successor of the primitive tribalism of Africa rather than Islam ; and if so, why ?
- 

## CHAPTER VII—THE CROSS IN THE WORLD

1. What grounds have we for believing in the claim of Christianity to be a world religion ?
2. "The Church in its true ideal is essential to Christianity." Do you agree with this statement ? If it is true, what are the bearings of it upon the life and work of the European in the East or in Africa, whether a missionary or not ?
3. How would you express the central appeal of the Person of Jesus Christ ?

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